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Abstract
This thesis is a sociological study of the management of apocalyptic belief in Kensington 
Temple, a Pentecostal church in London, in the years 1997-2000. Apocalyptic or 
millenarian beliefs, in which the supernatural end of the world lies just around the comer, 
have often been explained in terms of material deprivation or psychological disturbance. 
This study shows how members of a church with an apocalyptic tradition reconciled the 
doctrine of the Second Coming with their daily lives. It rejects the idea that there is a 
simple cause of apocalyptic beliefs, focussing instead on millenarianism as a form of 
rhetoric whose prophecies are constantly overtaken by events — a phenomenon referred 
to as “the Problem of the End”. Throughout history, members of apocalyptic religions 
have modified millenarian theology until its social costs are outweighed by its benefits. In 
practice, this has often meant the replacement of risky, time-specific predictions of 
Doomsday (predictive millenarianism) by apocalyptic narratives whose function is to 
account for features of the contemporary world (explanatory millenarianism). The data 
from Kensington Temple, which includes the results of a survey of 2,973 worshippers, 
points in this direction. It shows that worshippers assigned a low priority to the concept 
of the “End Times”, subjecting it to the same rational scrutiny that they applied to other 
spiritual claims. Almost none of them expected the year 2000 to bring the Second 
Coming of Christ, though it did serve as a deadline for an unsuccessful plan to create a 
network of 2,000 church groups that carried eschatological overtones. The thesis 
concludes that the fragmentation of religious meaning in modem society undermines the 
plausibility of apocalyptic prophecies, at least in the industrialised West; literal belief in 
millenarian doctrines is a casualty of secularisation.
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1. Introduction
Theories of millenarianism
How can people believe that the supernatural end of the world lies just around the comer 
when, so far, every such prediction has been proved wrong? Some scholars argue that 
millenarians are psychologically disturbed; others maintain that that their dreams of 
paradise on earth reflect a nascent political awareness. This study looks at how members 
of one religious group with a strong apocalyptic tradition — Kensington Temple, a large 
Pentecostal church in London — reconciled doctrines of the end of the world with the 
demands of their everyday lives. As we shall see, they subjected these doctrines to a 
process of scrutiny, moderating and marginalising them in response to what I call the 
“Problem of the End”, the tendency of apocalyptic discourse to predict things that do not 
happen. In doing so, they employed the same subjective rationality that they applied to all 
manner of risky religious claims, such as those relating to miraculous healing. In effect, 
they were testing hypotheses: not in a scientific fashion, but according to the dictates of 
common sense. These findings are difficult to reconcile with the notion that there is a 
single psychological or material cause of millenarianism.
This study arose out of a conviction that various academic theories of 
millenarianism, like the popular image of apocalyptic believers, over-simplify a 
complicated reality. I was not alone in thinking this: much of the theoretical groundwork 
for my ideas was laid by the communications scholar Stephen O’Leary, whose book 
Arguing the Apocalypse (1994) suggests that millenarianism is best analysed as a form of 
rhetoric. In this approach, the key to millenarianism is an understanding of how its 
arguments are framed, circulated and managed, rather than (mostly untestable) 
speculation about the deep-seated attitudes it represents. But O’Leary’s work was text- 
based; my aim has been to produce an ethnographic study of the operation of apocalyptic 
ideas in one setting, based on interviews and survey data. In the event, my findings led 
me well beyond the area of belief in the end of the world. It soon became clear that a
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study of the management of millenarianism could throw light on a wider social process: 
the management of deviant or “high-tension” ideas by religious groups in general. My 
main theoretical chapter, Chapter 2, therefore introduces the broader sociological 
concepts of tension, rational choice and charismatic authority before applying them to 
millenarianism. First, however, I want to underline the need for this study by examining 
the existing academic theories of millenarianism, some of which reflect, and may even 
help shape, popular misconceptions of apocalyptic believers.
Millenarian belief tends to be regarded by modem society as either sinister or silly. 
So-called “millennial fever” is associated with terrifying extremes of behaviour — 
understandably so, since the history of millenarianism is scarred by upsurges of violence. 
Apocalyptic prophecies typically assure the faithful that only God’s people will survive 
the coming crisis; the rest of the world is controlled by dark forces whose ultimate defeat 
will be accompanied by warfare and convulsions of the natural order. From time to time, 
the imagined violence of these scenarios has helped to inspire real-life tragedies: the 
murderous sorties of medieval sectarians, the siege of Munster, the slaughter of the Ghost 
Dancers, the 20th-century tragedies of Jonestown, Waco, Tokyo and Heaven’s Gate (see 
Cohn, 1993 [1957]; Hall, 2000; Wessinger, 2000). In some of these cases, apocalyptic 
believers have sought to bring on the End by their own violent acts, occasionally directed 
against themselves; in others, they have been more or less gratuitously assaulted by the 
forces of the state; often, a pattern of mutual misunderstanding means that it is not clear 
who bears the ultimate responsibility for the bloodshed. But the stigmatisation of 
apocalyptic belief is not purely the result of its association with violence. The prophet 
wearing a sandwich board announcing that “The End is Nigh” is an enduring comic 
stereotype; the setting and passing of apocalyptic deadlines is seen as intrinsically 
humorous. As early as 1844, newspapers made fun of the Millerites, American prophecy 
enthusiasts who predicted that Jesus would return on the night of October 12 that year. 
According to one account, once the deadline had passed,
the taunts and sneers of the scoffers were well-nigh unbearable. If any of Miller’s
followers walked abroad, they ran the gauntlet of merciless ridicule. “What! Not gone
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up yet? We thought you’d gone up! Wife left you behind to bum, did she?” (Alnor,
1989: 58).
Although scholars of millenarianism avoid value-laden adjectives such as “sinister” 
or “silly”, much of their work gravitates towards either millennial violence or the 
peaceful but painful failure of doomsday prophecies. This emphasis reflects the enormous 
influence of two books published in the 1950s: Norman Cohn’s The Pursuit o f the 
Millennium (1993 [1957]), a study of revolutionary and mystical millenarians in the later 
Middle Ages, and When Prophecy Fails (1964 [1956]) by Leon Festinger, Henry Riecken 
and Stanley Schachter,1 a frequently hilarious ethnographic account of a UFO cult 
confronted by the non-fulfilment of its prophecy of a catastrophic flood. Both these 
classic studies have initiated scholarly debates: Cohn’s about the causes of 
millenarianism and Festinger’s about the reactions of apocalyptic believers to the 
discontinuation of prophecy.
The Pursuit o f the Millennium has provided us with one of the most authoritative 
definitions of millenarianism. According to Cohn, millenarians always picture salvation 
as collective, terrestrial, imminent, total and miraculous (1993 [1957]: 13). This 
formulation is widely accepted,2 but the book’s explanation of the causes of 
millenarianism is more contentious. Cohn emphasises the desperate situation of the 
people who joined medieval sectarian movements: landless peasants, beggars, 
journeymen — “people who were not simply poor but who could find no assured and 
recognised place in society at all”. Lacking their own kinship groups, they turned to 
prophets whose eschatological fantasies offered an escape from their atomised condition 
and “emotional compensation for their abject status” (282). Cohn’s stress on 
psychological rather than material factors is in contrast to the work of scholars in the 
Marxist tradition such as Peter Worsley (1957) and E. J. Hobsbawm (1959), for whom
1 Leon Festinger was the major author of the study, and I shall follow convention in referring to When 
Prophecy Fails by his name alone.
2 Yonina Talmon offers a slightly different definition which is also often quoted: millennial movements are 
“religious movements that expect imminent, total, ultimate, this-worldly salvation” (1966: 166). For a 
useful summary of the academic debates about millenarianism, see Chapter 7 of Hamilton’s The Sociology 
o f Religion (1995).
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millenarianism marks the early stages of political consciousness. For Hobsbawm, 
millenarians are social revolutionaries who can “readily exchange their primitive costume 
in which they dress their aspirations for the modem costume of Socialist and Communist 
politics” (1959: 64). Few scholars would now defend this interpretation of apocalypticism 
as political or economic aspirations in disguise: the whole trend in the sociology of 
knowledge has been away from the conception of ideas as the simple product of material 
circumstances towards recognition of the power of symbols (see McCarthy, 1996: 11-26). 
Cohn’s ideas have worn rather better: according the sociologist Malcolm Hamilton, Cohn 
“seems to be right concerning the importance of social displacement, insecurity and 
emotional anxiety in these movements and their essentially fantastical character”. But he 
adds that “it is less easy to accept that they were the product of mass psychological 
disturbance or pathological mental states. The social character of them refutes such a 
claim” (1995: 92).
In recent years, the most influential explanation for millenarianism has involved the 
concept of relative deprivation, which utilises psychological and political arguments and 
can be reconciled with the perspectives of Cohn and the Marxists. Ted Gurr (1970: 23- 
24) defines relative deprivation as “the tension that develops from a discrepancy between 
the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction”. It arises not from some absolute 
level of poverty, but from poverty relative to expectations. Millenarianism identifies the 
source of deprivation and legitimates the use of violence to achieve a desired end; it is a 
natural outgrowth of relative deprivation. There are, however, significant problems with 
this theory. Despite its subtlety, it remains preoccupied with material factors. 
Millenarians are often, but not always, poor: what are we to make of middle-class 
American fundamentalists who believe that Jesus will return in their lifetimes but do not 
think of themselves as deprived in any sense, relative or absolute? The concept of relative 
deprivation might fit the wandering brigands described by Cohn or the Melanesian cargo 
cults studied by Worsley, but it is of dubious value to an analysis of, say, the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses: James Beckford, in his study of the British Watch Tower movement, reported 
that his interviewees “gave no indication ... that they felt economically or socially 
deprived, nor were any objective indicators of such deprivation prominent in their
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reported backgrounds” (1975: 156).3 Beckford adds that the concept of relative 
deprivation is “too gross and undiscriminating; it clearly applies to so many people that it 
cannot possibly succeed in distinguishing between those who are motivated by it and 
those who are not” (1975: 157-8). Methodologically, too, it is suspect. Relative 
deprivation tends to be identified after a millenarian outbreak; it has yet to establish itself 
as a way of predicting such outbreaks. The same objection applies to many explanations 
for the phenomenon, such as, for example, Mary Douglas’s theory that millenarianism 
arises in societies in which group identity is low but where people are subjected to 
impersonal rules (1973: 171).
If the debate about the causes of millenarianism has focused disproportionately on 
violent and exotic movements, that initiated by When Prophecy Fails is open to the 
charge that it caricatures belief in the end of the world. The group studied — one might 
almost say infiltrated — by Festinger and his colleagues was led by a prophet they called 
“Mrs Keech” (her real name was Dorothy Martin), who claimed to have received warning 
from extraterrestrial spirits of a flood that would submerge most of North America; 
before this happened, however, flying saucers would rescue her and her followers. When 
Prophecy Fails tells the story of disappointment felt by the group when the spaceships 
and flood failed to come, after which many of its members, instead of abandoning their 
beliefs, sought to promulgate them even more vigorously through the media. This 
surprising development led Festinger to claim that, under the right circumstances, 
apocalyptic believers in general react to prophetic discontinuation by stepping up their 
efforts to spread their message (1964 [1956]: 3-6). In the decades since the book’s 
publication, several scholars have sought to refine Festinger’s thesis or to prove it wrong. 
Jane Hardyck and Marcia Braden (2000 [1962]) interviewed a group of Pentecostal 
Christians who hid in a bunker awaiting a nuclear attack; after discontinuation, members 
of the group avoided proselytising. Richard Singelenberg (2000 [1989]) studied the 
reaction of Dutch Jehovah’s Witnesses to the failed apocalyptic deadline of 1975; he
3 Beckford also points out that neither the socialisation process nor the routine meetings of the Witnesses 
offer opportunities for expressing resentment at the prevailing social order: “In fact, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
accord less importance to scriptural references to this-worldly or other-worldly privilege than do the clergy 
of mainstream Christian churches and denominations” (1975: 156).
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found that evangelisation decreased after discontinuation. The consensus is that 
apocalyptic groups rarely react to disconfirmation in the manner described by When 
Prophecy Fails. Instead, they are more likely to try to reinterpret the original prophecy in 
ways that allow them to claim that it has been fulfilled; many of them fall apart in the 
process.4 Yet Festinger’s thesis is too valuable to be discarded in its entirety. It may be 
wrong about the likely behaviour of millenarians after disconfirmation, but its recognition 
that they act to reduce “cognitive dissonance” recognises the essential rationality of 
people who are often written off by society as irrational.
Put simply, cognitive dissonance is the tension between belief and experience. 
According to Festinger, people act to reduce this tension by changing their beliefs or 
behaviour, by acquiring new information or beliefs, or by trying to forget or reduce the 
importance of dissonance-causing cognitions (1964 [1956]: 25-26). This is a convincing 
argument; but I would suggest that, rather than prompting disappointed apocalyptic 
believers to proselytise further, as Festinger states, the instinct to reduce cognitive 
dissonance leads most members of millenarian religions to steer clear of time-specific, 
dissonance-inviting doomsday prophecies — or, at the very least, to treat them with 
caution. This fact is overlooked by Festinger and many of his critics, who, while 
disagreeing about how people react to prophetic disappointment, between them give the 
impression that the history of millenarianism is dominated by failed deadlines. It has been 
left to the American scholar of religion, J. Gordon Melton, to point out that millenarian 
groups are not necessarily obsessed with prophecy:
Though one or more prophecies may be important to a group, they will be set within a 
complex set of beliefs and interpersonal relationships. They may serve as one of 
several important sources determining group activity, but the prediction is only one 
support device for the group, not the essential rafter. The belief that prophecy is the
4 For a summary of the theoretical and methodological objections to Festinger’s theory, see the Introduction 
by Jon R. Stone to the volume of essays he edited entitled Expecting Armageddon: Essential Readings in 
Failed Prophecy. Stone writes: “The strong criticisms levelled at the Festinger study — which has not been 
unlike an ocean liner that developed leaks after its first launch — have all but scuttled its reliability for 
predicting responses to failed prophecy”. In almost all subsequent studies of failed millennial prophecy, 
proselytising did not occur; in Stone’s view, the evangelistic behaviour of Festinger’s flying saucer group 
“was indeed peculiar to that group: their response was counterintuitive but largely idiosyncratic” (2000:
23).
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organising or determining principle for millennial groups is common among media 
representatives, nonmillennial religious rivals, and scholars. In their eagerness to 
isolate what they see as a decisive or interesting fact, they ignore or pay only passing 
attention to the larger belief structure of the group and the role that structure plays in 
the life of believers (2000 [1985]: 147).
Melton’s argument, which is based on ethnographic observation of dozens of groups,
effectively pulls the rug from under several theoretical explanations of millenarianism. If
prophecy belief is only part of a theological system, and not necessarily the most
be
important part, how confident can we|of isolating its cause? If, as Melton implies (and my 
own fieldwork at Kensington Temple suggests), many millenarians spend most of their 
time thinking about subjects other than the coming end of the world, this suggests that 
they are neither psychologically disturbed nor tormented by relative deprivation. No 
doubt the scholars criticised by Melton would reply that the people he is describing are 
not really millenarians. But what is a millenarian, anyway, and who decides?
Cohn’s celebrated formulation tells us how millenarians conceive of salvation, but 
does not define them by their behaviour. The Pursuit o f the Millennium demonstrates that 
the actions of certain groups were inspired by millenarian teachings, but wisely refrains 
from claiming that millenarianism always leads to revolution and bloodshed. (In fact, as 
we know from the work of Bernard McGinn [1998 (1979)], medieval ideas about the end 
of the world were often peacefully expressed and exploited by the religious and political 
elite of the day.) Festinger and his colleagues thought they knew what millenarians did in 
certain circumstances, but their theory has failed most of its empirical tests. The truth is 
that it is no easier to generalise about millenarian behaviour than it is to discover the 
causes of millenarianism. We can agree that the phenomenon is characterised by belief in 
the imminent end of the world, but we must also come to terms with the fact that millions 
of people subscribe to this radical and counter-intuitive idea without allowing it to 
influence their daily lives too much. Again, one could reply that they are not really 
millenarians; but that objection implies that people cannot be classified according to their 
beliefs unless they act on them in some conspicuous way.
We need to find a more flexible way of thinking about millenarianism, one that 
avoids defining it as pure belief or, alternatively, a set of extreme actions inspired by
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belief. One solution ' is to focus on its operation as rhetoric. In O’Leary’s view, 
apocalyptic discourse is a dynamic process, the outcome of which depends on many more 
factors than predisposing economic status. As he points out, “expectations can be fostered 
and legitimised only through discourse, and social systems of status, behaviour, and 
worth have their origins in language and symbolic communication” (1994: 10). People 
must be persuaded that the world is coming to an end:
It comes as no surprise that sociologists and historians, lacking the perspective of 
rhetorical studies, should expend so much energy in trying to explain the appeal of 
apocalyptic discourse by discovering audience predispositions based in conditions of 
social and economic class, in experience of calamity, or in psychological anomie. It is 
curious, however, that even those rhetorical scholars who attempt to account for the 
appeal of apocalyptic never seriously entertain the hypothesis that people are actually 
persuaded by apocalyptic arguments; that is, that the nature of apocalyptic’s appeal 
should be sought in transactions of texts and audiences (1994: 11).
The advantage of O’Leary’s analytical framework is that it encompasses much more than 
the classic (and relatively rare) millenarian movements in which a single prophet whips 
up his followers into a state of hysterical expectation. We can apply it, for example, to the 
medieval literature collected by McGinn (1998 [1979]) and the 3,000 documents 
surveyed in Tom Mclver’s apocalyptic bibliography (1999). These are millenarian texts, 
in the sense that their visions of the future fit the criteria set out by Cohn. But, crucially, 
the vast majority of them do not attempt to incorporate the audience into a sect; what they 
seek to do is to persuade people that the end of the world is coming — not necessarily as 
a spur to action, but as a way of explaining troubling features of contemporary society. 
As O’Leary points out, the apocalyptic genre holds out the promise of a remarkably 
effective theodicy: it demonstrates that the action of sinister forces in the world forms 
part of a divine master-plan that is just about to come to fruition, thereby offering its 
audience a mythical and rhetorical solution to the problem of evil itself (1994: 32-44). 
People who are persuaded by the millenarian argument to the extent that they expect, or 
think it likely, that the end of the world will happen before they have a chance to die can 
legitimately be described as millenarians.
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One obvious objection to this broad definition of millenarianism is that it is fuzzy at 
the edges. Not all transactions between a text or speaker and an audience have lasting 
effects; many fail because the audience is not persuaded. Plenty of people merely toy 
with millenarian ideas, and it is difficult to know how to categorise them. But recognising 
this difficulty is, I would argue, an important insight in itself. Millenarianism is fuzzy at 
the edges. Too much of the academic literature assumes that either you believe firmly that 
the world is about to end or you do not. One of the findings of this study is that members 
of an apocalyptic religion can slip in and out of a prophetic paradigm, or reject it 
altogether; and this is consistent with Melton’s observation that members of “millennial 
cults” are often preoccupied with other matters.
A more serious objection to a wide definition of millenarianism is that it lumps 
together the extraordinary and the ordinary, fanatics and mild-mannered churchgoers. 
This is a problem that also confronts those scholars who, conceiving of millenarianism as 
essentially neurotic or bellicose, are not sure what to make of large bodies of law-abiding 
apocalyptic believers, such as American fundamentalists.5 The solution in some cases has 
been to suggest, misleadingly, that that the latter are separated by only the thinnest of 
membranes from those who seek the violent fulfilment of their fantasies.6 Other scholars 
have rightly stressed the difference between extreme and moderate varieties of 
millenarianism, and have adjusted their terminology accordingly. J. F. C. Harrison 
(1979), in his study of apocalyptic ideas in England from 1780 to 1850, employed the 
word millennialism to distinguish the sophisticated eschatology of the Anglican clergy 
from the crude millenarianism of self-educated adventists. But the use of a near-synonym
s See, for example, Meissner’s Thy Kingdom Come (1995), which explores the “underlying narcissistic 
dynamic” of millenarian belief; in his very brief discussion of Protestant premillennialism, Meissner writes 
that it suggests that millennialism “is not necessarily the preserve of rampant psychopathology” (237).
6 For example, Joseph Bettis wrote in a 1984 essay: “During the past two decades, millennialism has 
returned. The resurgence of evangelical Christianity ... has been accompanied by a new interest in 
historical transformation. This interest has been considerably abetted by the heightened awareness of the 
proximity of nuclear holocaust. Any attempt to introduce millennial ideas into the contemporary theological 
debate must understand ... the political power of millennial thought worldwide. The effort to avoid nuclear 
destruction cannot justify genocidal totalitarianism” (153-4). I encountered a similar attitude at a 
conference of the Centre for Millennial Studies at Boston University in 1997. This was the heyday of the 
Promise Keepers, a movement of evangelical Christian men who met in sports stadiums to declare their 
commitment to Christ. Several attendees at the conference warned of the “dangers” of the movement; it 
was even claimed, absurdly, that a charismatic leader might trigger anti-Semitic apocalyptic hysteria among 
the membership.
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in this context strikes me as potentially confusing, particularly as some authorities do not 
distinguish between millennialism and millenarianism. John Wallis (2000) makes a 
distinction between the “hard” apocalypticism of classic millenarianism, in which the 
wicked of the earth will perish, and the “soft” apocalypticism of the New Age, in which 
the world is renewed by the spiritual transformation of enlightened individuals. Catherine 
Wessinger (1997) offers a similar dichotomy, between “catastrophic” and “progressive” 
varieties of millenarianism. One criticism of these categories is that most millenarian 
scenarios incorporate both catastrophic and progressive elements: it is interesting to note 
how many apparently peaceful transitions prophesied by the New Age movement feature 
geographical convulsions in which a large number of unenlightened people die (see 
Thompson, 1996: 196-7). This study will suggest that the most important factor 
distinguishing extreme from moderate millenarianism is the imminence of the End, not its 
violent character. Chapter 2 sets out a distinction between predictive millenarianism, in 
which the prophet nails his or her colours to the mast by announcing when the apocalypse 
is coming, and explanatory millenarianism, which is organised around “signs of the 
times” that point to the end of the world in the near future, but whose main function is to 
account for the persistence of evil in contemporary society. As I shall argue, the shift 
from predictive to explanatory millenarianism that has occurred so often is the result of 
rational choices: most millenarians are not psychologically disturbed, and their usual 
reaction to the threatened or actual failure of apocalyptic prophecies is to adopt the safer, 
explanatory style of millenarian discourse.
Unfortunately, almost every specialist term in this field has more than one meaning. 
The word Millennium, with a capital “M”, refers specifically to the concept of the 
thousand-year reign of Jesus and the saints derived from the Book of Revelation (20:4). 
In its lower-case form, it usually means a calendar unit of 1,000 years; it can also refer to 
the earthly paradise envisaged by any millenarian believers, Christian or otherwise. 
Apocalypse comes from the Greek word meaning “to unveil”; its nuances are many and 
varied. The word will be used here to mean both the sudden end of the world and a 
literary genre. There have been a number of attempts to distinguish apocalypticism from 
millenarianism, but they point in different directions; in this study, the word apocalyptic 
is synonymous with millenarian (see glossary).
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The outline of this study
The analysis of apocalyptic transactions raises questions that are more modest, but 
intrinsically more answerable, than those about the causes of millenarianism. Who is 
making the argument that the world is about to end, and on whose authority? How is it 
communicated? Which members of the intended audience are persuaded by it? What are 
the practical consequences for them? How do they rationalise their position? Do they 
customise the argument in some way? O’Leary’s discourse-centred approach cries out for 
ethnographic research into how millenarian ideas operate in a specific setting. An 
important study by the psychologist Charles Strozier (1994), into the apocalyptic beliefs 
of born-again Christians in New York City, goes some way to providing this; but its 
focus is on the relationship of those beliefs to the individual psyche rather than the means 
by which they were acquired. It also contains generalisations: Strozier states that 
fundamehtalists (a term he employs loosely, to incorporate evangelicals and 
Pentecostalists) “feel the dangers of the signs of the end acutely, and their lives alter 
accordingly” (145). My study takes members of a British church that Strozier would 
certainly classify as fundamentalist and, in effect, uses them to test this dangerously 
sweeping hypothesis. First, however, it sets out a theoretical framework that extends 
beyond apocalypticism to take into account the acquisition of religious ideas in general.
Chapter 2 argues that religious movements and individual believers are faced with 
rational choices that have the effect of increasing or decreasing tension with society. 
Tension (or subcultural deviance) rises when charismatic claims are accepted by an 
audience. Some organisations and people choose a higher degree of tension than others; 
many find themselves pulled simultaneously towards and away from the societal 
consensus. Predictive millenarianism involves ambitious charismatic claims that, because 
they are so easily proved wrong, are hard to translate into lasting authority — the 
Problem of the End. The history of millenarianism is littered with disappointment, and 
the lesson has largely been learned: most apocalyptic believers are comfortable with 
lower-cost explanatory narratives that do not require them to sell their houses and head 
for the hills. Slowly, prophecy belief has been pushed to the margins of intellectual life. It
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has become a mark of eccentricity, the preserve of the individual who enjoys knowing 
secret information about the fate of the world that is denied to others.
Chapter 3 shows how Pentecostalism deals with the double pressure to resist and 
conform to society’s norms, in respect of both its own tradition of miracles and the End 
Times beliefs it has inherited from Christian fundamentalism. Chapter 4 introduces 
Kensington Temple and its senior pastor, Colin Dye, a truly charismatic leader who 
pushes the church’s level of subcultural deviance up or down according to his perception 
of risk. Chapter 5 explores the different strategies employed by leaders and members of 
Kensington Temple with regard to the troublesome subject of the End Times. Most 
interviewees were extremely wary of being seen as apocalyptic fanatics, and this finding 
is reinforced by data from a survey of nearly 3,000 church members carried out in 
October 1998, in which apocalyptic ideas were given a very low priority and most 
respondents declined to speculate about the return of Christ. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
small number of textbook millenarians in the congregation — people who were confident 
that Jesus would return in their lifetimes. It concludes that their beliefs were influenced 
by their conversion experiences, individual psychology and degree of subcultural 
immersion, but finds no evidence for a simple cause of millenarianism.
Chapter 7 discusses the significance of the year 2000 for secular society, 
evangelical Christianity and Kensington Temple. It argues that, in all three arenas, the 
looming deadline raised hopes that had already been disappointed by the time it dawned. 
At Kensington Temple, a scheme to create a network of 2,000 churches by 2000, heavy 
with apocalyptic resonances, had to be abandoned in 1999; the theological manoeuvring 
that followed illustrates what can happen when a charismatic strategy fails. Finally, 
Chapter 8 considers the parallels between the management of apocalyptic belief in this 
one setting and trends in the wider society. It attempts to answer one of the central 
questions to arise from this study: is the marginalisation of millenarian theology at 
Kensington a response to its inherent weakness, or does it reflect the emergence of a 
secularised, utilitarian mindset which is peculiar to modernity?
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2. The Problem of the End
Introduction
The first half of this chapter introduces the sociological concepts underlying this study. It 
suggests that people make rational choices about religion, weighing costs and benefits: 
they seek to avoid conflicts between belief and reality, they work on ideas until they 
make sense, and they are influenced by the degree of social support available for a 
particular belief. Sometimes, these choices lead organisations and individuals in a 
direction that raises the degree of tension between themselves and society. More often, 
the gravitational pull of the societal consensus leads to an easing of tension. In cases 
where people or groups choose to increase their subcultural deviance, the crucial factor is 
usually the attribution of charismatic powers to a leader, community or doctrine. But the 
authority created by the recognition of these powers is hard to sustain, since it is 
dependent on outcome and vulnerable to disconfirmation. Holders of traditional or 
bureaucratic authority are particularly wary of charisma, associating it with deviance and 
instability: they therefore tend to marginalise the people who make or recognise 
charismatic claims.
The second half of the chapter applies these ideas to millenarianism, perhaps the 
quintessential charismatic belief system. Predictive millenarianism offers a classic 
illustration of the fragility of charismatic authority: the threat of disconfirmation is so 
great that people are reluctant to invest in it. A more attractive option, for many believers, 
is explanatory millenarianism, in which the rhetoric of apocalypse is used to explain the 
state of contemporary society. Finally, the chapter examines the association of 
apocalyptic belief with a broader corpus of deviant ideas, the “cultic milieu”. It argues 
that the status of millenarianism as secret knowledge lies at the heart of its appeal, but 
also contributes to its stigmatisation and helps account for the suspicion with which it is 
regarded by the authorities.
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Key sociological concepts
Rational choice
In recent decades sociologists have moved away from the idea that religion is an 
essentially irrational response to the problems of mortality towards recognition that 
religious activity is governed by rational choice. In doing so, they have been influenced 
by the work of Max Weber, who, although he subscribed to the notion that religion in the 
West was being by progressively eroded by secularisation, also argued that religious 
behaviour followed rules of experience and was “relatively rational” (1993 [1922]: 1). 
Recent sociological perspectives tend to avoid judgments about whether it is reasonable 
to espouse particular doctrines; that is more the preserve of the theologian and 
philosopher. What they emphasise instead is that, in making religious choices, people do 
not abandon their “ordinary procedures for weighing alternatives and evaluating 
explanations” (Neitz, 1987: 79). Much of the ground for this approach was laid by Peter 
L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in The Social Construction o f Reality (1971 [1966]), an 
influential treatise in the sociology of knowledge by two scholars of religion. This 
suggested that the acquisition of religious knowledge is not very different from the 
acquisition of other forms of knowledge; the mental and social processes involved are 
broadly the same. It was not until the 1980s, however, that scholars began to apply 
“rational choice theory” — until then, chiefly a tool for analysing economic activity — to 
religion. Laurence Iannaccone, an economist who pioneered this approach to religious 
studies, sets out its basic assumptions as follows:
Rational choice theorists assume that people approach all actions in the same way, 
evaluating costs and benefits and acting so as to maximise their net benefits. Hence 
people choose what religion, if  any, they will accept and how extensively they will 
participate in it. Over time, most people modify their religious choices in significant 
ways, varying their rates of religious participation and modifying its character, or even 
switching religions altogether (1997: 27).
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In other words, the world of religious activity operates like a marketplace; it is 
governed by such factors as the quality of the spiritual products on offer, consumer 
loyalty, and the level of regulation in the market. The analysis of costs and benefits helps 
us to understand religion at both an organisational and an individual level: once we grasp 
that people are constantly modifying their choices in order to derive maximum benefits 
from them, then it becomes easier to understand why neat “top-down” models of spiritual 
leaders dictating doctrines to the faithful over-simplify reality. There are, however, 
serious limitations to the rational choice model that need to be acknowledged right at the 
beginning. Some scholars feel that the analogy between religious and economic activity 
can be pushed too far, since so many of the “products” of religion are intangible.1 The 
rationality that people employ in everyday life is not that of science or philosophy; it is a 
subjective rationality that combines elements of logic with a whole range of factors: 
personal taste and convictions, the limits of the available information, the circumstances 
of the moment,2 The word “subjective” is particularly apt where religious choices are 
concerned, since the extra-empirical nature of many spiritual claims makes them difficult 
to assess objectively according to scientific criteria. One might ask, therefore, in what 
sense such subjective choices are rational at all. The answer is that, as we suggested 
earlier, religious believers make use of ordinary mental procedures for weighing 
evidence; as Mary Jo Neitz points out, drawing on the work of Harold Garfinkel (1967), 
they use their common sense in working out strategies, analysing consequences and 
assessing “the goodness of fit between an item and an explanation” (1987: 79).
Theodicy, cognitive dissonance and ideological work
How do people go about assessing the benefits and costs of religion? Any attempt to 
answer this question must consider the appeal of religion in general. Most scholars agree
1 For a critique of rational choice theory in religion, see the essay by Neitz and Mueser (1997), who suggest 
that economic categories such as “output” and “consumption” underestimate the complexity of religious 
production. They also point out that, in contrast to the economic marketplace, the producers and consumers 
of religion tend to be the same people.
2 Max Weber, in The Methodology o f the Social Sciences, came close to setting out a concept of subjective 
rationality. He wrote that an individual “weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to 
his own conscience and his personal view of the world” (1949: 53). The phrase “subjective rationality” was 
coined by Herbert Simon (1982) to convey the complexity of human decision-making in situations where 
goals conflict, perfect satisfactions can never be obtained and available options are limited. For a discussion 
of its application to the sociology of religion, see Stark and Finke’s ylc/s of Faith (2000: 37).
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that one of the chief benefits of religion is its operation as a theodicy — that is, its ability 
to explain the existence of suffering and death, something that Max Weber saw as central 
to the development of most world faiths (1970 [1948]: 275). Malcolm Hamilton 
summarises this perspective as follows:
Religion is fundamentally a response to the difficulties and injustices of life which 
attempts to make sense of them and thereby enables people to cope with them and feel 
more confident when faced by them. Religious conceptions arise as a result of the fact 
that life is fundamentally precarious and uncertain ... There is always a discrepancy 
between what we think ought to be and what actually is. It is the tension generated by 
this discrepancy which is the source of the religious outlook (1995: 138).
There are, of course, many benefits that arise out of religious activity, some of which are
more social than spiritual: many people join a church to find a partner or because they
like its music. But religion’s ability to make sense of suffering and death, to provide
meaning where it is most needed, remains the source of its enduring appeal. Indeed, there
is not necessarily a big gap between the small-scale benefits of religion, such as singing
in the choir or making cakes for the bazaar, and the large-scale benefit of theodicy. As 
♦
Berger observes, society itself acts as a sort of theodicy by providing a meaningful 
context for the experience of anomic events (1969 [1967]: 58); seen in this light, religious 
groups are doubly effective, in that they provide both the implicit theodicy of social order 
and the explicit one of a religious cosmology.
The costs of religious activity can range from mild boredom during a sermon to 
martyrdom; but, whatever their magnitude, they are only likely to outweigh the benefits 
of religion if they frustrate the search for meaning that lies at the heart of its appeal. If the 
source of the religious outlook is the discrepancy between what we think ought to be and 
what actually is, then religion must undermine itself when, as often happens, it creates 
such a discrepancy. Believers who encounter such a cost will not necessarily abandon 
their faith; they may not even reject the doctrine that led to the discrepancy. But they will 
usually act to reduce the tension, thereby restoring the integrity of the overarching 
theodicy. In psychological language, they will attempt to remove the cognitive 
dissonance that is troubling them. As we saw in the Introduction, Festinger and his
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colleagues derived this term from their study of a 1950s UFO cult that expected the end 
of the world. But its usefulness is not confined to the study of millennial disappointment. 
The theory of cognitive dissonance seeks to explain what all human beings do when ideas 
contradict each other, or when there is a mismatch between ideas and behaviour. 
According to Festinger, this “dissonance” makes people feel uncomfortable, and so they 
act to remove or reduce it in one of three ways: by modifying their existing ideas or 
behaviour; by acquiring new information or beliefs; or by forgetting or reducing the 
importance of the ideas that caused the dissonance (1964 [1956]: 25-6).
The sociologist Bennett Berger has also written about the tension that is created 
when ideas and real life are in conflict:
When beliefs do not seem to be very effective in serving the interests of believers 
(from their own point of view) or when routine behaviour is in apparent contradiction 
with professed belief, tensions are added to that relationship that constrain people to 
resolve or reduce them by some alteration in their ideas or their circumstances or both 
... (1981: 15-16).
This process of alteration, which is necessary to keep people’s convictions in a viable 
relationship with their interests and circumstances, is what Berger calls ideological work. 
He also uses the phrase “remedial ideological work” to describe alterations forced on 
individuals or groups by discrepancies between ideology and practice (114). As he 
admits, he is effectively restating Festinger’s thesis that humans act to reduce cognitive 
dissonance; but the concept of ideological work is still a useful one because it reminds us 
that, throughout history, ideologies have been worked on until they fit circumstances 
better.
Tension and plausibility structures
It is one thing to state that people will act to reduce cognitive dissonance; it is another to 
predict what those actions will be. Some believers react to a dissonance between a 
controversial religious teaching and the beliefs of the wider society by deciding to 
embrace the former more intensely; others, however, will move in the other direction, 
adjusting the teaching or their behaviour until they conflict less sharply with societal
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norms. This idea that there are two directions in which a believer can move — towards 
and away from society’s standards — is consonant with the influential sociological 
theory that religious groups can be distinguished by the degree of tension between 
themselves and their environment. According to Stark and Finke (2000: 143), drawing on 
the earlier work of Stark and Bainbridge (1985), all groups can be located along an axis 
of tension, at one end of which serious antagonism exists between a group and society, 
sometimes erupting into bloody conflict, and at the other end of which there is such 
compatibility between a group and its environment that it is hard to distinguish between 
the two. Sects and cults are high-tension groups; churches and denominations are low- 
tension groups. Stark and Finke also state that tension is equivalent to subcultural 
deviance, subcultures being defined as “cultures within a culture, groups having norms 
and values different from that of the surrounding society” (144).
The extent of the tension between a group and society influences the balance of 
costs and benefits available to members. High-tension groups tend to be more 
“expensive”, in that the material, social and psychic costs of belonging to them are 
higher. But there is also a reciprocal relationship between expense and the rewards of 
membership: groups that demand a lot from their members offer substantial levels of 
certainty, emotional support and even material security (150). Several researchers have 
concluded that “strict” churches in higher tension with their environment tend to grow 
more quickly than others (Kelley, 1986 [1972]; Iannaccone, 1997). But it is, of course, 
possible for a group to demand too much from its members; there is an optimum level of 
tension or strictness above which costs outweigh benefits.
In practice, these observations are not quite as useful as they sound: religious 
choices are notoriously hard to anticipate, and no one has devised a model that allows us 
to predict the degree of tension that an individual or group will opt for. But certain 
patterns are observable in the way groups act to decrease and, less often, increase the 
degree of tension between themselves and society. Many religious movements begin life 
as high-tension sects. Over time, however, sects often develop a more comfortable 
relationship with their environment. Society itself may moderate its objections to the 
original teachings; but it is just as likely that a sect will moderate or even abandon the 
deviant elements in its cosmology. H. Richard Neibuhr (1929) coined the term
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denom inationalism  for the slow accommodation of sectarian groups to their 
surroundings; he had in mind groups such as the Methodists and the Quakers, which are 
today almost unrecognisable as the high-tension sects that they once were. There is, 
however, nothing inevitable about the process o f tension-reduction or 
denominationalism.3 Just as cognitive dissonance is sometimes resolved by an 
intensification of the dissonance-creating belief, so some groups and individuals respond 
to the gravitational pull of societal norms by increasing their degree of subcultural 
deviance (Stark and Finke, 2000: 154). One common pattern of tension-increase can be 
observed in the behaviour of purists who break away from a movement because it is 
becoming too “soft” or denominationalised and found a new sect. A slightly different 
pattern emerges when revivalist preachers, working from within, try to recapture the 
original spirit of a movement. Sometimes the founder or leader of a group will increase 
its level of subcultural deviance in order to discourage uncommitted members and to 
consolidate his own authority (Wallis, 1984: 103-118).
In reality, many religious groups are pulled in both directions — towards and away 
from societal norms. The imaginary needle pointing to the degree of tension between a 
group and society is constantly flickering as teachings are developed or modified through 
the interaction of leaders, members and non-members. For many groups, the secret of 
success seems to lie in sustaining a degree of medium tension with their environment. 
This can be achieved with different combinations of high- and low-tension beliefs and 
practices. The Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons, for example, combine novel 
doctrines with sober respectability (Bainbridge, 1997: 118). In Pentecostalism, the 
mixture is different: the theology is close to Christian orthodoxy, but aspects of group 
behaviour are seen as exotic. What these medium-tension groups have in common is that 
they maintain a significant degree of subcultural deviance while operating in the world: 
they are what Marc Galanter (1999 [1989]) calls “open systems” whose distinctive belief
3 Bryan Wilson, in The Social Dimensions o f Sectarianism, makes the following observation: 
“Denominationalisation — the loosening rigour; the loss of the sense of dissent and protest; the reduction 
of distance from other Christians; and the muting of claims that the sect’s distinctive teachings are 
necessary for salvation — is a current that exerts some pressure on all contemporary movements. But some 
resist better than others. A sect’s original stance may facilitate or impede the denominationalising process. 
Where there are practises and teachings that stand in sharp contrast with those of mainstream Christianity, 
these may act as insulating devices” (1990: 109). Wilson describes the Methodists and Disciples of Christ 
as sects that have become denominationalised, unlike the Brethren, Hutterites and Jehovah’s Witnesses.
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systems are inevitably influenced by the secular consensus. These groups know that it is 
hard to muster social support for deviant beliefs — or, to put it another way, that the 
group can sustain only a certain degree of subcultural deviance before people start falling 
away (which is much the same thing as saying that churches tend to work towards an 
optimum level of “strictness”). Certain questions present themselves again and again. 
How much commitment is it reasonable to demand from the membership? What are 
limits of acceptable theological discussion within the group? What weight, if any, should 
be attached to criticism from the outside world? The answers to these questions help 
determine a group’s position on an axis of subcultural deviance. As we noted earlier, 
there is no reliable way of predicting the choices people will make. We can, however, 
extract one useful guideline from our assumption that religious activity is, in Weber’s 
phrase, “relatively rational”. People will subscribe to ideas — doctrines, directives, ritual 
formulae — that they find plausible. They do not have to give them their unqualified 
approval, but they must find them broadly acceptable (the original meaning of the word 
“plausible” is “deserving of applause”).
A crucial factor in determining whether a proposition is plausible is the degree of 
social support that is available for it — what Berger and Luckmann (1970 [1966]) call its 
plausibility structure. As Berger explains:
With the possible exception of a few areas of direct personal experience, human 
beings require social confirmation for the beliefs about reality. Thus the individual 
does not require others to convince him that he has a toothache, but he does require 
such social support for the whole range of his moral beliefs (1980 [1979]: 17-18).
Some ideas are made plausible by the support of Western society in general and can be 
classed as belonging to intellectual orthodoxy. These include certain basic moral beliefs, 
such as those relating to the sanctity of human life; and the findings of science — 
knowledge certified by agreed methods of empirical inquiry (Ben-Yehuda, 1985: 107). In 
contrast, other ideas are considered to be deviant: their plausibility is not recognised by 
society in general, though of course the degree to which it regards them as implausible 
will vary. Examples of mildly deviant ideas (from a secular Western perspective) include
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the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, belief in UFOs and the claims of faith 
healers; more sharply deviant ideas might include advocacy of sex between adults and 
minors, a commitment to armed struggle against the state, and a belief that the world is 
about to end on a specified date.
The more deviant an idea, the more difficult it is to muster social support for it. 
There is a certain circularity to this statement, since it is hard to define deviance except in 
terms of lack of social support;4 nevertheless, it is important to note that certain ideas, 
lacking a plausibility structure supplied by the wider society, call for special 
reinforcement if they are to seem credible to people who are used to judging things 
according to common sense rationality. Admittedly, it is possible to entertain bizarre 
ideas without attaching any weight to them; ideas encountered in this way do not require 
robust social support, since they can be easily discarded. But if strongly deviant claims — 
those that can be demolished by empirical investigation, or are morally offensive in 
society’s eyes — are to take on the status of belief, then they require a strong plausibility 
structure supplied by people who accept those claims. An extreme example of this is the 
cult that protects its members from ideological contamination by shutting them away in a 
compound: Galanter (1999 [1989]: 105) calls this boundary control. (It is worth noting 
that groups in this situation frequently combine a number of ultra-deviant beliefs: many 
isolated apocalyptic cults have indulged in what society regards as immoral sexual 
practices. The affinity between apparently unrelated deviant ideas is an important subject 
to which we shall return.)
We should not underestimate the powerful attraction of the societal consensus. The 
strength of society’s plausibility structures helps to explain why most minority religions 
drift in the direction of lower rather than higher tension with society. The exercise of 
common sense relies heavily on consensus; even members of stigmatised groups derive 
most of their ideas about the world from information held in common with the rest of 
society. Religious believers instinctively follow the rules of evidence like everyone else. 
For the societal consensus to be successfully challenged, it is necessary to produce 
compelling evidence and arguments, often reinforced by new social ties. A fresh
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plausibility structure must emerge, sustained by a special — and notably fragile — type 
of authority.
Charisma and routinisation
It is not easy to manage a deviant organisation. It usually requires the exercise of what 
Weber termed charismatic authority, rooted in “specific gifts of the body and spirit” 
(1970 [1948]: 245). In its simplest form, Weber’s concept of charisma revolves around a 
great personality, a prophet, magician or war leader whose special powers, often regarded 
as divine in origin, persuade others to grant them authority. This authority is different in 
quality from traditional or rational forms of domination; those who hold it and those who 
acknowledge it “must stand outside the ties of this world, outside of routine occupations, 
as well as outside the routine obligations of family life” (248). At least, this is true of 
charismatic authority in its “ideal” form; but, as Weber acknowledged, over time it 
becomes mixed with traditional and bureaucratic authority. It becomes routinised, 
accommodated to the routines of everyday life.
A crucial feature of charismatic authority is its fragility. In Weber’s words:
The charismatic leader gains and maintains authority solely by proving his strength in 
life. If he wants to be a prophet, he must perform miracles; if  he wants to be a war 
lord, he must perform heroic deeds. Above all, however, his divine mission must 
“prove” itself in that those who faithfully surrender to him must fare well. If they do 
not fare well, he is obviously not the master sent by the gods (1970 [1948]: 249).
This tells us two important things: that charismatic authority is outcome-dependent, and 
that it is bestowed by others, who judge its claims according to subjectively rational 
criteria. In Ian Craib’s words, charisma can be seen “not as a quality of a leader but as a 
quality projected onto a leader by virtue of situation, opportunity and events” (1997: 
134); when it fails, creating cognitive dissonance, the authority can quickly evaporate. In 
the above passage, charisma is created by the leader’s personal power to win battles or
4 Nachman Ben-Yehuda, in Deviance and Moral Boundaries (1985: 3), writes: “Defining deviance has 
always been a problem. With the exception of the general statement that deviance involves violation of 
norms, a satisfactory solution to the problem has apparently not yet been found.”
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work magic; but Weber implies elsewhere that charisma can also repose in ideas, and that 
these, like the cult of the leader, are subject to routinisation. According to Ralph 
Schroeder, we can derive from Weber’s writings an understanding of charisma as “the 
novel impact of a belief-system on social life”. This sort of charisma is routinised not so 
much by the transmission of a leader’s special powers to his followers as by “the 
systematisation of a belief-system by a stratum of religious virtuosi, or through the 
accommodation of this belief-system to the predispositions of a certain strata of 
believers” (1992: 17-18). The anthropologist Thomas Csordas (1997: 138-9) suggests 
that the real locus of charisma is among participants in a religious movement: it is “a 
product of the rhetorical apparatus in use of which leader and follower alike convince 
themselves that the world is constituted in a certain way”. Understood in this way, 
charisma is an active process of attribution and imputation that ebbs and flows according 
to situational exigencies.
Weber’s cbncepts of charisma and routinisation can help us understand what 
happens when religious groups raise or lower their degree of tension with society. 
Charisma is what makes the raising of tension possible; it creates extraordinary 
conditions in which the cost of deviant activity or the deviant label is worth bearing. 
Charismatic claims challenge the societal consensus, and, once they are accepted, become 
translated into an authority that supersedes it. Yet charisma in its raw form rarely retains 
its original force for long: its claims to be able to control the future — through the 
production of miracles, the winning of battles or the transformation of society — are 
frequently modified in response to discontinuation or the encroachment of more stable 
forms of authority; and, as this routinisation takes place, tension falls. This is the point at 
which institutions develop, often according to a pattern that combines the development of 
bureaucracy and the rationalisation of belief patterns (O’Dea, 1966: 36-44).
Although the origins of charisma are not always directly traceable to one person, 
and its operation is dependent on complex social interaction, as a form of authority it is 
strongly marked by individualism: charismatic movements are typically centred around 
leaders, prophets and revelations granted to individuals. Sharp rises in a group’s degree of 
tension with society can often be traced back to the actions of people acting on their own 
initiative. But this individualism is a weakness, too: those aspiring to charisma rarely earn
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society-wide support for their claims, and only occasionally manage to win over the 
institutions — churches, political parties or whatever — to which their appeal is directed. 
If they are granted authority, it will probably be by limited numbers of people in a 
restricted arena. In effect, would-be charismatic leaders face a vicious circle: they find 
themselves marginalised because they advance deviant claims, and their claims are 
judged to be deviant because they originate from the margins.
Any assessment of the costs and benefits of high-tension religion will be influenced 
by one’s vantage point: for example, a charismatic claim that excites people on the 
fringes of an organisation may strike those in authority as ludicrous and threatening. 
Often, pressure to lower subcultural deviance comes from the routinising administrative 
centre of a group, while pressure to raise it comes from the margins. Sometimes, 
however, precisely the opposite is the case. Csordas has coined the term “radicalisation of 
charisma” to describe the cranking up of tension that occurs in groups that decide to 
suspend the security of routine in favour of a grander ideological striving (1997: 101). In 
these circumstances, the administrative centre of a movement may prove more radical 
than its fringes. Leaders may take steps to increase their own charismatic aura, or they 
may welcome evidence of charismatic excitement within the membership, recognising its 
potential for institutional rejuvenation
Underlying all these calculations is the organisational dilemma described by the 
sociologist Donald Swenson:
In order for a religious organisation to be effective it needs some sort o f  organisational 
structure. However, if  the routinisation processes increase, the original charisma is lost 
and what is left is an over-elaborate organisation or bureaucracy that tends to be self- 
perpetuating. The key seems to be some sort o f  balance. The object is to have enough 
routine to make effective the religious organisation but also to maintain a certain 
element o f the charisma as well (1999: 248).
This balance is, of course, essentially the same as that between high- and low-tension 
religion. The question facing many religious bodies can be stated very simply: how 
deviant should we be? Or, to put it another way: how much risk should we take?
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The benefits and costs of millenarianism
In this first half of this chapter, we have considered a number of concepts: subjective 
rationality, cognitive dissonance, ideological work, subcultural deviance, charisma and 
routinisation. These are all useful tools for analysing the changing dynamics of a system 
of religious belief. The second half of this chapter explores the operation of one such 
system, millenarianism. Its basic assumption remains the one outlined earlier: that people 
make religious choices in the way they make other choices — they seek to maximise 
benefits and minimise costs: But we need to bear in mind that “benefit” and “cost” are not 
scientific categories. What looks like a benefit to one person can look like a cost to 
someone else (or to the same person under different circumstances).
Predictive millenarianism: the new world and its non-arrival
A doomsday prophecy is the ultimate high-tension doctrine, especially if it is attached to 
a looming deadline. A clear prediction of the timing of the apocalypse can raise 
expectations to a point where believers feel impelled to take action (such as, for example, 
selling their possessions or leaving their homes); likewise, the disappointment caused by 
disconflrmation can produce a violent reaction. Predictive millenarianism is an extreme 
manifestation of the radicalisation of charisma, in which an escalation of rhetoric leads a 
group to abandon security in favour of a greater goal — in this case, surviving the 
apocalypse. It is not, however, a common phenomenon. Christian churches with an 
apocalyptic heritage tend to draw back from explicit anticipation of the end of the world; 
and, as Melton observes, even some “millennial cults” turn out on closer examination to 
be less apocalyptic than one might imagine (2000 [1985]: 147). To understand why, it is 
worth examining the balance of benefits and costs associated with classic millenarian 
beliefs.
The most obvious attraction of millenarianism is the promise of paradise on earth, 
and it forms the basis of textbook definitions of the phenomenon. Norman Cohn (1993 
[1957]: 13) writes that millenarian movements picture salvation as collective (to be 
enjoyed by the faithful as a collectivity); terrestrial (to be realised on the earth, not in 
heaven); imminent (to arrive soon and suddenly); total (in the sense that nothing will be
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left unchanged); and miraculous (to be accomplished by, or with the help of, supernatural 
agencies). This definition encompasses countless ways of imagining the millennium, 
whose imagined specifications have varied enormously throughout history. For the 
ancient Zoroastrians, it consisted of a “making wonderful” in which the world would 
become a single fertile plain and no one would be older than 40 (Cohn, 1993: 98-9). For 
the 14^-century Franciscan Spirituals, it was a society miraculously purged of the evils of 
private property and the Roman Church (McGinn, 1998 [1979]: 221). For the 
contemporary new religious movement known as the Raelians it will be a sexually 
liberated utopia presided over by benevolent aliens (Barrett, 2001: 390-395). In every 
case, the most striking feature of the millennial theodicy is the contrast between present 
misery and the glory to come: the latter justifies and makes tolerable the former. It is like 
the promise of heaven, but with the added attraction that the believer does not necessarily 
have to die to experience the post-apocalyptic paradise and may even pass unharmed 
through the dreadful events that lead up to it. Millenarian narratives typically envisage 
the destruction of civilisation by wars and natural disasters: in the Book of Revelation, for 
example, the prophesied horrors include plagues, famine, poisoned water, hailstones 
mixed with blood and flesh-devouring birds, to say nothing of the carnage of 
Armageddon. Yet the anticipation of violence does not constitute a cost of 
millenarianism, since the blood being shed will be that of the unsaved: in most predictive 
millenarian discourse, it is strongly implied that true believers will escape not only harm 
but mortality. The Jehovah’s Witnesses put it succinctly with their slogan, “Millions now 
living will never die” (Barrett, 2001: 190). In effect, this rhetorical abolition of death 
creates the ultimate theodicy: death can have no sting if it is not going happen.
Moreover, the coming millennial kingdom will be a place where all the injustices of 
the old world will be put right. The yearning for social justice looms so large in much 
apocalyptic rhetoric that some scholars have concluded that the prime cause of 
millenarianism must be social and economic (Hamilton, 1995: 89). Whatever flaws this 
has as a catch-all explanation, there is no doubt that, for many millenarians throughout 
history, the egalitarian features of the millennium have provided a good reason to believe 
in it. Millenarian movements themselves have the potential to redistribute power: once 
accepted by an audience, apocalyptic claims create an especially potent form of
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charismatic authority, one that rubs off on ordinary believers as well as the prophet. The 
possession of foreknowledge about the most important subject imaginable — the fate of 
the planet — creates a special, even intimate, bond between those who share it. In the 
pure millenarian scenario, after all, they are destined to enter the new world together. 
Knowing this can have an extraordinary effect on behaviour, producing a sense of 
purpose that can lead to increased proselytising, religious ecstasy and (occasionally) 
violent confrontation with the state.
Such things can happen, however, only when people really believe that the 
transformation of society is about to occur. The problem is that it is not an easy thing to 
believe. Since the emergence of the apocalyptic genre 2,000 years ago, every prophecy of 
the end of the world has been proved false. Peter Berger describes vulnerability to 
disconfirmation as millenarianism’s great weakness:
There are, to be sure, various cognitive and psychological mechanisms to rationalise 
• empirical .counter-evidence. A ll the same, there remains a theoretical problem in 
accounting for the fact that Yahweh has not brought the rain, that the parousia is 
delayed longer and longer, that the alleged Mahdi turns out to be another all too 
mundane ruler, and so on (1969 [1967]: 70).
Note that Berger lists the absence of rain alongside the delay in the Second Coming of 
Jesus. Dismay at the failure of the world to end is related to other forms of prophetic 
disappointment. The non-arrival of the millennial kingdom is an extreme example of 
disconfirmation; it might be regarded as the biggest single cost that a millenarian can 
incur, necessitating radical and often unsuccessful ideological work, but it is certainly not 
the only one to arise from a lack of correspondence between prophecy and the real world.
The history of millenarianism is overshadowed by disappointment. The emotional 
and social cost of failed prophecy leaps out from the historical record, and is particularly 
acute where predictions of the end of the world have been date-specific. The first extant 
millenarian document, the Book of Daniel, dating from the second century BC, appears to 
have been altered soon after it was written, extending the period of time before the end of 
the old world and the supernatural triumph of the Jewish people, presumably in response 
to prophetic failure (Hartman and Di Leila, 1990: 419). The writings of St Paul hint at the
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frustration of the early Christians at the delay in the Second Coming, though it was not 
until many centuries later that Christian millenarians began to write about the experience 
of disappointment. “Take heed of computing [apocalyptic calculation],” lamented one 
n^-century millenarian after the eschatological excitement of the English 
Commonwealth came to nothing. “How woefully and wretchedly have we been mistaken 
by this” (Hill, 1980: 58). An even more acute sense of failure emerges from the so-called 
“Great Disappointment” of October 22, 1844, when thousands of followers of the 
American preacher William Miller waited in vain for the Second Coming. “Our fondest 
hopes and expectations were blasted,” wrote one Millerite, “and such a spirit of weeping 
came over us as I never experienced before. It seemed that the loss of all earthly friends 
could have been no comparison. We wept and wept until the day dawn” (quoted in 
O’Leary, 1994: 108). The same misery was experienced in the UFO cult described by 
Festinger when neither the prophesied flood nor the rescue of the faithful by spacemen 
took place. Mrs Keech, the group’s leader, “broke down and cried bitterly” while the 
other members suffered agonies of disappointment (1964 [1956]: 168).
There are numerous strategies for reducing the cognitive dissonance caused by 
millennial disappointment: a prophet can claim that he miscalculated the date; that the 
apocalypse has been delayed through the power of prayer, or as punishment for lack of 
faith; or that a form of apocalypse did occur, but has been revealed only to the faithful. 
Jon R Stone (2000: 25) argues that most prophets, when a prediction fails, retreat to more 
ideologically defensible positions, concentrating instead on non-empirical understandings 
of their original prophecy. But such strategies are rarely completely successful: many 
former believers are unwilling to shoulder the heavy burden of remedial ideological work 
involved in explaining away disconfirmation; the disappointed movements usually 
collapse — and with them the charismatic authority of their leaders. Those that do not 
collapse, meanwhile, usually find ways of moving away from their millenarian origins, of 
directing religious zeal towards institutional ends. Just as millenarianism represents 
perhaps the ultimate charismatic claim, so the slow absorption of apocalyptic theology by 
religious bodies offers a classic example of the routinisation of charisma (a quality which, 
as we saw earlier, can repose in ideas as well as in the aura of an extraordinary leader). 
Many well-known movements — mainstream Christianity, Mormonism, the Baha’i faith,
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the Unification Church — have apocalyptic roots that have become progressively 
obscured in the aftermath of millennial disappointment and as their leaders have worked 
to reduce the degree of tension between themselves and the surrounding society. Even 
movements which retain a strong millenarian inheritance, such as Seventh-day 
Adventism and Pentecostalism, have attempted to reduce the overall importance of 
apocalyptic themes as they have moved towards denominational status. They have not 
repudiated millenarianism, exactly; but they have discovered that there are varieties of 
belief in the end of the world that, because they are less likely to lead to crippling 
disappointment, are more cost-effective.
The disruptive power of predictive millenarianism is indirectly revealed by the 
many campaigns against dating the apocalypse that have been waged across the centuries 
by religious authorities. Gershom Scholem reports that Jewish teachers repudiated 
attempts to calculate the End “again and again, not without reason, though with little 
success” (1995 [1971]: 11); St Augustine implored millennial mathematicians to “relax 
your fingers” (City o f God, 18: 54); the sixth century Paschal List o f Campania described 
date-setters as “arrogant fools” (ignari praesumptores) and “crazies” (deliri) (McGinn, 
1995: 63); and there is compelling evidence that the medieval Church twice changed its 
dating system rather than allow it to reach the year 6000, traditionally associated with the 
apocalypse (Landes, 1988). Since then, Church authorities have repeatedly moved against 
what McGinn calls “predictive imminence” (1995: 63). Date-setting is essentially 
incompatible with traditional authority, though it can form a powerful tool for the 
creation of charismatic authority. If established leaders endorse a prediction of Christ’s 
imminent return (or any apocalyptic event), their authority will be undermined by its 
disconfirmation. They will have pointlessly raised the degree of tension between 
themselves and the outside world; at the very least they will be forced to engage in 
ideological work in order to undo the damage to morale and their credibility. Even if they 
condemn predictive millenarianism, however, they may be forced to deal with its 
consequences: waves of expectation and disappointment in which apparently rational 
people become swept up, creating problems of discipline and (sometimes) public order. 
Again, what we observe here is the quintessentially charismatic nature of millenarian 
claims: the clash of interests between religious or secular institutions and the millennial
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prophet and his followers illustrates in a concentrated form the incipient tension between 
traditional and charismatic authority.
There are few quicker routes to subcultural deviance than the issuing of doomsday 
prophecies. One reason for this is the association between predictive millenarianism and 
violence (see Robbins and Palmer, 1997; Hall, 2000; Wessinger, 2000). Date-setting has 
played a role in numerous apocalyptic tragedies; although not necessarily the crucial 
factor in generating disorder, it often concentrates expectations to the point where armed 
conflict is possible. The subject of millennial violence impinges on this study because the 
period of my fieldwork, the late 1990s, coincided with public anxiety about “Pre- 
Millennial Tension”: the tragedies of Waco, Aum Shinrikyo, the Solar Temple and 
Heaven’s Gate led many people to conclude — wrongly — that the arrival of the year 
2000 would lead to a worldwide upsurge in millennial violence (see Thompson, 1996; 
Wojcik, 1997; Abanes, 1998).
But, as we noted in the Introduction, apocalyptic movements can inspire ridicule as 
-well as fear. The danger of being laughed at has often formed part of the social cost of 
millenarianism. As early as the fifth century, St Augustine warned his listeners to be 
cautious in evaluating apocalyptic claims, so that “when we fall into a panic over present 
happenings as if they were the ultimate and extreme of all things, we may not be laughed 
at by those who have read of more and worse things in the history of the world” (1955: 
387). One could cite many other examples, such as the Venerable Bede’s good-humoured 
criticism of the rustici who were forever asking him the date of the Millennium (Landes, 
1988: 176) or the discovery by a 17th-century English wit that the name of an apocalyptic 
prophet of the day, Dame Eleanor Davis, was an anagram of “never so mad a ladie” 
(Thomas, 1973 [1971]: 163). The effect of this sort of stigmatisation was clearly visible 
during my fieldwork at Kensington Temple: many of my interviewees were at pains to 
distance themselves from what they saw as the comic absurdity of over-the-top prophecy 
belief. Such reactions remind us of the power of labelling in society. As Richard Jenkins 
argues, once a label is applied to an individual, his or her behaviour and biography 
becomes organised with reference to an identification which is now internal as well as 
external (1996: 75). But fear of labelling is also significant. The popular identification of 
millenarianism with the silly or sinister may discourage someone from investing in the
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concept of the end of the world; it greatly increases the social cost of such a belief — 
even for those people who are otherwise attracted by it.
To sum up: the costs of predictive millenarianism usually outweigh the benefits; its 
charismatic claims are unsustainable in the long term, and for this reason people’s 
rational choices will tend to move in the direction of accommodation with society — 
towards an acknowledgement that the world is not about to end. There are, of course, 
circumstances in which quite large numbers of people can suddenly be led in the other 
direction, and scholars are still divided as to what these are: the most convincing 
explanation remains that of Cohn (1993 [1970]: 281-288), whose analysis of radical 
medieval millenarianism combines material factors (a background of social disaster) with 
psychological ones (the relief of psychological disorientation provided by apocalyptic 
fantasies). This analysis is not incompatible with a rational choice perspective: people 
who have been disorientated by extraordinary circumstances can still make subjectively 
rational.decisions; unless we recognise this, we are unlikely to be able to account for the 
breadth of the appeal of the classic millenarian movements that occasionally spring up. 
From our. point of view, however, what matters is the rarity of such movements. This can 
be ascribed to predictive millenarianism’s extreme vulnerability to disconfirmation and 
its challenge to established authority, leading to an almost automatic presumption against 
it on the part of risk-averse religious and secular leaders.
Explanatory millenarianism: making sense o f the present
If millenarianism existed only in its most extreme form — as belief in an imminent, time- 
specific apocalypse, expressed in a discourse that inspires radical social action — it 
would probably be confined to isolated eccentrics or ultra-deviant cults. There is, 
however, a more routinised version of millenarianism that does not create such a high 
degree of tension with society. This is explanatory millenarianism, in which the main 
function of apocalyptic prophecy is not to provoke action but to make sense of the present 
moment in terms of an overarching scheme of history. Before elaborating on this concept, 
however, I should make it clear that my categories of predictive and explanatory 
millenarianism are dynamic, not static. The difference between the two often lies in the 
tone and balance of the argument rather than in questions of doctrine, and one mode can
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easily develop into the other: explanatory rhetoric is sometimes radicalised by the 
introduction of date-specific predictions, while predictive millenarianism has often 
become routinised through the removal of such risk-inducing details.
The historian Hillel Schwartz hints at the existence of explanatory millenarianism 
when he observes that, in practice, millenarians seem less interested in the features of the 
world they are waiting for — the millennium — than in the circumstances that will give 
birth to it. He suggests that this is because the millennium is “a time of instant and perfect 
communication whose seamlessness makes anatomical detail unnecessary. Millenarians 
are, rather, diagnosticians of bodies in metastasis” (1987: 525) — the body in question 
being the doomed pre-apocalyptic modem world. My own experience of apocalyptic 
religions in London, California and Peru (Thompson, 1996, 1999a, 2001b) bears this out. 
In conversation, members of such religions rarely volunteer descriptions of a radiant post- 
apocalyptic order. Instead, they are more likely to analyse current affairs in terms of 
sacred prophecy: a recent earthquake, a terrorist bomb, the spread of homosexuality, or 
even an international trade agreement shows that the End is not far off. Quite often, 
people using prophecy in this way will say that they think it “likely” that the world will 
end in their lifetime. Or they may decline to speculate about when the End will come, but 
will nonetheless espouse a conspiracy theory — for example, one that identifies a living 
person as the Antichrist — whose basic premise is that mankind is living in its last 
generation. A further complication is that the strength of people’s millenarian convictions 
appears to rise and fall according to the circumstances of the moment, so that during a 
crisis in international relations they are more interested than usual in biblical prophecy 
but tend to forget about the subject when the situation returns to normal.
As we have already noted, the difficulty of drawing the line between millenarians 
and non-millenarians tends to be glossed over in the academic literature, which too often 
implies that anyone who subscribes to apocalyptic doctrines has become a predictive 
millenarian whose whole life is lived in expectation of the End. This is not the case. Once 
we accept O’Leary’s argument that millenarianism is best understood as a form of 
rhetoric, we can see more clearly how people are free to make use of it as they see fit. 
The category of explanatory millenarianism helps to fill the gap between classic 
millenarianism and the rest of society. It can be viewed as a routinised form of predictive
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millenarianism, in so far as its vision of the end of the world is derived from that of 
intensely expectant apocalyptic believers: thus, the explanatory, mostly non-predictive 
End Times discourse of modem evangelical Christians draws heavily on the ideas of 
early Christians who expected the Second Coming of Jesus within their lifetimes. 
Explanatory millenarianism is, however, more than a watered-down version of the 
predictive variety. Its emphasis on the contemporary world highlights an important 
function of millenarianism. The urge to make sense of contemporary society has been 
present in apocalyptic thinking since the emergence of the genre; it is part of its broader 
operation as a theodicy. A historical perspective is helpful here: we need to remember 
that millenarianism as an ideology did not appear suddenly, but grew slowly out of the 
ancient human project to locate the present moment within an overarching divine plan. 
Models of time that organise history into ages or cycles predate the notion of the sudden 
end of the world by many centuries.5 The Book of Daniel, written during the Seleucid 
occupation of Jerusalem between 168 and 164 BC, divides history into a sequence of four 
kingdoms that is related to the Greek sequence of ages of gold, silver, iron and bronze 
and may have its origins in the Mesopotamian concept of history as a “Great Year” of 
four seasons (Campion, 1993). Like so many apbcalyptic texts, it has a political subtext: 
Daniel’s visions are replete with many-headed beasts that, in passages of almost 
impenetrable allegory, are made to represent the military enemies of the Jewish people. 
The Book of Daniel is, among other things, the first extant conspiracy theory, 
demonstrating that, from the birth of the apocalyptic genre, explanatory narrative was at 
least as important as predictive imminence.
There is a remarkable consistency to the way societies separated by vast stretches 
of time and geography have used prophecy to explain otherwise incomprehensible events. 
For example, Daniel provides us with an early demonstration of the technique known as 
vaticinium ex eventu, history disguised as prophecy (McGinn, 1998 [1979]: 7): the close
5 Nicholas Campion’s book The Great Year: Astrology, Millenarianism and History in the Western 
Tradition provides an authoritative comparative analysis of models of time. Drawing on the work of Eliade 
and Popper, Campion locates the roots of both millenarianism and historicist schemes such as Marxism in 
ancient myths about time based on the sequence of the seasons and the movement of the night sky. “All 
theories that assume a greater purpose underlying historical change are intimately bound up with concepts 
of order in nature and the cosmos: if nature has an order, runs the argument, then so does history,” he 
writes. “From this simple assumption it follows that if  this order can be understood, then history’s purpose 
will become clear, and once its purpose it revealed, the future can be predicted” (1993: 8-9).
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match between certain of its images and the invasion of Jerusalem is attributable to the 
fact that the invasion was already history. More than 2,100 years later, in the days after 
September 11, 2001, an anonymous Internet author played the same trick, rewriting the 
famous Nostradamus quatrain prophesying the arrival of a “king of terror” to make it 
look as if it predicted the destruction of the World Trade Centre by Osama bin Laden 
(Thompson, 2001a). Likewise, the search for the true identity of the Antichrist, a demonic 
leader derived from the Book of Revelation, has continued for nearly 2,000 years, 
throwing up hundreds of candidates from Nero to Bill Gates (Boyer, 1992; McGinn, 
1994).
The significance of these ideas lies in the way they place the present moment, with 
all its ugliness and chaos, in the all-embracing context of divine history. As O’Leary 
argues, apocalyptic eschatology simultaneously addresses the problems of evil and time, 
offering “the perfection (which is to say the annulment) of time as the redemptive 
solution to the problem of evil” (1994: 33). It anticipates an apocalypse that will justify 
everything that has ever happened. The story of humanity is understood as a progressive 
conflict between absolute good and absolute evil that is only now reaching its climax, and 
whose contours can be discerned behind the machinations of today’s evil men; hence the 
centrality of conspiratorial themes in millenarian tradition. Framed on either side by the 
predetermined working out of history, the present is replete with cosmic significance; no 
turn of events is too anomalous to be absorbed into a foreshortened future. The 
desecration of the Temple in Jerusalem, the Mongol invasions, the Reformation, the 
French Revolution, Hiroshima: all of these dissonance-creating threats to the reality of 
everyday life — many of them appearing with little warning — have at various times 
been neutralised by incorporation into an apocalyptic framework.6 At the same time, 
however, millenarianism itself is partly neutralised by being confined to the (mostly 
harmless) identification of “signs of the End”. On rare occasions, a perceived 
correspondence between current events and prophecy can have dramatic consequences:
6 For a sense of the awesome explanatory range of prophecy literature, see Tom Mclver’s The End o f the 
World: An Annotated Bibliography, which contains brief descriptions of more than 3,000 publications from 
the Book of Enoch to books warning of computer meltdown in the year 2000. All the major conflicts in 
Western history have been subjected to apocalyptic analysis, together with many less obvious phenomena: 
one 1 ^ -century Islamic text argues that “the prevalence of tall buildings” is a sign of the End (1999: 31).
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an apocalyptic sect might take up arms because it believes that the government has begun 
the persecution prophesied in the Book of Revelation. It is far more likely, however, that 
the recognition of “signs” will be confined to the level of rhetoric, reflecting a desire on 
the part of the believer to reduce the threat posed by anomic events. Apocalyptic ideas, 
particularly in a routinised form, can be comforting and occasionally even a source of 
social stability. As McGinn observes, throughout the Middle Ages apocalyptic traditions 
“were used to support the institutions of medieval Christianity rather than to serve as a 
critique, either mild or violent” (1998 [1979]: 29); many apocalyptic texts were “attempts 
of the educated clerks to make sense of major changes in society within the universal 
scheme of history provided by apocalypticism” (35).
Today, although the major institutions in society no longer make use of apocalyptic 
ideas in this way, something of the same, routinised, millenarianism can be found in 
religious movements for whom apocalyptic belief is essentially a matter of cultural 
identity, or of sustaining (but not increasing) their traditional degree of tension with 
society. The social costs of such beliefs need not be high. It is easier to sustain a 
plausibility structure for a vague anticipation of the end of the world in the next few years 
than it is to create one for an imminent apocalypse that requires urgent action, such as 
retreating to the wilderness. In many cases, the only action arising from explanatory 
millenarianism is the deployment of certain images in speech and texts; this does not 
mean that we should not take such images seriously as expressions of belief, but it does 
suggest that in these cases millenarianism resembles mainstream, uncontroversial 
religious doctrines in operating mainly on the level of rhetoric.
The contrast between the two styles of millenarianism becomes clearer if we 
consider the ways they conceive of the future. A distinction is sometimes made in the 
anthropology of time between the long-term future (in French, le futur) and the short­
term future (I ’avenir, the forthcoming). The former is distant, a world imagined in 
opposition to this one; its landscape has a fictional or dream-like quality. The latter is 
easy to visualise: it is the day after tomorrow, an extension of the present peopled with 
familiar characters and situations.7 Predictive millenarianism inserts a mythical
7 The difference between Vavenir and le jutur was explored by Pierre Bourdieu in his writing about the 
Algerian K$b*jle, for whom the short-term future could be planned for but the long-term future “belongs to
38
apocalypse into the immediate horizon; it tells us that an incredible event, whether it be 
the Second Coming or the arrival of a spaceship, will occur so soon that we might as well 
enter it in our appointments diaries. Such a claim is, under normal conditions, hard to 
believe — and, even where it is accepted, carries with it formidable costs. Explanatory 
millenarianism, in contrast, makes only relatively modest claims about the immediate 
future and relegates the strange events of the apocalypse to the medium-term future. The 
apocalyptic audience may live long enough to experience the End, but there is still a 
comforting degree of doubt about when it will occur. In the meantime, life can be lived 
according to everyday rhythms, secure in the knowledge that otherwise baffling current 
events correspond to sacred prophecy. The theodicy that this knowledge creates is less 
comprehensive than that of predictive millenarianism, but it is also more subtle and, to 
many people, intrinsically more believable.
It is not completely risk-free, however. The main cost of explanatory 
millenarianism is essentially the same as that attached to doomsday eschatology: the 
threat of empirical disconfirmation. In practice, explanatory prophecy always contains, a 
predictive element, offering its audience clues as to what will happen next. The problem 
is that even the most careful predictions tend to be proved wrong over time; and the more 
detailed the prediction, the more likely this is to happen. In short, the most important 
quality of explanatory prophecy — its willingness to address the fast changing details of 
contemporary life — also constitutes its Achilles’ heel. Thus, countless Christian 
prophecy books of the 1970s and 80s, having analysed the Cold War in terms of Bible 
prophecy, went on to tell their readers to watch out for a Soviet invasion of the Middle 
East, or the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and the nations of the EEC, whose 
number — ten — corresponded to the ten horns of the Beast in Daniel (Boyer, 1992: 
276). Like predictions of the end of the world, however, these more modest forecasts 
were overtaken by events: the Soviet Union, instead of invading Israel, fell apart; the 
EEC grew to more than ten nations. Explanatory millenarianism, like doomsday 
millenarianism, contains a claim to charismatic authority, since it depends on recognition 
of the special illuminative powers of a prophet or prophetic document, and it shares in the
God” (1963: 61-2). For a further discussion of the distinction, see Alfred Gell’s The Anthropology o f Time 
(1996 [1992]: 288).
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weakness of such authority — that is, its constant need to prove itself to its audience. 
This fragility is not necessarily fatal, but in the long term it imposes a burden of 
ideological work on the person making the claim. The ability of the apocalyptic paradigm 
to explain the details of the contemporary world quickly breaks down when the details 
change; therefore the prophet or exegete can only preserve the match between prophecy 
and real life by constantly shifting his or her ground. The more detailed the material 
demonstrating the alignment between prophecy and real life, the more ideological work is 
required.8
That said, the sheer proliferation of explanatory apocalyptic texts, compared to the 
rarity of the full-scale dramas of the type described by Festinger, tells us something about 
the respective benefits and costs of the different levels of millenarianism. Put simply, 
explanatory apocalyptic rhetoric is a safer option than the time-specific doomsday 
prophecy. The reward it offers is more accessible, and less disturbing, than the world- 
shattering prospect of an immediate End, and the dissonance created by disconfirmation 
is more manageable. Explanatory millenarianism does not usually make great demands of 
its audience, since it postpones an apocalyptic crisis that demands urgent action to an 
indeterminate date. Its claim to charisma is of a limited variety. Often, all it requires of its 
consumers is that they entertain its propositions; indeed, more than any other form of 
religious argumentation, it has functioned historically as a sort of entertainment — 
notably during the Middle Ages, when eschatological prophecies were a popular form of 
folklore (Lemer, 1976, 1983; Taithe and Thornton, 1997; McGinn, 1998 [1979]), and in 
the prophecy subculture of modem fundamentalist Christianity (Boyer, 1992; Wojcik, 
1997). The amusement value of “soft” millenarian rhetoric constitutes one of its benefits;
8 This dynamic can be illustrated by a recent example of prophecy literature. In 1996, the Christian Zionist 
author Marvin Byers published a book entitled Yasser Arafat — An Apocalyptic Character? which named 
the PLO chairman as the satanic “little horn” in Daniel. In making such an explicit identification, however, 
Byers faced the threat of empirical disconfirmation, and in anticipation of it he prepared several escape 
routes for himself. He acknowledged that the situation in the Middle East might improve instead of moving 
towards apocalyptic crisis, and he devoted two pages to the possibility that Arafat might die before 
fulfilling his prophetic role, explaining that the role of little horn could be transferred to his successor as 
head of the PLO (1996: 222-3); he also added an Introduction taking into account developments in Israel 
since he finished the original manuscript. Significantly, the tone of Byers’s book and many similar texts is 
notably defensive; this is testimony to the ridicule and criticism that apocalyptic analysis of current events 
has always attracted, thanks to its tendency to issue incorrect forecasts and its often convoluted attempts to 
uncover the identity of living people in the pages of Scripture.
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it is no accident that, since the dawn of the genre, so many apocalyptic texts have been 
packaged in a way that might appeal to the general reader.
Secret knowledge and the cultic milieu
In this section our focus shifts away from the distinction between types of millenarianism 
towards its status as secret knowledge and its similarity to other deviant ideas. The word 
“apocalypse” comes from the Greek verb meaning “to unveil”. Apocalyptic information 
is something that was once hidden, and remains hidden from non-believers. This fact is 
crucial to its appeal, constituting a benefit in itself. Seen from another angle, however, it 
is one of the great costs of millenarianism. The family resemblance between apocalyptic 
theology and other ideas rejected by society — conspiracy theory, the occult, 
“alternative” history and science — has tarred millenarianism with guilt by association. 
Religious institutions, in particular, are reluctant to endorse apocalyptic ideas that seem to 
belong in a wider category of bizarre beliefs. Not only are they worried by the damage to 
their reputations that might result, but they recognise the disruptive potential of an 
epistemology in which the ultimate judge of truth is the individual.
Hidden knowledge is often deviant knowledge: its premises are rejected by society, 
usually on moral or empirical grounds, and this rejection only adds to its importance in 
the eyes of believers. Furthermore, people who subscribe to one rejected idea are more 
likely to entertain others: the fact of knowing secret things counts for more than the actual 
content of the secrets themselves. The mixing and merging of deviant knowledge is not a 
recent phenomenon: in an essay on the roots of the New Age, Robert Ellwood writes of 
“a western alternative spirituality tradition going back at least to the Greco-Roman world. 
The current flows like an underground river through the Christian centuries, breaking into 
high visibility in the Renaissance occultism of the so-called ‘Rosicrucian Enlightenment’, 
eighteenth-century Freemasonry, and nineteenth-century Spiritualism and Theosophy” 
(1992: 59). The sociologist Colin Campbell (2002 [1972]: 14) has coined the phrase 
cultic milieu to describe the “cultural underground of society”, incorporating all deviant 
belief systems and their associated practices. The cultic milieu is characterised by a 
common consciousness of deviance, says Campbell; indeed, one of its most pronounced 
features is syncretistic sharing of deviant ideas by groups that, at first glance, have little
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in common with each other. Thus, many modern-day witches make use of the Jewish 
number-mysticism of the Kabbalah (Luhrmann: 1989: 60); believers in “lost 
civilisations” argue for life on Mars (Hancock, 1998); ultra-traditionalist Catholics flirt 
with the ideology of the survivalist Right (Cuneo, 1997); and the neo-Buddhist Japanese 
sect Aum Shinrikyo found room in its cosmology for UFOs, “earthquake weapons”, 
Masonic conspiracies and the Catholic apocalyptic folklore known as the Prophecies of 
StMalachi (Thompson, 1996; Barkun, 2003).9
It is hard to define deviance beyond stating that it involves the violation of norms 
(Ben-Yehuda 1985: 3); it is socially constructed and therefore always culturally relative. 
We can, however, identify one feature common to most of the deviant ideas in the cultic 
milieu, and that is their appeal to the authority of the individual. Roy Wallis (1979, 
quoted in Lewis, 1992: 7) noted that “there prevails in the [cultic] milieu an attitude of 
‘epistemological individualism’, that is, a belief that the individual is the ultimate locus 
for the determination ... no individual or collectivity possesses a monopoly of the truth”. 
Such an attitude implies a rejection of traditional plausibility structures. In the cultic 
milieu, the very implausibility of an idea, in society’s terms, may be a reason for taking it 
seriously; indeed, in the absence of shared procedures for evaluating evidence, there are 
really no limits as to what might be considered plausible.10 This state of affairs is hard to 
reconcile with the stable power relations operating within established institutions, since 
every heterodox or secret idea can be regarded as a potential claim to charismatic 
authority. The possession of hidden knowledge is not translated into authority until it is 
communicated to and accepted by others; but, once this happens, it raises the prospect of 
a redistribution of spiritual or political power.
9 Detailed accounts of the formation of deviant cosmologies can be found in a volume edited by Jeffrey 
Kaplan and Helene Loow entitled The Cultic Milieu: Oppositional Subcultures in an Age o f Globalization, 
which includes essays on occult National Socialism, neo-Shamanism and the apocalyptic Satanism of 
Gothic rock music. Kaplan and Loow argue (2002: 3) that the exchange of heterodox ideas in the anti­
globalisation movement of the late 1990s perfectly illustrates the circulation of proscribed knowledge 
described by Campbell a quarter of a century earlier.
10 Michael Barkun uses the phrase “stigmatised knowledge” to convey the full range of ideas circulating in 
the cultic milieu. He defines such knowledge as consisting of “claims to truth that the claimants regard as 
verified despite the marginalisation of those claims by the institutions that conventionally distinguish 
between knowledge and error — universities, communities of scientific researchers and the like” (2003: 
43). In other words, rejection by the societal consensus is a qualification for the special status of certain 
truth claims.
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It is true, of course, that there are such things as deviant institutions: in terms of our 
earlier discussion, these are high-tension groups whose subcultural deviance is preserved 
by their own plausibility structures. Even here, however, the individualism of the cultic 
milieu sits uneasily with established authority. Many religious movements have, in their 
sectarian early days, flirted with conspiracy theories, sexual experimentation and the 
occult — but it is interesting to note that the same groups have, over time, tended to move 
away from deviant ideas, or reduced the range of such ideas that they endorse. In rational 
choice terms, the social cost of public identification with these ideas has been too great.11 
The cost for the individual, on the other hand, need not be anything like as high. One can 
explore bizarre or dangerous ideas in private without being branded deviant by society; 
indeed, engaging with these ideas behind closed doors, or within a closed circle of 
friends, may be an essential part of the experience. The fact that, in Wallis’s phrase, the 
individual is the “locus of determination” does not imply unwavering commitment to a 
set of ideas. In the cultic milieu, the audience is under little pressure to pronounce on the 
validity of the charismatic claims being made by, say, an esoteric author or a conspiracy 
theorist. On the contrary: they are often asked only to consider whether something might 
be true. The authors of deviant claims often tailor their rhetoric to the tastes of individuals 
whose commitment to ideas is tentative and transitory. Those authors are themselves 
usually acting as individuals unencumbered by official responsibilities. Even where they 
belong to a religious tradition, their productions have a freelance and freewheeling 
quality to them: in the modem cultic milieu, it is noticeable that many authors move 
promiscuously from one “mystery” to another in search of an audience.
Popular millenarianism — “prophecy belief’ — forms an almost inescapable part 
of the cultic milieu: a great many deviant beliefs have millenarian overtones, or exist in a
11 For example, the Mormons early on turned their back on the occult and Masonic elements in Joseph 
Smith’s theology and banned polygamy (Barrett, 2001: 157). The Seventh-day Adventists have distanced 
themselves from the colourful statements of their prophet, Ellen G White, who claimed to have made out- 
of-body visits to other planets (Reavis, 1995: 95; Barrett, 2001: 171). The Church of Scientology has 
reduced the importance of magic in its programmes (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985: 263-283) and no longer 
insists on the literal truth of L Ron Hubbard’s science fiction-influenced cosmology. The Holy Order of 
MANS, a Christian order which sprang up in hippie San Francisco, purged itself of the theosophical and 
New Age elements in its teachings and embraced Eastern Orthodoxy (Lucas, 1995). Such changes can be 
ascribed in part to the gravitational pull of societal norms that we noted earlier: it is difficult — and often 
not worth the effort — to preserve the plausibility of beliefs or practices that offer easy targets for critics in 
the outside world.
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millenarian version. Secrecy and individualism have permeated the apocalyptic genre 
from the very beginning. The Book of Daniel and the other early apocalypses, although 
they envisage the collective salvation of the Jewish nation, do not address the people in 
the straightforward manner of the earlier prophets: in Gershom Scholem’s words, “what 
reached the prophets as knowledge which could hardly be proclaimed with sufficient 
loudness and publicity, in the apocalypses becomes secret” (1995 [1971]: 6). In Jewish 
literature, the moment at which the coming redemption of God’s people takes on the 
status of a millenarian event, leading to the resurrection of the dead and the Last 
Judgment, is also the moment at which knowledge of the future becomes a mystery to be 
penetrated by the individual. Moreover, the appeal of apocalypticism was strongest 
among those Jews who emphasised other forms of esoteric knowledge, such as Kabbalah 
and gnostic throne-mysticism. Many scholars have pointed out the family resemblance 
between millenarianism and gnosticism. Both systems are radically pessimistic about the 
present order of society, and assume that a special class of people — the chosen ones — 
will survive its inevitable destruction. They also tend to frame their arguments in ways 
that repose authority in the individual: people choose themselves, as it were, by
19penetrating mysteries that are insoluble by the unenlightened.
In the apocalyptic genre, the pre-eminent mystery is the timing of the End — yet, 
we have seen, the history of attempts to uncover this information is one of humiliating 
failure. Many apocalyptic documents tackle this problem by hiding the date of doomsday 
behind a firewall of millennial arithmetic and other ciphers (the Book of Daniel being the 
first example). They provide clues rather than a clear answer, thereby protecting 
themselves from disconfirmation and placing the responsibility for solving the puzzle 
onto the reader. There is little sense that their authors intend this knowledge to be 
uncovered collectively, by members of an institution; indeed, as we have seen,
12 It is difficult to produce a simple definition of gnosticism, originally a complex early Christian heresy 
with roots in paganism and esoteric Judaism. Perhaps its most important feature was its emphasis on the 
intrinsic corruption of the created world, and the need to free the soul from its material environment; these 
doctrines were typically secret and sometimes expressed in occult rites (Cross and Livingstone, 1997: 683- 
5). For a discussion of the shared features of gnosticism and apocalypticism, see “The New Science of 
Politics” by Eric Voegelin (1999 [1952]); The Apocalyptic Movement: Introduction and Interpretation by 
Walter Schmithals (1975); and Prophecy and Gnosis: Apocalypticism in the Wake o f the Lutheran 
Reformation by Robin Bruce Barnes (1988).
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institutional hostility to apocalyptic calculation is one of the leitmotifs of millennial 
history. The reasons given for such condemnations include the biblical injunction against 
calculating Christ’s return and the fact that such theories have been proved disastrously 
wrong in the past. Often, however, something else lies behind this official disapproval: an 
intense mistrust of the do-it-yourself epistemology described by Wallis and a suspicion 
that people who indulge in date-setting will prove dangerously suggestible in other areas.
For centuries, the anxieties of the religious authorities concentrated on 
millenarianism’s links to heresy and superstitious folk belief. The significance of the 
latter is often overlooked: as J F C Harrison argues, folklore, with its belief in omens and 
the significance of dreams, “provided a matrix in which millenarian yearnings could be 
nourished”; the authority of local prophets was acknowledged alongside that of conjurers, 
magicians and astrologers (1979: 39-41). Increasingly, however, the intellectual 
establishment rejected empirically disprovable claims. In the early modem era, European 
governments began to treat millenarianism as a threat to public order rather than as 
heresy; there was a growing awareness that people claiming to be prophets or the Messiah 
might be mentally disturbed. By the 18th century, few educated Europeans made use of 
Bible prophecy as an analytical tool, though in England apocalyptic calculation remained 
“an indoor sport for eccentric clergymen” (Thomas, 1973 [1971]: 172). Millenarianism 
was seen as the preserve of sectarians, mystics, the deranged and their uneducated 
followers; and it was associated with a range of “enthusiastic” attitudes and behaviours, 
such as speaking in tongues or public displays of nudity.
In America, millenarianism was closer to the intellectual mainstream, but even here 
it was recognised that prophecy belief could lead the gullible into error. William Miller 
himself was worried that his prediction of the Second Coming had opened the floodgates 
of fanaticism. In a letter of 1843, he wrote: “My heart was deeply pained during my tour 
east, to see in some few of my former friends [ie, followers], a proneness to the wild and 
foolish extremes of some vain delusions, such as working miracles, discerning of spirits, 
vague and loose views on sanctification, &c” (quoted in O’Leary, 1994: 115). There 
could hardly be a clearer demonstration of the instability of charismatic legitimation: 
having succeeded in persuading an audience of his own authority, Miller provoked a 
whole new set of charismatic claims and was soon forced to engage in boundary
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maintenance. He would have been horrified to learn that, within a few years, a Millerite 
remnant would become the heterodox Seventh-day Adventist Church, and that this, in
tliturn, would give birth to a 20 -century cult, the Branch Davidians, whose messianic 
leader claimed to have travelled to heaven in a spaceship (Reavis, 1995: 94).
Modem prophecy material offers extensive evidence of millenarianism’s ability to 
open up a short cut between conventional religious belief and the furthest reaches of the 
cultic milieu. Mclver’s survey of nearly 1,500 apocalyptic documents published in 
English since 1970 demonstrates how receptive millenarians are to heterodox notions in 
general. Among the ideas put forward are: the alien authorship of Mayan prophecies 
(1999: 199); a Satanic conspiracy involving the British Royal Family (220); pollution of 
the atmosphere by flying saucers (229); an ancient civilisation in Antarctica (245); 
interplanetary body-snatching (251); talking animals (256); telepathy and time travel 
(264); cyber-electronic mind control (277); and Caucasian racial superiority (290). The 
political scientist Michael Barkun, in his study of recent conspiracy theories (2003), 
argues that the indiscriminate combination of themes from science fiction, occultism and 
radical politics in contemporary apocalyptic scenarios, especially on the Internet, 
constitutes a new style of millenarianism — “improvisational millennialism” (2003: 32). 
It is certainly true that many Christian apocalyptic authors are increasingly influenced by 
secular conspiracy theories of a dawning New World Order. The affinity between 
Christian millenarianism and conspiracy theories goes back many centuries, and can 
partly be explained by the similar explanations they offer for the operation of evil. But 
Barkun makes the interesting point that, while in the past Christian millenarianism has 
normally adopted only those conspiracy motifs grounded in Biblical tradition, the 
increasingly improvisational style of apocalyptic fantasies is blurring the boundary 
between Christian and non-Christian themes, so that some fundamentalist preachers 
feature aliens in their conspiracy narratives while UFO writers insert the Antichrist into 
their visions of a New World Order. This is an age of “millenarian entrepreneurs”, says 
Barkun, in which conspiracy ideas have become the ideological glue binding together an 
ever more disparate array of elements (270-1).
To sum up: it is hard to disentangle the benefits from the costs of millenarianism’s 
status as secret knowledge. For some people, the fact that an apocalyptic argument is
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rejected by society counts in its favour; others will conclude that it has been rejected for 
good reasons. Likewise, the association of apocalypticism with other ideas from the cultic 
milieu can be regarded as a benefit, pointing the way to a universe of hidden secrets, or as 
a cost, demonstrating that millenarianism belongs in a wider category of foolish and 
bizarre beliefs. Different people will reach different conclusions, and for unpredictable 
reasons; but what we can say is that the balance of benefits and costs is different for 
individuals and institutions. Individual believers enjoy the advantage of being able to 
explore millenarian or other deviant ideas without investing heavily in them. The curious 
consumer can follow the trail of “alternative” wisdom wherever it leads — towards 
millenarianism, secular conspiracy theory, the occult, or gnostic self-knowledge. He or 
she is unlikely to be held to account for this exploration, and there is no need to establish 
a robust plausibility structure for every deviant idea, since many will be presented as a 
form of entertainment. Cognitive dissonance can easily be brushed aside. As Campbell 
notes, “individuals who ‘enter’ the cultic milieu at any one point frequently travel rapidly 
through a wide variety of movements and beliefs and by doing so constitute yet another 
unifying force within the milieu” (2002 [1972]: 15).
For an institution, in contrast, any engagement with secret knowledge raises 
awkward questions. If hidden information acquires the status of official doctrine, not only 
does it cease to be secret, but the organisation can be held responsible when the 
information is discredited. Often, a religious institution will compromise by allowing 
various ideas that are mildly deviant in its own terms (and more so in society’s terms) to 
circulate under its umbrella without explicitly endorsing them. In theory, this strategy 
poses a double threat to institutions, since the extremist or eccentric figures who hold 
these ideas can damage the reputation of the organisation in the outside world while also 
disrupting its internal stability by their claims to charismatic authority. It is, however, a 
very common dynamic, and probably unavoidable in large institutions where doctrinal 
orthodoxy is unenforceable. All the major religions and many minor ones have a 
millenarian/esoteric fringe whose claims have to be managed in some way: Judaism has a 
long history of false messiahs and revolutionist movements; Islam has mystical 
millenarian sects; Roman Catholicism has its Marian apocalyptic traditionalists; 
conservative evangelical churches have their End Times conspiracy theorists. In each
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case, religious institutions have had to make decisions about boundary control which 
affect the degree of tension that exists between themselves and society.
Conclusion
Let us quickly glance over the balance sheet of apocalyptic belief. In textbook or 
predictive millenarianism, the most obvious benefit is the promise that paradise is about 
to materialise on earth. This belief is, however, difficult to sustain under ordinary 
circumstances; a more accessible benefit is provided by the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric 
to explain the operation of evil in the world. This creates an unusual and effective 
theodicy that can be exploited by individuals and institutions; while it presumes that 
history is drawing to a close, it is not dependent on the accuracy of a specific doomsday 
deadline. Moreover, for those people who are persuaded by millenarian arguments, there 
is the extra thrill of possessing secret knowledge denied to the vast majority of humanity.
For each benefit, however, there is a corresponding entry on the debit side of the 
ledger. Indeed, the costs of millenarian belief are tied in so closely to its benefits that one 
could say that the apocalyptic discourse subverts itself. The glorious new world fails to 
materialise, giving rise to disappointment, humiliation and sometimes violence. The 
ability of explanatory millenarianism to account for the shape of the modem world is 
continually being tested and breaking down, forcing its proponents to perform laborious 
ideological work. And even the possession of secret knowledge has its drawbacks, for 
one man’s secret is another’s bizarre conspiracy theory. Millenarianism has historically 
been associated with other bodies of knowledge that society regards as deviant; those 
who invest in it run the risk of being labelled fanatics or eccentrics — even within 
religious institutions that take the notion of the end of the world seriously.
Do the costs of millenarian belief outweigh the benefits? There can be no definitive 
answer to this question because the balance sheet varies from person to person and group 
to group. What we can say is that groups and individuals work towards a level of 
apocalyptic belief at which, according to their subjective assessment, benefits outweigh 
costs. On the whole, the effect of this work is to accommodate millenarian ideas to the
48
conditions of everyday life, though the degree of such accommodation varies 
enormously. For many members of apocalyptic religions the status of the millennial 
tradition as a discourse, as opposed to non-negotiable dogma, is crucial: it means they are 
free to move in and out of an apocalyptic paradigm in response to their perception of 
benefits and costs. The whole area remains an unusually sensitive one: millenarianism is 
so stigmatised in the public imagination that any decision to embrace apocalyptic 
theology is likely to be fraught with difficulties. The same could be said, however, of 
many controversial beliefs: the presence of millenarian ideas within a religious tradition 
raises questions about charismatic authority, subcultural deviance and boundary 
maintenance that frequently surface in non-apocalyptic contexts. This point is illustrated 
in the next chapter, which discusses Pentecostalism and its fascination with the End 
Times.
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3. Pentecostalism and the End Times
Introduction
The previous chapter suggested that the central assertion of millenarianism — “the End is 
coming, and here is the proof’ — has much in common with other charismatic claims: it 
undermines traditional authority, increases subcultural deviance and is threatened by 
empirical investigation. Pentecostal churches offer an ideal environment in which to 
observe this shared dynamic. Pentecostalists not only claim to be able to harness divine 
power in order to work miracles of healing, tongue-speaking and personal prophecy; they 
are also taught that mankind is living in the End Times. The first half of this chapter 
shows how Pentecostal churches are pulled towards and away from accommodation with 
society as they seek to exercise ministries of miraculous healing and non-eschatological 
prophecy. The second half describes the millenarian traditions that Pentecostalism has 
inherited from fundamentalism. Here, too, we can observe opposing forces at work: on 
the one hand, self-styled “prophecy experts” who seek to increase subcultural deviance 
by offering secret knowledge from the cultic milieu; and, on the other, critics who regard 
such ideas as “unbiblical” and dangerous. Finally, the chapter discusses specifically 
Pentecostal attitudes to the End Times, which range from enthusiastic participation in the 
prophecy subculture to a complete lack of interest in it, and also include a more recent, 
optimistic belief in the coming restoration of God’s kingdom.
Pentecostalism and charisma
Tension versus accommodation
Pentecostalism began, in David Martin’s phrase, as “a fusion of the faith of culturally 
despised blacks with that of culturally despised whites” (2001: 5). At the start of the 20th 
century, evangelical revivals broke out in Kansas, Wales and Los Angeles. Their
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theology drew heavily on the traditions of Methodism and the American holiness 
movement; but this time the respectable poor who attended the meetings made unusually 
explicit claims for themselves. They believed that, as a result of being baptised in the 
Holy Spirit, they had received the miraculous gifts (charismata) bestowed on the 
disciples at Pentecost (Acts 2: 1-4). Chief of these was the ability to speak in tongues, 
usually producing a glossolalia that only the enlightened could translate, but sometimes 
also — it was claimed — the instant acquisition of foreign languages. Other gifts 
included faith healing, the casting out of demons and prophecy (see Hollenweger, 1972; 
Cox, 1995; Kay, 2000). Pentecostalists emphasised spiritual experience over reflection: at 
their meetings people clapped, shouted, fainted and were apparently cured of illnesses. 
Dozens of “classic Pentecostal” denominations arose on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
movement spread to Africa, then to Latin America. In the 1960s, white middle-class 
congregations in the house churches and mainstream denominations began to adopt a 
similar “Charismatic” theology and worship, speaking in tongues, exorcising demons and 
issuing prophecies. Some Pentecostals did not welcome this competition; but gradually 
the movements overlapped. Recently, members of both traditions have found themselves 
swept along by the so-called “Third Wave”, a vigorous Charismatic spirituality 
emphasising miracles and spiritual warfare which emerged from America in the late 
1980s (Smail, Walker and Wright, 1995a; Percy, 1996; Coleman, 2000). Pentecostal 
churches are today among the fastest growing in the world: a recent survey estimates that 
the number of their adherents will rise from 12 million in 1960 to 154 million by 2010 
(Brierley, 1999: 1.5).'
Pentecostalism is a charismatic religion according to several definitions of the 
word.2 In the Pentecostal tradition, everyone who is “bom again in the Holy Spirit” 
theoretically possesses one or more of the charismata, such as the ability to speak in
1 There can be no authoritative figure for the number of Pentecostalists in the world, since where the 
boundaries of the movement lie is a matter of opinion. Everything depends on whether the total includes 
Charismatic Christians from non-Pentecostal denominations and indigenous churches. David Martin argues 
that, “broadly understood, Pentecostalism includes one in eight of the Christian ‘constituency’ of nearly 
two billion [ie, 250 million]... and one in 25 of the global population” (2001:1). Hunt, Hamilton and 
Walker, after attempting to identify the characteristics of Pentecostalism, conclude that “the movement is 
evolving so rapidly that it is not entirely clear whether these distinctive hallmarks still hold” (1997: 2).
2 In this study, “Charismatic” with a capital “C” refers exclusively to the exercise of the New Testament 
gifts of the Spirit; it normally applies to Christians outside the classic Pentecostal denominations. The use 
of the word with a lower-case “c” refers to the Weberian concept of charisma.
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unknown tongues. In practice, however, the more spectacular gifts of the Spirit tend to be 
channelled through senior figures who, in a circular dynamic typical of Weber’s 
charismatic authority, owe their positions to their ability to manifest these gifts. Most 
Pentecostal leaders aspire to perform miraculous healings and to prophesy. Although they 
are careful to attribute these powers to Jesus and the Holy Spirit, they are, in fact, making 
classic charismatic claims which, once accepted by the faithful, translate into a potent 
form of authority. Moreover, the charismatic nature of Pentecostal leadership extends 
beyond the purely religious sphere. Pentecostal leaders are often expected to manifest the 
charisma of the inspired business leader, achieving phenomenal levels of church growth. 
For Pentecostals, there is no great distinction between actual miracles and “miracles” of 
evangelisation: the two blend together in what Roland Howard (1997: 126) describes as 
the Pentecostal and Charismatic obsession with success. From a sociological perspective, 
too, they have much in common. Forecasts of supernatural healing and church expansion 
both imply an ability to manipulate the future — and therefore run the risk of being 
invalidated by the turn of events. Discontinuation of a charismatic claim, whether it 
relates to a cancer prognosis or attendance at a revival meeting, is destructive of 
authority. Admittedly, disconfirmation is partly a question of perspective: the audiences 
at Pentecostal rallies do not judge reports of miracles by the rigorous standards of 
medical science. But it would be wrong to conclude that Pentecostalists and Charismatics 
suspend their common sense: religious claims are evaluated. Evangelists who predict that 
revival will break out at a certain place and time will be expected to explain themselves if 
nothing happens; faith healers whose “miracles” are dismissed as fraudulent by the 
outside world may also arouse suspicion within the religious community. In a tradition 
that demands proof of spiritual success, and in which congregational allegiances tend to 
be fluid, failure is swiftly punished.
As we saw in Chapter 2, religions often find themselves confronted by the question 
of how deviant they should be. High-tension religion is associated with more substantial 
benefits and costs than low-tension religion: the greater the risk one is prepared to take in 
terms of dissonance-inviting claims, the greater the reward if those claims are accepted 
by one’s chosen audience — and the bigger the disaster if they cannot be sustained. The 
demonstration of special powers is a dangerous business. That is one reason why
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charisma becomes routinised: it is an exercise in risk management. But, as Swenson 
observes (1999: 248), it is not in the interests of a religious tradition to extinguish the 
exciting, unpredictable spirit that provided the impetus for its growth. Religious 
movements are often pulled in two directions: towards accommodation with society by 
risk-averse routinisers, and away from it by charismatic risk-takers. Few traditions offer a 
clearer example of these opposing forces than Pentecostalism, a movement built around 
the belief — highly vulnerable to disconfirmation — that modem Christians possess the 
same miraculous powers as their New Testament forebears.
Almost from the moment it emerged, Pentecostalism found itself under pressure to 
scale down its Charismatic claims. The two gifts that caused the most trouble were 
prophecy and healing. The concept of prophecy is a loose one: the gift can be exercised 
through tongues, or in a Biblical “word of knowledge”, or in dreams and visions; and the 
scale of its subject matter ranges from the domestic (a church member’s search for the 
right job) to full-blown eschatology (the coming of the Antichrist). The sociologist 
Margaret Poloma describes prophecy as one of the most problematic Charisms:
What is to be done about the person who disrupts religious drama and institutions in 
the name o f  being a spokesperson for the divine? How can the damage that private 
prophecy may pose for the undisceming believer be controlled by those more aware o f  
its dysfunctional uses? What about its use to promote a position o f  power and prestige 
by leaders who are at best naive and at worst unscrupulous? (2001: 177).
The leaders of Pentecostal churches were acutely aware of these questions. Within a few 
years of the first revivals, mechanisms were put in place to distinguish between 
authorised and unauthorised prophetic messages, and also between types of prophecy: 
local and eschatological, private and public. As early as 1908, there was an attempt to 
ward off disconfirmation by steering the gift of prophecy away from anticipation of the 
future: at a conference that year, the Rev A. A. Boddy, a leader in the Welsh revival, 
condemned the idea that New Testament prophecy was a recital of future events. A move 
by the Apostolic Faith Church to place its ministers’ prophetic utterances on a par with 
Scripture was quickly repudiated by the other denominations. The Apostolic Church 
declared that prophecy was not infallible, and should only take place “when the local
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church is assembled with its presbytery in charge”; the use of this gift in making 
appointments was abandoned (Kay, 2000: 60-66). This is typical routinisation: an attempt 
to control the exercise of charisma by setting out increasingly restrictive boundaries of 
belief and behaviour. Much the same could be said of the changes to Pentecostalism’s 
theology of healing, a potent source of disconfirmation and disillusion. The founder of 
Elim Pentecostalism, George Jeffreys, originally taught that Christians could expect to 
enjoy perpetual freedom from illness. By 1934, the denomination’s position had softened: 
it stated that “we believe that our Lord Jesus Christ is the healer of the body and that all 
who will walk in obedience to his will can claim Divine Healing for their bodies”. Today, 
Elim talks about the Gospel embracing “the needs of the whole man” and says only that 
the Church is commissioned “to fulfil a ministry of healing and deliverance to the 
spiritual and physical needs of mankind” (Kay, 2000: 86).
This progressive restriction of the scope of Pentecostalism’s prophetic and healing 
claims can be seen as a specific form of routinisation arising from its quasi-magical 
theology. At the same time, moreover, it was undergoing a more general routinisation of 
the sort experienced by most religious movements when they put down roots — a process 
of institutionalisation. Thomas O’Dea, expanding on Weber, describes the components of 
institutionalisation: they include the emergence of myth, the development of religious 
bureaucracy and the rationalisation of belief patterns (1966: 36-44). The history of 20th- 
century Pentecostalism provides evidence of this process. Poloma, in her study of the 
Assemblies of God (1989), found that, in its growth from 300 members to two million 
members and 22,000 ordained ministers, it had become less like a sect and more like any 
other American denomination. The same could be said of Elim, which was one of the 
subjects of Bryan Wilson’s book Sects and Society, published in 1961, but is now far less 
sectarian in character.
But what the story of Pentecostalism also shows is that there is nothing inevitable 
about tension reduction: the impulse towards greater accommodation with society has 
frequently been offset by an exuberant, dissonance-inviting revivalism which has 
attempted to drag the movement back in the direction of the cultic milieu. One example 
of this was the ministry of the American healing evangelist William Branham (1909-65), 
a Baptist who talked with angels, argued with demons, and diagnosed illnesses through
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the colours of the aura, and whose followers expected him to be raised from the dead.3 
Impressed by Branham’s popular following, Pentecostalists initially welcomed his 
claims; but, as Walter Hollenweger notes, this friendly reception “turned into an almost 
unanimous rejection when [he] announced that the Millennium would begin in 1977” 
(1972: 355). It is interesting that the Pentecostalists should have used this excursion into 
predictive millenarianism to mark the boundary of acceptable belief. During my 
fieldwork, a Kensington Temple pastor offered the story of “Brother Branham” as an 
example of what happens when a Spirit-filled individual goes off the rails.
If  Branham’s cmde attempts to raise subcultural deviance were easily resisted, the 
same cannot be said of the tension-raising miraculous claims which have swept through 
the Pentecostal and Charismatic world in recent years. This development dates back to 
the 1980s, when American Charismatics began to speak of a Third Wave of the Holy 
Spirit, manifested in powerful healings and unprecedented church growth. (The first two 
waves were the founding of the classic Pentecostal churches at the turn of the century and 
the emergence of the house churches in the 1960s.) A key figure in this movement was 
the late John Wimber, a former Quaker whose international ministry was preoccupied 
with the power of God (Percy, 1996: 16). Wimber helped to produce a renewed interest in 
prophecy: he was associated with a group of preachers called the “Kansas City prophets” 
who forecast that full-scale revival would break out, beginning in Great Britain, at the 
beginning of the 1990s (Wright, 1995b). This failed to happen, but something unusual did 
emerge from the Vineyard: the so-called Toronto Blessing, in which whole congregations 
would be “slain in the Spirit” or burst into “holy laughter” (Percy, 1996; Hunt, 1997). 
Meanwhile, in a separate but related development, worldwide Pentecostalism, especially 
in Africa, increasingly came under the influence of “health and wealth” ministries which 
promised that faith would bring material rewards (Coleman, 2000).
Faced with an upsurge in reports of miracles, the structures of Pentecostalism 
responded with characteristic ambiguity. Some leaders revelled in the possibilities of the 
Toronto Blessing and mass healing services; others worried that things were getting out
3 Branham had announced that a great miracle evangelisation campaign would begin on 25 January, 1966. 
But he died as a result of a car accident on Christmas Day, 1965, so his followers had his body embalmed 
and refrigerated to allow him to rise from the dead a month later (Hollenweger, 1972: 354-5).
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of hand. The concerns of the more cautious Pentecostals and Charismatics are 
encapsulated in Charismatic Renewal (1995), a collection of essays by Tom Smail, 
Andrew Walker and Nigel Wright, three British theologians sympathetic to the 
movement. The book gives us a clear idea of the areas of disagreement between 
proponents of low-tension and high-tension Charismatic Christianity. In an essay entitled 
“The Rise of the Prophetic”, Wright criticises the American evangelist Paul Cain for 
prophesying that a revival would break out in Britain in 1990, and Wimber for supporting 
him: “It is evident in retrospect that this claim did not materialise in the way anticipated, 
and that the outcome was a great disappointment” (Wright, 1995c: 118). Wright calls for 
greater restraint in the exercise of prophecy, and suggests that it should focus on society 
rather than on risky anticipation of the future: “A prophetic ministry which addresses the 
issues of an unjust world is less likely to become in-house entertainment for the saints,” 
(122). He also criticises Wimber’s theology of Charismatic healing, in which illness was 
regarded as essentially Satanic. For Wright, sickness is part of the disorder of the natural 
world, and it is more dignified for Christians to recognise it as such (1995b: 75). It is also 
less damaging to charismatic authority: if illness can be natural as well as demonic, then 
the healer does not need to engage in elaborate ideological work to explain why the 
person prayed for has died.
An essay by Andrew Walker, entitled “Miracles, Strange Phenomena and 
Holiness”, tackles the problem of Pentecostalism’s uncritical evaluation of claims of the 
miraculous:
It is precisely at the level o f  rigorous investigation into the miraculous that the 
Pentecostal movements, since their earliest days, have let themselves down. In the 
euphoria and excitement o f  revival, miracles have been testified to in abundance, but 
rarely verified ... Congregations awash with the emotion o f  enthusiasm feed o ff  
rumour, conjecture and hearsay. When you know that God heals, what you look for 
is not empirical evidence but tacit confirmation o f  your belief, in the form o f  positive 
reports, reconstructions o f  events, or books replete with amazing stories (1995c:
125).
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Walker, a former Elim Pentecostalist who converted to Eastern Orthodoxy, emphasises 
that he is open to the possibility of real miracles. But, in his opinion, silly and 
exaggerated claims bring the Charismatic movement into disrepute: “Nothing convinces 
people more that miracles do not occur than endless claims of bogus prophecies, 
unsubstantiated healings, and the sanctification of trivial supernatural happenings ... 
Today I still shudder at the ‘God found me a parking place’ kind of testimony” (126). 
Like Wright, Walker is troubled by some Charismatics’ extreme emphasis on the 
demonic. Certain contemporary preachers and authors have created a “paranoid 
universe”, he says, infested by demons of abortion, masturbation and witchcraft which 
supposedly have the ability to enter foetuses or cling like flies to the back of a person’s 
head. Such doctrines breed fear and sow dissent, says Walker; and they are unbiblical, 
since they are ultimately derived not from Scripture but from “inside information” 
granted to an elite few (1995a: 86-105).
The dangers of secret knowledge are elaborated on in the book’s final essay, in 
which Smail, Walker and Wright jointly denounce the Faith movement, a loose network 
of Pentecostal ministries which teach that a believer has a right to the blessings of health 
and wealth won by Christ, and that he or she can obtain these blessings merely by a 
positive confession of faith (Gifford, 1998: 39; Coleman, 2000: 27). Emanating originally 
from America, Faith ministries have attracted a vast following in Africa, where the 
promise of freedom from sickness and poverty has a particular resonance; African 
members of Kensington Temple tend to be heavily influenced by it. Smail, Walker and 
Wright quote one of the original Faith authors, E W Kenyon, to the effect that “when 
these truths [of the Faith Gospel] really gain the ascendancy in us, they will make us 
spiritual supermen, masters of demons and disease” (1995b: 137). The essay argues that 
such claims are not only ridiculous: the “truths” on which they are based are heretical. 
The “revealed knowledge” offered by present-day Faith leaders such as Kenneth Hagin 
and Kenneth Copeland is really gnosticism, since it teaches that Satan is in control of the 
world and that Christians can only defeat him by taking upon themselves the divine 
nature of God (142). It even invokes a sort of magic — and not a beneficent magic, 
either: the essay’s final quotation is from a taped message by Copeland in which he says 
that several people who criticised the Faith movement “are dead right today in an early
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grave because of it, and there’s more than one of them got cancer” (151). The excesses 
identified by Smail, Walker and Wright are important because they are so similar to those 
associated with apocalyptic belief. Like millenarianism, “signs and wonders” theology is 
vulnerable to unanticipated events: disconfirmation strikes simultaneously at the personal 
authority of the prophet or healer and at the credibility of the belief system. Furthermore, 
the implicit gnosticism of the Pentecostal fringe opens doors to the cultic milieu: as 
Walker points out, Charismatic demonology is not far removed from the world of 
Dungeons and Dragons (1995b: 96) and flirts with the occult in much the same way as 
gnostic eschatology.
The Pentecostal world, therefore, is one in which there is a constant struggle for 
equilibrium: between exotic beliefs and behaviour that conflict with the values and 
scientific methodology of Western society, and a respectability that brings in its wake a 
dangerously comfortable accommodation with the secular world. Yet, judging by its 
worldwide growth, Pentecostalism has achieved a remarkably successful balance between 
the high- and low-tension elements in its cosmology. What is it about Pentecostal and 
Charismatic Christianity that modem people find so appealing?
Personal experience and consumer choice
Most Pentecostalists enjoy a greater degree of religious freedom than one might gather 
from examining the movement’s uncompromising spiritual claims. This is not a religion 
of self-contained sects. Writing in 1970, Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine observed that 
the organisation of Pentecostalism tended to be “reticulate and acephalous”, characterised 
by interacting networks with no single clearly identifiable leader. Since then, the 
globalisation of conservative evangelical Christianity has further reduced the level of 
ideological control exercised by leaders. The flow of books and broadcast material across 
national and denominational boundaries means that the typical Pentecostal pastor enjoys 
limited influence over the degree of tension that exists between his church members and 
society at large. He may wish to distance the congregation from certain controversial 
ideas or phenomena, such as the Toronto Blessing; but it is difficult to stop individual 
worshippers absorbing such influences from other sources and promulgating them 
informally. The free-market ethos of Pentecostal religion permits a greater degree of
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specialisation than one encounters in mainstream Christianity. Careful selection of 
religious material allows the believer to “get into” particular fields such as spiritual 
warfare, evangelisation, faith healing or millenarianism. The level of subcultural deviance 
among Pentecostals or Charismatics therefore tends to fluctuate to a greater extent than in 
more self-contained movements: it is not only a question of which churches believers 
attend, but of what material they consume and where they position themselves in relation 
to a variety of spiritual fads and charismatic claims. In the words of Thomas J. Csordas, 
“the multiple reinterpretations, reflections, backwashes, anchorings, hybridisations, and 
discontinuities of the Charismatic Renewal in its global manifestations [form] an ideal 
showplace of the postmodern condition of culture'\l997: 58).
One need not, however, invoke the language of postmodernism to analyse the social 
forces that have given Pentecostalism its competitive, self-referential qualities. Peter 
Berger, in his book The Heretical Imperative (1980 [1979]), showed how religious 
allegiance in general is taking on some of these characteristics. For Berger, the 
development of modem consciousness entails a movement “from fate to choice”. 
Modernity (not postmodemity) has disrupted taken-for-granted explanations of how the 
world works and opened up an unthinkable range of choices, so that society is now 
characterised by “unstable, incohesive, unreliable plausibility structures” (19). With this 
has come a strong accentuation of the subjective style of human experience. In the 
religious sphere as in many others, people are forced to pick and choose between 
alternatives, using their own experience as a reference point: they ask themselves, “Does 
this feel right to me?” and “How can I know what is true?” Berger’s study does not 
mention Pentecostalism, but its appeal to this mindset is obvious: Charismatic worship 
provides immediate, validating experiences for consumers looking for a quick return on 
their investment; and, by offering “proof’ of the operation of the Holy Spirit, it addresses 
epistemological doubts.
All of this makes it difficult to assess the doctrinal beliefs of Pentecostalists. In 
theory, at least, most of them are theologically conservative. They believe that the secular 
world is the province of Satan. Most Pentecostal churches, including Kensington Temple, 
teach that every word of the Bible is divinely inspired and inerrant; they expect believers 
to observe the Commandments and refrain from all sexual activity outside marriage. They
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are firmly Protestant in their theology and, together with non-Charismatic fundamentalist 
Christians, are usually fitted into the category of conservative evangelical churches.4 
Some scholars maintain that Pentecostalism is itself a version of Christian 
fundamentalism. The Anglican theologian Martyn Percy argues that Pentecostals and 
Charismatics should be included in a “wide” definition of fundamentalism as a set of 
doctrines, linguistic practices, assumptions and behaviours. Pentecostals are just as anti­
liberal as other fundamentalists; they “simply construct their remedial programme 
differently” (1996: 11). The anthropologist Simon Coleman describes Pentecostals and 
Charismatics as “fundamentalistic”: he reports that the traditional disagreements between 
Pentecostals and fundamentalists over miracles and tongue-speaking have become less 
intense in recent years as the two constituencies have fought side by side against the 
common enemy of diabolical atheism (2000: 26).
The sociologist Bernice Martin, in contrast, rejects the term “fundamentalist”. 
Pentecostalism may be highly disciplined and literal in its reading of the Bible, she says, 
but the authoritarian tone of its pastors is chiefly designed to protect boundaries and 
reinforce participation. Moreover, the Pentecostal belief in biblical inerrancy does not 
produce uniformity, because it is accompanied by an extreme form of the Protestant 
insistence on the right of each believer to read the Bible and become his or her own 
theological authority:
Latin American Pentecostals certainly read the Bible literally, though they do so less 
as a matter o f  settled principle than because they actually share the mental world o f  
the writers o f  the N ew  Testament ... They regard the Apostles as their own familiar 
friends, people like themselves with whom they converse on intimate terms in their 
prayers ... It is important, too, to remember that narrative is a far more common usage 
than generalised theological or dogmatic formulae among the new Pentecostals: telling 
and retelling the stories o f  their own, personal, individual salvation is at the heart o f  
their evangelism, their worship and their self-understanding (1998: 131).
4 Although some Roman Catholics describe themselves as Pentecostalists, this label is potentially 
misleading. “Pentecostal” in a Catholic context is usually a synonym for Charismatic. Certainly, so-called 
Catholic Pentecostalists have far more in common with middle-class Protestant Charismatics than they do 
with the classic Pentecostal denominations, which historically have been strongly anti-Catholic.
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It is the cognitive style of modem Pentecostals and Charismatics, rather than the fine 
print of doctrine, that distinguishes them from fundamentalists or their own sectarian 
predecessors. According to Russell Spittler (1994: 108), where fundamentalists mount 
arguments, Pentecostals give testimonies: “The one goes for theological precision, the 
other for experiential joy. There is a profound difference between the cognitive 
fundamentalist and the experiential Pentecostal”.5 To a much greater extent than 
traditional Protestantism, Pentecostalism mobilises the senses, manipulating images, 
feelings and ideas in a way designed to integrate the self — mind and body — into a 
global Charismatic culture (Lehmann, 1996: 8; Coleman, 2000: 66-71). In this culture, 
ideology is often subordinated to personal experience, and this has implications for the 
way people relate to a range of “difficult”, tension-inducing doctrines — including those 
relating to the end of the world.
Pentecostalism’s apocalyptic heritage
Expectation of the Second Coming of Jesus is an important theme in Pentecostalism. The 
early Pentecostalists were in no doubt that the rediscovery of the Charismatic gifts was a 
sign of the approaching end of the world: their early documents spoke of the “Soon- 
Coming of the Lord in the air” (Kay, 2000: 132), while the first general council of the 
Assemblies of God proclaimed that the message “predominant ... in all this great 
outpouring ... is ‘Jesus is coming soon’ ”. Virtually every written interpretation of a 
message in tongues mentioned the approaching apocalypse. Indeed, the appearance of 
glossolalia was described as a “reverse Babel”: Christ would return when all Christians 
were united by speaking in tongues (Prosser, 1999: 254). In the century that followed, 
apocalyptic expectation faded somewhat, but was revived from time to time in
5 Spittler’s essay, entitled Are Pentecostals and Charismatics Fundamentalists?, provides a useful summary 
of the arguments for and against the use of the label. He concludes that Pentecostals cannot be described as 
fundamentalists per se, but that they often “think and act like fundamentalists”. He also points out that a 
majority of American Pentecostals would probably be happy to describe themselves as fundamentalists.
The situation in Britain is different: many members of Kensington Temple associate the word 
“fundamentalist” with redneck Americans and refuse to apply it to themselves.
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conjunction with the high-tension claims of the miraculous: many of the most 
controversial Pentecostalist healers, such as Morris Cerullo, have stressed the imminence 
of Christ’s return.
Pentecostalists have always been familiar with the notion of the End Times, in other 
words; but a feature of their eschatology is that it is not distinctly Pentecostal. Rather, 
they have tended to borrow it wholesale from two related traditions, both of them rooted 
in non-Charismatic American Protestantism. The first is what one might call the 
“official” millenarianism of conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists, enshrined in 
complicated premillennial models of history, of which the best known is 
dispensationalism. The second is the “unofficial” millenarianism of American prophecy 
belief, in which freelance variations on dispensationalism blend into conspiracy theory 
and other ideas from the cultic milieu. The categories of “official” and “unofficial” are 
distinct from the distinction between explanatory and predictive millenarianism made in 
Chapter 2; there is some correspondence between them, however, since one of the aims 
of the official sponsors of dispensationalism was to discourage Christians from indulging 
in date-setting. In this, as we shall see, they were only partly successful.
Official millenarianism: dispensationalism
It is not surprising that the first Pentecostalists should have looked forward to the Second 
Coming: the conservative Protestantism from which the new movement sprang was 
strongly flavoured by apocalyptic expectation, albeit of a respectable, undemonstrative 
variety. In the early years of the 20th century, millions of evangelicals and 
fundamentalists believed that Jesus would return soon, before the thousand-year reign of 
the saints prophesied in the Book of Revelation: hence the name of this position, 
premillennialism. Many of them also subscribed to dispensationalism, an ingenious 
variety of premillennialism that acquired a huge following in America thanks to the best­
selling Scofield Reference Bible (1909), which incorporated dispensationalist ideas in its 
marginal notes. The Scofield Bible was the Pentecostalists’ favourite edition of Scripture, 
and most Pentecostal denominations adopted its eschatology (Prosser, 1999: 253; Kay, 
2000: 129-133).
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Dispensationalism, whose adherents still number in the tens of millions, draws 
heavily on the ideas of John Nelson Darby (1800-92), an Anglican minister who left the 
Church of England to found the Plymouth Brethren. Darby divided human history into a 
structure of divine ages or dispensations not dissimilar to those constructed by medieval 
exegetes (McGinn, 1997 [1979]). According to dispensationalists, mankind currently 
lives in the “Church Age” in which Bible prophecy is not being fulfilled. But, at any 
moment, Christ could return for his Church, lifting all true believers into the clouds in the 
manner prophesied by Paul (1 Thess 4: 16-17), leaving everyone else behind. After this 
“secret Rapture”, the world will come under the sway of a seductive leader. Initially 
welcomed by as a peacemaker, this man will soon reveal himself to be the Antichrist, a 
Satanic tyrant who will desecrate the Temple at Jerusalem and order everyone to worship 
him. After seven terrible years of chaos and tyranny, the so-called Great Tribulation, 
Satanic forces will converge on Israel in order to destroy the Jews. As the armies gather 
at Armageddon, Christ and his saints will descend from the skies and destroy the enemy. 
King Jesus will reign from Jerusalem for 1,000 years. At the end of this period, Satan will 
mount one last rebellion. After it is defeated, the resurrection of the dead and the last 
judgment will take place; God will create a new heaven and a new earth for his people (T. 
Weber, 1979: 23).
The theologian James Barr, in his study of Protestant fundamentalism, describes 
dispensationalism as “a remarkable achievement of the mythopoetic fantasy”, adding that 
“as a feat of the imagination it might well compare with the apocalyptic poems of Blake, 
and indeed these latter may have done something to influence its origin” (1977: 195). 
From our perspective, its most interesting feature is the compromise it represents between 
high- and low-tension religious belief. On the one hand, dispensationalism focuses 
unwaveringly on the Bible’s apocalyptic passages, interpreting them literally wherever 
possible. It assures Christians that the apocalypse could come at any moment, and seeks 
to capitalise on the sense of urgency this creates by urging them to evangelise as many 
people as possible before the End. On the other hand, it incorporates a safety valve to 
protect against apocalyptic panic or disappointment. The pioneers of dispensationalism 
were determined not to witness a repeat of the Millerite fiasco; therefore they insisted that 
God’s prophetic clock had stopped for the duration of the Church Age and that any
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attempt to guess the date of the apocalypse was fruitless. In addition to this ban on 
predictive millenarianism, they also placed restrictions on the explanatory variety: while 
it was permissible to interpret the state of the world as evidence of mankind’s 
preordained slide into wickedness, nothing that happened in the contemporary world 
could be presented as the fulfilment of prophecy.
Given these restraints, both the benefits and the costs of dispensationalism tended 
to be relatively modest. James Snowden, one of the movement’s early critics, was struck 
by its limited impact on the lives of believers:
What do they [the dispensationalists] do that is different from what other Christians ... 
do on this subject? ... As far as w e can make out, they do not differ in their practice 
from other Christians, unless it be that they hold “prophetic conferences”; and carry on 
a propaganda to convert other Christians to their view. They do not engage in any 
distinctive or special kind o f  Christian service that fulfils their doctrine ... On 
pragmatic principles, i f  this doctrine is true, it should “make a difference” (Snowden, 
1919: 157-8, quoted in T. Weber, 1979: 44).
Arguably, however, the whole point of dispensationalism is that it does not make too 
much of a difference. A scholarly theory about the End Times which forbids risky 
speculation is unlikely to inspire extremes of belief or behaviour. Dispensationalism is a 
routinised form of apocalypticism, compatible with the exercise of denominational 
authority. Admittedly, its status in modem society has always been mildly deviant, in the 
sense that, even in the late 19th century, mainstream Christianity and secular orthodoxy 
rejected its premises; but, paradoxically, it was informed by the same sort of rationality 
that drove the Victorians to create systematic models of the development of civilisation or 
the evolution of species (quite an irony, given that dispensationalists were in the 
vanguard of the battle against the theory of evolution). For literal-minded Protestants, for 
whom Biblical verses possessed the status of hard data, the organisation of the 
contradictory texts of Ezekiel, Daniel, the Gospels, Thessalonians and Revelation into a 
single scheme served to strengthen the empirical basis of their beliefs.6 In Weberian
6 Barr, whose book about fundamentalism is marred by his inability to conceal his distaste for his subject, 
has this to say about dispensationalism’s approach to disparate texts: “The whole dispensationalist
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terms, this is an example of the development of the “rational theology” that accompanies 
the routinisation of charisma in Western society (M. Weber, 1970 [1948]: 327; O’Dea, 
1966; 43-45). Dispensationalism and other varieties of premillennialism, such as 
covenant theology, are complex theories, difficult to master; but this can be seen as an 
advantage, since they place the troublesome subject of the end of the world in the hands 
of what Weber called religious virtuosi — experts who have mastered a specialist 
eschatological discourse. This is reassuring for many ordinary believers, who can leave 
the burden of understanding apocalyptic prophecy to seminary-trained individuals who 
have “gone into” the relevant texts. In Festinger’s terms, the existence of a specialist 
discourse permits them to reduce the importance of a cognition — knowledge of an 
imminent End — that might otherwise make life unbearable. For those in authority, 
meanwhile, qualified prophecy commentators are supposed to act as border guards on the 
frontiers of doctrine, using their professional skills to repel “crazy” ideas from the cultic 
milieu. We can draw an analogy between the official millenarianism of dispensationalism 
and the scaled-down theology of healing adopted by the Pentecostal denominations. In 
both cases, those in religious authority have routinised a message that has the potential to 
channel power to the wrong people — doomsday prophets and bogus healers — and to 
damage the integrity of the belief system by exposing various charismatic claims to 
public ridicule.
Yet by any standards they have been only partly successful. In a religious tradition 
lacking a settled hierarchy, there can be no definitive map of the boundaries of acceptable 
belief and behaviour. Just as the Pentecostal world still struggles with disruptive prophets 
and dubious signs and wonders, so the conservative evangelical community plays host to 
innumerable tension-raising millenarian claims. As Barr points out, Christian 
fundamentalism lacks any conceptual mechanism capable of controlling eschatological 
speculation; it “is unable to discipline its own millenarian offspring” (1977: 206). Many 
“prophecy experts” have dubious qualifications, and use dispensationalism as a jumping
framework is in a certain mad way an attempt to cope with problems and facts that were being dealt with by 
critical study at the same time in a completely different mental world. Dispensationalism gives some sort of 
recognition, however distorted, to the fact that what Jesus says is not the same as what Paul says, that the 
gospels have a different theological role from the epistles, and that the idea of the kingdom of God does not 
easily fit into the customary structures of Christian doctrine” (1977: 198).
65
off point for their own heterodox theories, happily ignoring the prohibition against 
measuring contemporary events against Bible prophecy. The next section considers the 
place of their ideas in conservative evangelicalism as a whole.
Unofficial millenarianism: popular prophecy belief
When an evangelical Christian is described as being “into the End Times”, it is unlikely 
to mean that he or she is a specialist in dispensationalist theory. It is more likely to signal 
an appetite for popular material emanating from a prophecy subculture heavily influenced 
by American fundamentalism.7 This subculture straddles the respectable and the bizarre, 
theology and conspiracy, revivalism and survivalism. It influences the content of Sunday 
sermons, Right-wing websites and the tabloid magazines sold in American supermarkets, 
in which predictions of the return of Christ alternate with sightings of Elvis Presley. The 
basic framework of this prophecy belief is Protestant, premillennial and usually 
dispensationalist; a majority of its exponents expect the Second Coming to be preceded 
by the rise of Antichrist and the Great Tribulation. But, in its endlessly resourceful 
improvisations on biblical texts, and in its determination to unmask the Satanic 
conspirators leading the world to perdition, it strongly resembles the medieval and early 
modem prophetic texts described by Cohn (1993 [1970]), McGinn (1997 [1979]) and 
Mclver (1999). In the apocalyptic subculture, the specialist discourse of seminary 
professors shades imperceptibly into conspiracy theory, urban myth and the popular 
beliefs and practices of what Homsby-Smith (1991) calls “common religion”. As the 
folklorist Daniel Wojcik points out, apocalyptic ideas have often operated outside the 
sanction of religious institutions, and tend to be founded in personal experience rather 
than doctrine:
Today, many of the leading proponents of apocalyptic worldviews are not formally 
trained theologians associated with mainstream religious denominations ... but 
visionaries or prophecy interpreters who derive their apocalyptic authority from their
71 am aware that the use of the word “subculture” here might be seen as contentious. Christian prophecy 
enthusiasts are usually members of the broader subculture of conservative evangelical Christianity, so 
perhaps it would be more accurate — if pedantic — to speak of a “sub-subculture”.
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charisma, predictive abilities, or divinely inspired revelations attained outside the 
formal sanction o f dominant social institutions (1997: 16).
The anthropologist Susan Harding has depicted the consequences of this eschatological 
free market:
The old-fashioned dispensationalist scheme is still spoken in sermons on the Rapture, 
the Tribulation, and the Second Com ing, in self-declared pretribulational, 
premillennial churches (see ads in the Yellow Pages), and in books by (older) Dallas 
Theological Seminary professors. But believers are routinely exposed to an 
undifferentiated array o f  variations —  in other sermons by their preachers, in other 
books (the prophecy sections in most Christian bookstores contain a hodgepodge o f  
millennial texts), in television, audio and video tapes, in conversations among 
Christian friends from other churches (1994: 66).
On the face of it, the popularity of this sort of improvised prophecy belief within 
conservative evangelicalism represents a failure of boundary maintenance by the 
proponents of official millenarian schemes. Yet such a failure was inevitable, given the 
unstable nature of millenarianism and its usefulness as an analytical tool. It was 
unrealistic of strict dispensationalists to expect that the faithful, while being assured that 
Christ could return at any time, would refrain from looking for signs of the End in the
tViworld around them. The 20 century offered too many clues that the Last Days were 
about to begin, the most striking of which were the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the 
foundation of the state of Israel in 1948. Since the Middle Ages, apocalyptic believers 
had looked forward to the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, and the fulfilment of the 
prophecy so soon after the invention of nuclear weapons that promised a literal 
Armageddon was enough to persuade many dispensationalists that God’s prophetic clock
o
had started ticking again.
8 Harding (1994: 66) writes that “the heterogeneity, instability and partiality of dispensational narrative 
framings of current events undermine the absolute ‘futurism’ of Bible prophecies. Everyone ‘knows for 
certain’ that no Bible prophecy can be fulfilled before the Rapture. But what if events scheduled to occur 
after the Rapture seem to occur before it? Much of the variation in dispensational discourse revolves around 
questions such as these.”
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The full explanatory power of popular premillennialism was revealed after Israel’s 
victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, which seemed to provide further evidence of the 
fulfilment of prophecy. In 1970, Hal Lindsey published The Late Great Planet Earth 
(1971 [1970]), a fundamentalist Christian analysis of the Cold War which was to become 
the best-selling American non-fiction title of the decade (Boyer, 1992: 5). Lindsey, a 
former Mississippi tug boat captain, offered his audience a brilliant contemporary spin on 
dispensationalism, showing how the emerging crisis in the Middle East would soon lead 
to the emergence of a diabolical “Future Fiihrer”. Initially charismatic, this world leader 
would reveal himself as the Antichrist, initiating a persecution that would make the 
regimes of Hitler, Mao and Stalin “look like Girl Scouts weaving a daisy chain” (1971 
[1970]: 110). But the book’s real originality lay in its detail, and in particular its depiction 
of the post-Tribulation nuclear war. Biblical descriptions of lightning, hailstones, beasts 
and “locusts with scorpion tails” were identified as, respectively, missiles, ICBMs, 
armoured tanks and Cobra helicopters spraying nerve gas from their tails. Lindsey 
produced the testimony of engineers and scientists to demonstrate the divine prescience 
of biblical texts — and all within a framework of God’s unalterable plan for mankind.9
The Late Great Planet Earth introduced premillennialism to millions of people and 
breathed new life into prophecy literature. The influence of such material on born-again 
Christianity has been considerable — yet it has not been welcomed by everyone in the 
community. There are a number of vociferous evangelical opponents of the prophecy 
subculture, whose reservations are shared by many ordinary church members. Books such 
as William Alnor’s Soothsayers o f the Second Advent (1989), B J Oropeza’s 99 Reasons 
Why No One Knows When Christ Will Return (1994) and Richard Abanes’s End-Time 
Visions (1998) roundly mock the prophetic pretensions of Lindsey and his imitators. 
Alnor, Oropeza and Abanes are Bible-believing Christians who object to what they 
regard as the prophecy genre’s frivolous interpretations of Scripture. They are not writing
9 For example, Lindsey asserts that the feet of the returning Jesus will first touch the earth where they left it, 
on the Mount of Olives. This will cause the mountain to split in two, creating a crevice running from the 
Dead Sea to the Mediterranean. Lindsey adds: “It was reported to me that an oil company doing seismic 
studies of this area in quest of oil discovered a gigantic fault running east and west precisely through the 
Mount of Olives. The fault is so severe that it could split at any time. It is awaiting ‘the foot’ ” (1971 
[1970]: 174). This marshalling of small pieces of data is typical of the prophecy genre: it suggests that 
secular corroboration plays a crucial role in validating supernatural claims, just as it does in the case of 
Pentecostal faith healers who produce doctors’ affidavits as evidence of cures.
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from a secular perspective; but they do employ reason and scientific data in an attempt to 
demolish what they regard as demonstrably wrong empirical assertions. Their criticisms 
resemble those levelled at the “signs and wonders” movement in the essays by Smail, 
Walker and Wright that we considered earlier: in both cases, the authors are trying to 
protect the religious tradition from damage to its reputation caused by dubious and 
disconfirmable ideas.
One of the major charges laid against popular prophecy by its evangelical 
opponents is that, by issuing false predictions of the Rapture or the return of Christ, it 
invites the ultimate disconfirmation. According to Oropeza (1994), date-setting can “ruin 
a believer’s faith”, “ruin a teacher’s reputation” and “make a mockery of Christianity”. It 
is certainly true that many prophecy authors have crossed the line from explanatory to 
predictive millenarianism. In the last quarter of the 20th century, commentators such as 
Harold Campling and Jack Van Impe issued a series of “possible” deadlines for the 
Rapture. Perhaps because they were so careful to open up rhetorical escape routes for 
themselves (“I could be wrong, but...”) they were rarely taken seriously; but from time to 
time a prediction would gain sufficient currency to alarm church leaders. In 1988, Edgar 
Whisenant, a former NASA engineer, published a book entitled 88 Reasons Why the 
Rapture Will Be in 1988 that caused a considerable stir in conservative evangelical 
circles; 4.5 million copies were printed. “Nearly every evangelical Christian in America 
was at least aware of Whisenant’s predictions,” writes Alnor. “Some laughed. Others 
dared not” (1989: 29). Better known authors, such as Hal Lindsey and the Canadian 
evangelist Grant Jeffrey, flirted with millennial arithmetic in more subtle ways: Lindsey 
suggested that the apocalypse might occur within a biblical generation (40 years) of the 
founding of Israel in 1948. Abanes quotes a prophecy teacher reminiscing about the early 
days of Calvary Chapel, a network of mildly Charismatic congregations founded by 
Chuck Smith in the 1970s:
How excited we were. Oh, some o f  the prophecy preachers got a little out o f  hand and 
those plagues like Revelation 9 were Vietnam helicopters and you know we sort o f  
started dating things and we were even told that a generation is 40 years, and when 
Israel became a nation in 1948 it would be 40 years and the Lord would come. So we 
back it up [advance the deadline] seven. So the Rapture’s coming in 1981. I’ve met
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people all over this country who believed that, followed that, and anticipated that. It 
did not come and as a result many o f  them bombed out, dropped out, copped out -  
they’re not around anymore (1998: 327).
Today, Calvary Chapel is a hugely successful operation, celebrated by the sociologist 
Donald Miller in his book Reinventing American Protestantism (1997) as an example of 
culturally innovative “new paradigm” evangelicalism. Calvary congregations offer a 
relaxed, informal style of worship that can be seen as a calculated attempt to lower 
subcultural deviance; one would never guess from Miller’s admiring portrait that they 
had engaged in anything as deviant and risky as date-setting. The quotation from the 
prophecy teacher suggests that, although predictive millenarianism might be stigmatised 
in respectable evangelical churches, it can sometimes be found lurking beneath the 
surface.
Explanatory millenarianism is as vulnerable to disconfirmation as the predictive 
variety, albeit on a smaller scale. Evangelical opponents of the genre are well aware of 
this, and rarely miss an opportunity to stress the all-round unreliability of unofficial 
apocalyptic ideas as a guide to the future. As Abanes puts it:
If God reveals every detail before it happens, then why didn’t he reveal the date o f  the 
Jews’ 1948 return to Palestine, the date o f the Six-Day War in Jerusalem, the date o f  
the fall o f  communism and so forth? Virtually all doomsday-setters consider such 
events prophetically significant, yet we have no evidence that anyone predicted the 
date —  not even the month or year —  o f these events (1994: 26-7).
What worries these critics even more, however, is the association of prophecy belief with 
other forms of deviant secret knowledge. Oropeza’s 99 Reasons Why No One Knows 
When Christ Will Return — the title an obvious send-up of Whisenant — provides a tour 
d ’horizon of the “unbiblical ideas” that have been generated by Christian prophecy belief 
or have become grafted onto it in the cultic milieu. The book’s “reasons” include: 
“Discerning the signs of the times does not warrant date suggestions”; “Humans lived on 
earth prior to 4004 BC”; “Scripture does not say that Christ will return by AD 2000”; 
“Current earthquakes do not tell us the time of the End”; “The fact that Israel has returned
70
to Palestine does not necessarily mean that Christ will return in our generation”; “We do 
not know that the European Union is the revived Roman Empire”; “We do not know that 
the Roman Catholic Church is the Whore of Babylon”; “UFO enthusiasts do not know 
the date of the End”; “The prophecies of Nostradamus are not accurate”; “The Procter & 
Gamble company is not Satanist”; and “The current Universal Product Code is not the 
Mark of the Beast.” Oropeza’s list provides a useful map of the boundaries of Christian 
prophecy belief and what lies just beyond them: motifs from the occult, the New Age and 
secular conspiracy theory. His book shows how the prophecy genre brings together 
different types of deviant knowledge. These include empirically questionable data from 
Christian and secular sources, such as claims that the earth is 6,000 years old and dubious 
statistics relating to earthquakes; religious statements that are thought morally 
unacceptable in a pluralist society, such as anti-Catholic rhetoric; the disconfirmable 
predictions of astrologers and psychics, cited with surprising frequency by Christian 
prophecy authors; obvious urban myths; and conspiracy theories current on the Far Right.
What Oropeza and the others are saying, in effect, is that unofficial millenarianism 
carries with it crippling costs. So why, then, do so many conservative evangelical 
churches — themselves cautious in their pronouncements about the End Times — help to 
circulate the works of freelance prophecy writers, including outright date-setters and 
conspiracy theorists? Why is the boundary with the cultic milieu not policed with more 
vigilance? Barr makes the point that fundamentalism lacks a conceptual instrument that is 
capable of controlling millennialism; but nor is there much of a will to do so, judging by 
the shelves of colourful prophecy material to be found in church bookshops in America 
and Britain. The basic explanation for this lack of concern, I would suggest, is that the 
theoretical costs of unofficial millenarianism rarely translate into actual social costs; its 
disruptive potential remains unfulfilled. There are two major reasons for this. The first is 
that only a minority of born-again Christians are “into the End Times” — and those who 
are find themselves occupying a mildly deviant and not particularly influential position 
within the community. The second is that popular prophecy does not require its 
consumers to engage in socially disruptive activity: it is in many ways a form of 
entertainment.
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Some born-again Christians are fascinated by the End Times, but many others 
either have no interest in it or only occasionally read a book devoted to the subject. The 
level of prophecy belief — official and unofficial — varies between and across 
congregations. The historian Paul Boyer offers this topography of the subculture:
I have found it helpful to visualise the world o f  prophecy b elief as a series o f  
concentric circles, at the centre o f  which is a core o f  devotees who spend much time 
thinking about the B ib le’s apocalyptic passages and trying to organise them into a 
coherent scenario. These are the men and women who attend prophecy conferences; 
raise the topic in Sunday school classes and Bible study groups; and avidly devour the 
prophecy paperbacks, cassette tapes and study aids that annually pour into the market 
... Next in this concentric series one finds those believers who may be hazy about the 
details o f  biblical eschatology, but who nevertheless believe that the Bible provides 
clues to future events ... In the outer circle there are those superficially secular 
individuals who exhibit little overt prophecy interest, but whose worldview is 
nevertheless shaped to some degree by residual or latent concepts o f  eschatology 
(1992:2-3).
Boyer is right to emphasise that there are different levels of prophecy belief, but his 
notion of a “core” of devotees is potentially misleading. Many of the people who attend 
official, church-sponsored prophecy conferences are also enthusiasts for conspiracy 
theories and other forms of rejected knowledge from the cultic milieu — often to the 
dismay of other believers. They are sometimes known by fellow worshippers as 
“prophecy nuts” or some similar dismissive term. Far from making up the core of 
congregations, such people can find themselves pushed to the fringes relegated to an 
outer circle alongside other “difficult” types, such as people who issue unorthodox 
personal prophecies (with whom they may in any case overlap). They are, however, 
unlikely to find themselves excluded from the wider religious community. Partly this is 
because born-again Christianity has such permeable borders; someone whose 
millenarianism is too intense for one congregation can easily switch allegiance to another. 
But the fact remains that even pastors who play down the subject of prophecy in their 
sermons are prepared to sell conspiracy-flavoured material to “prophecy nuts” and other
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interested parties. They feel free to do so because they regard it as essentially harmless: 
with the exception of the occasional date-setting embarrassment, the practical 
consequences of unofficial millenarianism are limited. Just as Snowden wondered what 
difference dispensationalism made to the lives of believers, so one might ask what 
prophecy fans actually do with the knowledge that the European Union is controlled by a 
Satanic computer in Brussels or that supermarket barcodes conceal the Number of the 
Beast. The answer is that they do little, since the terms of this particular apocalyptic 
discourse rarely require any action other than the consumption of more prophecy 
material.
In theory, the claims made by prophecy experts might seem to pose a threat to the 
holders of religious authority within the conservative evangelical denominations. 
Sometimes problems do arise — for example, when someone invokes a personal message 
from God in support of an apocalyptic argument.10 For the most part, however, prophecy 
authors do not pose a significant threat to church order. Hal Lindsey and his imitators are 
not interested in attracting disciples or founding their own sects: their prime concern 
seems to be to carve out a paying audience for their message and to hold on to it. They 
are constantly updating their material to take account of new trends in the marketplace, 
and to disguise the disconfirmation of earlier prophecies: the Canadian fundamentalist 
Grant Jeffrey, for example, was quick to exploit the mid-1990s fad for discovering hidden 
codes in the Bible and the later panic over the Y2K computer bug. The most obvious 
question raised by such material is the one that was raised in Chapter 2: to what extent is 
it a form of entertainment?
10 The folklorist Robert Glenn Howard, who monitors Christian apocalyptic websites, writes that the people 
posting to them tend to adopt one of two conflicting modes of argumentation: appeals to “truth as known 
through individual experience”, and appeals to “truth as pursued through pluralistic negotiation” (1999: 4). 
Howard sees these modes as opposite ends of a spectrum. At the “revealed” end, a website called 
AlphathroughOmega.com predicts that the Rapture will occur after the Great Tribulation. This is a familiar, 
if minority, evangelical scenario — but the website’s owners, a computer technician called Gene and his 
wife Susan, support it with an appeal to divine knowledge which has been granted to them. Gene is “not 
interested in exploring the possibility that he might be wrong because his knowledge is the result of direct 
experience with God” (6). At the “negotiated” end of the spectrum, meanwhile, is ldolphin.org, a popular 
End Times site run by Lambert Dolphin, a retired American physicist. This presents a standard 
dispensationalist scenario; there are no risky predictions, and Dolphin respectfully “compares notes” with 
other evangelical authorities. Howard adds that most End Times debaters on the Internet lie somewhere in 
the middle of the spectrum. This conclusion is consonant with the history of millennial belief, which 
suggests that it is difficult to introduce or interpret any authoritative prophecy without making some sort of 
claim to charismatic authority.
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In 1995, a quarter of a century after The Late Great Planet Earth, premillennialism 
once again crossed over into the bestseller lists — but this time as fiction. The novel Left 
Behind and its many sequels, written by veteran prophecy author Tim LaHaye and 
journalist Jerry Jenkins, are set during the worldwide Tribulation that follows the 
Rapture: the first book observers this event from the vantage point of an international 
flight on which many passengers suddenly disappear, leaving behind their socks, shoes 
and clothes (LaHaye and Jenkins, 1995: 16). By 2002, the novels had sold 50 million 
copies (McCain, 2002). Like Lindsey, LaHaye and Jenkins insist that there is an 
evangelistic purpose behind their mass-market approach; but it could be argued that, by 
adopting the medium of the novel, they are unintentionally making it more difficult for 
their audience to take the Rapture doctrine seriously. The Left Behind sequence leaves 
intact the outline of dispensationalism, but neatly sidesteps the question of its credibility. 
Instead, it presents it in a form — popular fiction — that is acceptable not only to secular 
society, but also to Bible-believing Christians who are not themselves “prophecy nuts”. 
Arguably, the novels provide evidence of an aspect of secularisation. The authors claim 
that they are a way of reaching unbelievers; but might they reflect what the sociologist 
James Davison Hunter (1983, 1987) maintains is a shift in the cognitive style of 
evangelical Christians away from literal belief in difficult doctrines? We shall return to 
this question later in this study.
Obviously we cannot dismiss popular prophecy belief as pure entertainment; but 
nor is there much evidence to suggest, as several commentators have done, that it 
supplies the hidden dynamic of evangelical Christianity. According to Barr, 
millenarianism probably has “much more influence within conservative evangelicalism 
than would appear on the surface”, and it is “likely that many conservative evangelicals 
personally entertain strongly millennial ideas, even when they know that it is not 
expedient to put them in the shop window” (1977: 202-3). The more one studies the 
literature that serves as the major carrier of such ideas, however, the harder it is to take 
seriously as the expression of an ideology. Rather, it emerges all the more clearly as 
religious rhetoric, endlessly adaptable, sensitive to mood, whose propositions possess 
formidable explanatory power but rarely provoke significant social action.
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Pentecostal perspectives
Present-day Pentecostalism has a curious relationship with prophecy belief in both its 
official and unofficial variants. A minority of Pentecostalists are heavily “into the End 
Times” and buy uncritically into versions of the dispensationalist package of doctrines. 
This is not surprising, given that Pentecostalist Bible schools traditionally teach 
dispensationalism, and that many healing evangelists of the postwar years, such as Oral 
Roberts and Jimmy Swaggart, were dispensationalists (Prosser, 1999: 258). What my 
fieldwork suggests, however, is that Pentecostalists who are preoccupied with the End 
Times are — to an even greater extent than in other evangelical churches — often 
marginalised within congregations: the whole subject is seen by some members of the 
community as somehow old-fashioned and un-Pentecostal.
The evangelical historian Peter Prosser (1999) argues that the sterile formulae of 
premillennialism are alien to the spontaneous spirit of Pentecostalism. He doubts that the 
movement ever really took dispensationalism to heart, and questions whether, even in the 
early days, it was as millenarian as it appeared to outsiders. He lists the characteristics of 
Pentecostalism that were intensified by awareness of an approaching Last Judgment: 
diffidence towards worldly affairs, militaristic rhetoric, personal asceticism and 
missionary zeal. But he adds that none of these is wholly explained by millenarianism; to 
some extent each was a product of other traditions inherited by the movement. “The point 
rather is that millenarianism seems to have sharpened the edges, stoked the fires, 
intensified the colours of their world,” he concludes (1999: 26-7). Prosser’s own view is 
that Pentecostalism should move away from Darbyite theology and concentrate instead 
on the more optimistic holiness tradition followed by many black and Hispanic 
Pentecostal churches, thus freeing the gifts of the Spirit to work socially and politically in 
the present (288-9).
Margaret Poloma, in a recent essay, also questions the importance of traditional 
End Times rhetoric to modem Pentecostals:
While some Pentecostals joined their evangelical and fundamentalist cousins who 
focus on interpreting the prophetic elements in the Book o f  Revelation, many more 
downplay the details o f  premillennial eschatology ... These believers prefer a more 
practical, utilitarian and personal experience o f  the prophetic that is bom through
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common experience o f  the prophetic and nurtured through prophetic myths (2001:
169).
Prophecy is integral to the Pentecostal worldview, writes Poloma, but more as a prayerful 
religious experience of the individual than as a detailed blueprint for the Last Days. One 
question worth asking is whether this orientation reflects an attempt by the Pentecostal 
denominations — that is, church leaders rather than ordinary believers — to play down 
their millenarian inheritance. As we have seen, dispensationalism does exist as a 
respectable, quasi-scholarly discourse; but its overtones are fundamentalist rather than 
Pentecostal, and it is also associated with popular conspiracy beliefs that sit uneasily with 
the professional ethos of emerging denominations. There may be a parallel here with 
Seventh-day Adventism, a once overtly apocalyptic sect which has moved a long way 
towards accommodation with society. Ronald Lawson’s recent survey of Adventists 
found that pastors gave a low priority to eschatology, and that their seminaries and 
religious departments generally avoided the subject (1997: 215-6). This suggests that, for 
Adventist leaders, the marginalisation of apocalyptic doctrines was an effective way of 
lowering subcultural deviance. There is some evidence that Pentecostalism is moving in 
the same direction: witness, for example, Elim’s 1994 decision to remove any reference 
to the Millennium from its list of “fundamental truths”. As William Kay points out, this 
move in no way denies the return of Christ, allowing instead a variety of evangelical 
views to be held on the subject (2000: 133); but, considered alongside Elim’s 
increasingly vague statements about healing, it does point to some degree of 
accommodation with mainstream Christianity.
It is also true, however, that the routinisation of Pentecostal healing and prophecy 
has been challenged by the high-tension claims of the “signs and wonders” movement. In 
much the same way, any downplaying of dispensational theory has been offset, in some 
churches, by a new eschatological fervour that also owes much to the Third Wave. The 
Wimberite excitements of the 1980s and 90s did not just create an upsurge in reports of 
the miraculous: they also intensified some Pentecostalists’ sense of living in the Last 
Days. The two key concepts here are Revival and Restoration. Pentecostalism has always 
been revivalist, but it became intensely so at the end of the 20 century — and that, in
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itself, raised the eschatological temperature. Revivalism was described to me by one 
Kensington Temple pastor as “eschatology in disguise”. According to an often quoted 
verse from Matthew’s Gospel, the good news “will be preached throughout the whole 
world, as a testimony to the nations; and then the end will come” (Matt. 24: 14). This 
prophecy and others lend an apocalyptic charge to the whole notion of revival: any 
sudden move of the Spirit resulting in many conversions becomes a candidate for the 
final outpouring of grace before Jesus comes back. It is only fair to point out that, as a 
result, many preachers are careful to qualify their use of the word “revival”: they speak of 
the “coming” revival or a “possible” revival. But this hesitancy only underlines the 
potency of the concept: no sooner is the word used than the promise of the End is in the 
air.
Hand in hand with the prospect of revival, meanwhile, went an increasing 
Pentecostal fascination with the concept of Restoration. This word, too, is highly charged. 
The movement known as Restorationism, which surfaced in middle-class house churches 
in the 1960s, aims to return the worldwide Church to the New Testament pattern 
described in St Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians:
And his gifts were that some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, 
some pastors and teachers, to equip the saints for the work o f  the ministry, for 
building up the body o f  Christ (Eph. 4: 11-12).
tViIn the last decade of the 20 century, several important Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal 
churches, including Kensington Temple, declared their intention to restore the apostolic 
orders, just as the house churches had 20 years earlier. In doing so, however, they took on 
board ideas about the end of history that subtly contradicted the traditional doctrines of 
classic Pentecostalism. As Andrew Walker has pointed out, the very concept of 
Restoration is eschatological; but its vision of the future is not as catastrophic as that of 
premillennialism, which focuses on themes of tribulation and Antichrist. Restorationists 
believe that they are living in the End Times; however, instead of this era being 
characterised by chaos and wars, they expect it to be marked by “an outpouring of God’s 
Spirit culminating in the establishment of the kingdom that is ready and fit for the return
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of the King” (1989: 30-1). Stephen Hunt argues that, by taking on board Restorationist 
themes of the return of a New Testament pattern, the Wimberite neo-Pentecostalists 
acquired some of the key tenets of postmillennialism, the idea that the rule of the saints 
will occur before Jesus returns (2001: 58). Postmillennialism is traditionally foreign to 
classic Pentecostal churches; yet those closest to the Third Wave, such as Kensington 
Temple, have undoubtedly been touched by its apocalyptic optimism.
This development has created something of an ideological dilemma for classic 
Pentecostalists caught up in Restorationist revivalism. How can the notion of an emerging 
kingdom be reconciled with belief in the imminent rule of Antichrist and the Rapture of 
the Church? One way of squaring the circle for believers is to engage in complicated 
ideological work; another is not to let such theoretical considerations loom too large. 
Premillennialism and postmillennialism are sometimes treated by scholars as alternative 
beliefs separated by a vast theological gulf; the reality is that they are often mixed up 
with each other, and it is not uncommon for evangelical Christians to oscillate between a 
pessimistic premillennial scenario and an optimistic postmillennial one depending on 
their mood and circumstances. Susan Harding (1994) has shown how, during the 1980s, 
the premillennialist Religious Right in America was tempted by the success of its 
political project to flirt with postmillennialism. Something similar happened to many 
Pentecostals and Charismatics in the 1990s: confronted by the extraordinary growth of 
their congregations, they scented victory rather than preordained disaster. But, lacking the 
relish of their fundamentalist brethren for detailed eschatology, these Spirit-filled 
Christians did not let any ideological contradictions worry them too much. Instead, they 
revelled in visions of revivalism and Restoration, their relaxed attitude to their 
premillennial inheritance serving only to highlight the discursive, contingent and 
utilitarian nature of apocalypticism in the Pentecostal tradition.11
11 Andre Droogers (2001: 48) argues that Pentecostals have a special capacity for “the paradoxical 
combination of opposite characteristics”. He cites the contrast between, on the one hand, a long-term, 
apocalyptic view of history, and, on the other, the use of Pentecostal gifts to solve problems in the short 
term. Other examples include the vigorous participation of believers in a secular world they profess to 
despise, and, in Pentecostal services, “the simultaneous presence o f spontaneity and control, or of 
individual expression and social conformity”. In short, it seems possible that Pentecostals have a greater 
tolerance for contradiction than more regimented religious traditions, and this has obvious implications for 
the present study.
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Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to place Pentecostalism’s relationship with apocalyptic 
theology in the wider context of routinisation and boundary maintenance. Pentecostalism 
has always made claims about the empirical realm that require careful management. The 
vulnerability of such claims to disproof, and the difficulty of reconciling them with the 
exercise of traditional authority, has meant that Pentecostalism has undergone a degree of 
routinisation; but it has also received regular infusions of charismatic authority in the 
shape of controversial revivalist ministries. The movement is therefore pulled 
simultaneously towards and away from accommodation with the reality of everyday life. 
This double movement is observable in the Pentecostalist relationship with the 
charismatic claims of millenarianism. The apocalyptic teachings that Pentecostalism has 
borrowed from American fundamentalism form an uncomfortable inheritance, and not 
just for Pentecostalists: as we have seen, many non-Pentecostal evangelicals are 
suspicious of the prophecy subculture. For Pentecostalists, dispensationalist prophecy 
belief poses special difficulties, since it sits uneasily with their understanding of prophecy 
as something spontaneous and personal. Yet some worshippers still subscribe;to the 
traditional premillennial doctrine of the End Times, while others have been drawn by 
promises of revival into an unmistakably apocalyptic vision of the triumph of the Church.
Any attempt to consider the costs and benefits of millenarianism in a Pentecostal 
context must take into account a wide variety of competing ideas and practical dilemmas. 
There are bound to be conflicting ideas about the appropriate degree of subcultural 
deviance for a movement which combines strikingly countercultural beliefs and practices 
with a commitment to Christian orthodoxy. The sources of authority in global 
Pentecostalism are far too diffuse for any one leader or organisation to hope to raise or 
lower the overall degree of tension that exists between the movement and the Western 
secular consensus. At the level of the local church, however, it is certainly possible to 
manipulate subcultural deviance through the management of Charismatic gifts and 
apocalyptic ideas; indeed, such management is essential if the believing community is to 
flourish and plausibility structures are to be maintained. To observe this dynamic at close 
quarters, we now turn to Kensington Temple.
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4. Kensington Temple
Introduction
This chapter sets the scene for our later discussion of the circulation of apocalyptic ideas 
at Kensington Temple. It describes the history and organisational structure of this large, 
multi-ethnic Pentecostal church, and introduces its dynamic senior pastor, Colin Dye. We 
see how the life of the congregation reflects the religious trends discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3, such as the increasing role of consumer choice in the everyday spirituality of born- 
again Christians. Kensington Temple also reproduces on a small scale the conflicting 
demands of high- and low-tension religion, and in the second half of the chapter we see 
how Dye and his flock attempt to reconcile these demands by engaging in the rational 
management of charisma. On the one hand, they are open to the “signs and wonders” that 
swept through the Charismatic world in the 1990s; on the other, they take measures 
against cognitive dissonance and discourage excesses of enthusiasm and theology that 
might raise subcultural deviance to an unacceptable degree. Leaders and ordinary 
worshippers alike are wary of “difficult” or “superspiritual” people who; attach 
disproportionate importance to miraculous phenomena or prophecy belief.
‘KT’: a church with a mission
The church on the comer
Every Saturday morning, hundreds of tourists pour out of Notting Hill Gate underground 
station and walk past a parade of coffee bars and antique shops on their way to Portobello 
Market. As they do so, they pass a grey stone Victorian church with imposing twin 
towers. Very few of them give it a second glance. There are dozens of these slightly
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forbidding neo-Gothic buildings in west London. Many of them have been taken over by 
Pentecostal Christians who speak in tongues and pray for miraculous healing — practices 
quite alien to the staid denominations that built the original churches. In London, 
Pentecostal congregations are largely made up of members of ethnic minorities: Africans, 
West Indians, Filipinos, Latin Americans. Kensington Temple, known to almost everyone 
in the church as “KT”, is one of these churches.
Every few minutes during the day, worshippers arrive on the local red buses and, 
after the services or meetings, form queues at the bus stops. Most of them belong to 
social groups traditionally associated with Pentecostalism. There are old black ladies in 
the straw hats beloved of the first generation of Caribbean immigrants. They are much in 
evidence on Sunday mornings, their cheerful banter in sharp contrast to the shy smiles of 
another KT “type”, the middle-aged Filipina women who often work as checkout 
assistants in the local supermarkets. There are students from Brazil, Singapore and 
Eastern Europe, clutching heavily annotated zip-up Bibles as they fish for change for the 
fare. On Saturday afternoons, while the tourists walk back from the market, the church 
hosts Nigerian or Ghanaian weddings; this produces the most colourful bus queues of the 
week, with departing and arriving guests dressed in the dazzling silk robes of tribal 
chieftains and their wives. On weekday evenings, in contrast, many worshippers are 
barely identifiable as churchgoers at all. They are young men and women, mostly black, 
dressed in businesslike suits; with their clipboards and mobile phones they could be 
delegates at a sales conference. Even so, most of the women arrive on the bus.
So far, there is nothing very surprising in all this: although some Pentecostal 
churches in London cater almost exclusively to one ethnic group, others create a rich 
demographic stew of races and nationalities. At Kensington Temple, however, there are 
unexpected ingredients in the mixture. A few worshippers are middle-aged white people 
who, judging by their well-tailored suits and skirts, belong to the professional classes 
who have colonised Notting Hill in the past decade. (This is an area in which, at the turn 
of the millennium, the average one-bedroomed flat cost £250,000 and most houses well 
over a million pounds). This in itself is unusual. In Britain, such people are rarely found 
in Pentecostal churches: if they are attracted to speaking in tongues or healing services 
they tend to go to churches which describe themselves as “Charismatic evangelical”, in
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which the gifts of the Holy Spirit are experienced in a more restrained or sophisticated 
way than in the classic Pentecostal tradition. In addition, many visitors to KT look like 
typical student backpackers; a number of them speak with Australian or South African 
accents and sport the deep tan of the habitual traveller.
An observer might also notice that that worshippers emerge from services clutching 
not a photocopied newsletter, as in other local churches, but an impressively glossy 
magazine called Revival Times. Produced once a month, its 28 fiill-colour pages speak of 
ambitions and resources well beyond the reach of even the largest Anglican or Catholic 
parish. The issue of May 1999, for example, carried on its cover an image of thousands of 
worshippers filling the stalls and balconies of the Royal Albert Hall; many of them had an 
arm outstretched in a gesture that indicated their openness to the Holy Spirit. Inside, a 
message from Colin Dye, KT’s senior pastor, appeared underneath his photograph. He is 
white, slim and pale-skinned, with neatly-cut dark hair dramatically streaked with grey. 
“What an amazing God we serve!” he wrote. “The Easter Monday services at the Royal 
Albert Hall were everything we hoped for. I will never forget the sense of the presence of 
God, the levels of high praise and passionate worship and the manifestation of God’s 
power.” The reader was left in no doubt that the rally, though attended by people from 
many churches, was a Kensington Temple event. There was, however, not one reference 
in the magazine to KT’s mother denomination, the Elim Foursquare Gospel Church.
How can one small church afford to hire the Albert Hall, filling it twice in one day? 
In fact, “Kensington Temple” is shorthand for much more than one building. It is really a 
network of congregations which, during the 1990s, was sometimes described in the media 
as Britain’s largest church; estimates of its size range from 3,000 to 15,000 worshippers, 
depending on whether affiliated congregations are counted as part of the whole. The 
pages of the May 1999 issue of Revival Times were sprinkled with references to zones 
and satellites, to ethnic fellowships, special conferences and cell groups. There were 
advertisements for an evangelistic crusade in West Africa, to be led by Colin Dye (cost: 
£1,100) and a Christian school sponsored by the church (fees: £3,000 a year). All these 
were KT projects. Confusingly, though, the magazine also referred throughout to 
something called the London City Church (LCC), with offices in North Acton rather than 
Notting Hill Gate. In fact, the LCC is Kensington Temple writ large. In the mid 1990s,
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after years of spectacular growth, KT embarked on an ambitious plan to transform itself 
into a city-wide network of Pentecostal churches, ministries and cell groups. To this end 
it leased a former BBC warehouse building in Acton and divided it into offices, a Bible 
college and a 3,000-seater arena called the Tabernacle; KT would remain the spiritual 
home of this London City Church, but this would be its nerve centre. At Easter 2000, 
however, these plans suffered a catastrophic setback. KT was unable to renew the lease 
on the building, and many staff and services had to be relocated at short notice to the 
cramped original building. As a result, scores of people who, until recently, travelled to 
Acton for the Sunday evening revival meeting have found themselves back in Notting 
Hill Gate; the bus queues have lengthened significantly.
The history o f Kensington Temple
The foundation stone of Kensington Temple is dated 20 August 1848. It was laid by 
members of a prosperous Congregational church in Homton Street, Kensington, who 
wanted to help “the poor and neglected people of Notting Hill Vale”, then one of 
London’s most insalubrious areas; at the meeting at which the project was commissioned, 
some of the Homton Street worshippers were so moved that they wept. The new building 
was christened Horbury Chapel, after the Yorkshire birthplace of one of its founders. 
Wealthy Londoners began to worship there with their servants (Hywel-Davies, 1998: 25- 
6). By the 1920s, however, attendance at the chapel had fallen so sharply that it was 
forced to close, and after a period standing empty it was bought by the Elim 
Pentecostalist Alliance. The Alliance was led by George Jeffreys, a young lay preacher 
who launched a campaign to evangelise Ireland at the beginning of the First World War. 
Jeffreys’ initiative became the Elim movement, named after an Israelite encampment in 
the Book of Exodus (15: 27). By 1920 it was holding revival meetings in borrowed halls 
and tents all around Britain. Jeffreys was a spellbinding preacher, capable of winning two 
or three thousand converts in each campaign. There were rallies in the Albert Hall and the 
Crystal Palace. The Daily Express reported incredulously on an Elim convention: 
“Swinging arms and resonantly clapping hands. Again and again — the same verse ... It 
was a species of trance creation. Hysteria seemed at hand. They were lashed and urged by 
massed melody into an unearthly joy” (quoted in Wilson, 1961: 38). Under Jeffreys,
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Horbury chapel, re-named Kensington Temple, became the headquarters of a World 
Revival Crusade; it was dubbed by the newspapers “the Church of the Great Physician” 
because of the many miracles reported there.
This success did not last. The outbreak of war in 1939 and the subsequent 
evacuation emptied many London churches. More damaging for Kensington Temple, 
however, was the dispute about church government that broke out between Jeffreys and 
his colleagues. Jeffreys attempted to dismantle the administrative hierarchy of the 
movement; he lost the struggle and resigned from Elim. Bryan Wilson (1961: 49; 1990: 
116) offers the controversy as an example of the tension that can arise between a 
charismatic leader and supporters of a routinised, denominationalised form of 
government.1 From our point of view, it is interesting to note that the argument was also 
at least partly about Bible prophecy. Jeffreys was a supporter of British Israelism, a 
theory of divine history which identified the British with the lost ten tribes of Israel and 
predicted that the Battle of Armageddon would be fought between Britain and Russia.2 
British Israelism had been banned from Elim pulpits in the mid-1930s, but its influence 
persisted among the membership: in 1940, the Elim conference narrowly passed a 
resolution that “while all questions of prophetical interpretation should be decided by the 
governing body, liberty of expression on questions of prophetical interpretation should be 
permitted” (Wilson, 1961: 51). British Israelism belonged to the cultic milieu of its day: 
despised by many educated Protestants, it threatened to increase the subcultural deviance 
of Elim Pentecostalism and was not surprisingly opposed by the forces of routinisation. It 
was, however, supported by Jeffreys, who found himself in the position of a charismatic 
leader who, against the wishes of his lieutenants, espouses a deviant idea associated with
1 Roy Wallis (1984: 111-118) described the Jeffreys case as an example of “charismatic displacement”, in 
which “institutionalisation proceeds without clear recognition by the charismatic leader of what is 
occurring, until [it is] too late for him effectively to reverse the situation”.
2 The entry for British Israelism in the Oxford Dictionary o f the Christian Church gives a flavour of the low 
regard in which the movement was held by the theological establishment: “The theory that the British 
people is ultimately descended from the ten Israelite tribes which were taken captive into Assyria c.721 BC, 
and thereafter wholly disappeared from Hebrew history. It was often found in conjunction with pronounced 
imperialist views; and though the numbers and influence of those who defend it are small, they often hold it 
with a persistence and enthusiasm which refuse to give a dispassionate consideration to objections urged 
against it. The theory meets with no support from serious ethnologists or archaeologists” (Cross and 
Livingstone, 1997: 239). The implication of this statement is that British Israelism should not be taken 
seriously because its claims can be empirically disproved.
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his rank and file followers.3 In the schism that followed, Jeffreys was able to keep 
Kensington Temple as the headquarters of his breakaway movement; but his following 
slowly dissipated, along with British Israelism, and the building reverted to Elim (Hywel- 
Davies, 1998: 43).
Since the 1960s, Kensington Temple has had a succession of dynamic pastors, who, 
by concentrating on church growth and strengthening contacts with other evangelical 
Christians, have gradually moved it away from sectarianism. KT has been in the 
vanguard of this modernisation. Wynne Lewis, a fiery Welshman who was senior pastor 
during the 1980s, turned the church into an international community. He visited West 
Africa, where religious leaders instructed their followers to attend Kensington Temple 
whenever they were in London. He set up fellowships for individual ethnic groups, 
effectively abandoning the philosophy of total integration previously adopted by the 
church. Chinese, Filipinos and Ethiopians started holding services after which they served 
their own food — “culinary evangelism”, as Lewis called it (Hywel-Davies, 1998: 106). 
These ethnic fellowships accounted for most of Kensington Temple’s spectacular growth 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Lewis’s policy was to identify potential leaders and 
encourage them to recruit vigorously among members of their own community, many of 
them recent arrivals in London who felt detached from their roots. As a result, the KT 
congregation would sometimes swell by several hundred almost overnight. Admittedly, 
this strategy was not without risks. Some newly evangelised worshippers from the Third 
World brought with them controversial folk beliefs verging on the animist; during my 
fieldwork I occasionally heard rumours that voodoo practices survive on the fringes of 
the church’s African, Caribbean and Latin American communities. For the most part, 
however, Kensington Temple seems to have achieved on a small scale what 
Pentecostalism has achieved throughout the developing world: it absorbed indigenous 
traditions, such as belief in spirit possession, reinterpreting them in the light of its own 
Charismatic worldview (Cox, 1995; Martin, 2001). Indeed, it used those traditions to 
enrich its own cosmology: in Hwyel-Davies’s book, the visions of demons and fire-
3 This dynamic is far from unique: one loose present-day parallel might be with Pope John Paul II, who, to 
the dismay of proponents of a sophisticated, routinised Catholicism, publicly embraced some of the 
apocalyptic claims associated with the Portugese shrine of Fatima.
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breathing witches experienced by immigrant worshippers are offered as evidence of the 
assault of Satanic powers on KT, and therefore of its divine mission (1998: 119). A more 
serious risk was (and remains) that of large-scale defection by a particular ethnic group. 
On several occasions prominent members of fellowships left the network to join another 
church or start their own, taking their friends with them. When this happened, the ethnic 
balance within the church could change radically.
Colin Dye and the central organisation
In 1991 Wynne Lewis was succeeded as senior pastor by his chosen successor, Colin 
Dye, an Elim pastor who had been instrumental in setting up KT’s international Bible 
college. Dye possessed unusual qualifications. Bom in Kenya in 1952, he moved with his 
family to Tanzania to escape the Mau-Mau rebellion, and then to Australia when he was 
10 years old. He came to England at the age of 16 to train as a ballet dancer, joined the 
Royal Ballet and began to dance principal roles. It was during this time that he was 
converted to evangelical Christianity and started attending Kensington Temple, 
eventually abandoning dance to train for the ministry (Dye 1997a: 16-17). Today, Dye’s 
much-admired platform performances draw on both his African childhood and his artistic 
training. He has a special rapport with the African men in the congregation, laughing with 
them and upbraiding them:
I want to speak to you African men before it’s too late. Stop playing games with God!
Do you think only African men are proud? All men are proud! the only difference 
between men and boys is the price and the consequence o f  their toys [sermon, 10 
December 1998].
There is also a balletic gracefulness to the way he moves around while preaching, 
twisting and turning unexpectedly, sometimes leaping off the stage. His timing is 
impeccable, his jokes well crafted. Some of his younger colleagues copy his mannerisms.
First-time visitors to Kensington Temple are struck by Dye’s nervous energy. His 
image is that of a man who pushes himself excessively hard: on the platform, in church 
meetings, in the gym, and above all in prayer. He has turned the Wednesday night prayer 
meeting into one of the central events of church life, attended by up to 800 people. He has
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been known to shut himself in his office for hours, praying for guidance. Sometimes his 
staff find the intensity of his commitment a little frightening. In early 2000, at around the 
time that KT lost the lease on the Tabernacle, Dye embarked on a 40-day fast, drinking 
only water. He emerged from it “looking like an inmate of Belsen,” according to one 
colleague. Again and again during my research, conversations about aspects of church 
life or teaching drifted into discussion of his leadership style. “Colin is autocratic — all 
he does is surround himself with yes-men that are like bodyguards,” said one former 
satellite leader. Yet the same person said he showed “wonderful” leadership qualities, for 
example in championing the ministry of women pastors at a time when most pastors in 
the Elim denomination thought only men should be ordained. Dye himself told me that 
his leadership is “charismatic” in the Weberian sense. A minister in another Pentecostal 
church made a similar point:
Colin has grown into the role o f  charismatic leader, the sort o f  person who has a
special kudos, almost an aura. He’s a leader on a pedestal rather than one o f  the lads.
A cult of personality has built up around “Colin” (as everyone calls him) which resembles 
that surrounding charismatic business leaders, and can also be encountered in other big 
Charismatic congregations, such as the Faith movement’s Word of Life church in 
Uppsala, Sweden.4 Moreover, the organisational structure of Kensington Temple has 
been refined in ways that increase the senior pastor’s authority over it; the church has 
become increasingly responsive to his constantly evolving theological vision. But, as we 
shall see, this institutional reinforcement of Dye’s personal charisma is in itself 
precarious: it depends heavily on his own responsiveness to the mood of the congregation 
and his ability to assess risk.
4 Simon Coleman, in his ethnographic study of the Word of Life church, describes its pastor, Ulf Ekman, in 
terms that could also apply to Colin Dye. He writes that Ekman, referred to as “U lf’ even by people who 
have never met him, is perceived by group members to be the inspiration for most church projects, and that 
this perception is reinforced by organisational structures. He adds: “Even disillusioned adherents have 
described in interviews the sense of dread they have felt in leaving the group: the fact that they were 
required to have a personal meeting with Ekman in order to withdraw membership was often perceived as a 
major hurdle in the decision to leave” (2001: 97). Similarly, former KT staff have told me that the worst 
part of leaving the organisation was breaking the news to Dye.
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Dye is a classic example of a charismatic leader whose authority is dispersed 
throughout an organisation. As Samuel Eisenstadt observers, the test of such a leader is 
“his ability to leave a continuous impact on an institutional structure — to transform any 
given institutional setting by infusing into it some of his charismatic vision, by investing 
the regular, orderly offices, or aspects of social organisation, with some of his charismatic 
qualities and aura” (1968: xxi). This is what Dye has set out to do at Kensington Temple: 
he has modified the chain of command within the church in ways that increase his 
freedom of manoeuvre. This approach is reminiscent of Jeffreys’s attempts to remove 
bureaucratic constraints on his charismatic authority; the difference is that, although some 
leaders of Elim are critical of what they regard as Dye’s dictatorial manner, he has mostly 
secured denominational approval for his initiatives.
Under Dye, Kensington Temple has been granted the status of an independent Elim 
region; this gives it the right to appoint and train its own pastors, award diplomas to 
students, set up new churches and send missions abroad. Since these activities are 
supervised by the senior pastor, the effect of this change was to increase his personal 
authority. Dye has also assumed responsibility for appointing members of the board of 
elders that, in theory, was supposed to oversee his ministry. One former board member 
described the reconstituted body as “Colin’s cabinet, appointed by patronage, over which 
he has almost total control”. The choice of a political metaphor is significant. The church 
administration is divided into quasi-govemmental “divisions” and departments. In the late 
1990s, these consisted of pastoral ministry; satellites and planted churches; training 
(including the Bible college); evangelism and foreign missions; operations (including the 
bookshop and publications); and finance. Again, the point to note is that every 
department is answerable to the senior pastor. The structure of Kensington Temple can be 
usefully measured against the two templates of church organisation described by Mark 
Chaves (1998: 189-190). Despite its affiliation to Elim, it is closer to the unitary 
structures associated with sects, in which liturgical and “worldly” activities fall under a 
single line of command, than to the dual structures of the mainstream Churches, in which 
boards of education, finance, social justice and so on operate relatively independently of 
the spiritual leadership. One could say that the church’s administration has been 
streamlined in order to facilitate the operation of charisma.
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But if the adoption of a unitary structure represents a rejection of the secularised 
agencies spawned by the mainstream Churches, it does not imply a refusal to employ the 
tools and methods of the secular world. Like many fast-growing Pentecostal and 
Charismatic churches, Kensington Temple has some of the characteristics of an 
international corporation, carving out markets for its products both at home and abroad 
(Hexham and Poewe, 1997: 45). In the late 1990s it employed graphic artists and 
marketing experts to create a corporate identity for the London City Church, complete 
with logo; the LCC offices in the Acton Tabernacle (now vacated) had more of the feel of 
a medium-sized company than of a church organisation. It is worth remembering that the 
business world of the 1990s was strongly influenced by the operation of charismatic 
authority — by the personal charisma of corporate executives and their ability to achieve 
results that transcended the everyday reality of the stock markets. The central 
organisation of KT during the same period was staffed by people who thought about 
Colin Dye in much the same way as employees of a software company might think about 
their dynamic CEO: as the originator of a “vision” to which the day-to-day business of 
administration must be subordinated.
Congregations and worshippers
In purely administrative terms, the structure of Kensington Temple is relatively simple: 
all members of staff are answerable to the senior pastor. Viewed as a network of 
congregations, however, the church is more difficult to anatomise. Even the meaning of 
the words “Kensington Temple” is unclear. Estimates of the size of the congregation(s) 
vary enormously, reflecting confusion about where the boundaries of the KT/LCC 
network actually lie. During the late 1990s, it was quite common to encounter members 
of outlying LCC congregations who denied being part of Kensington Temple; yet they 
were invariably counted as part of the 10,000-plus total claimed for KT in media 
descriptions of it as “Britain’s largest church”. (The same people may also have been 
unaware that as members of the LCC they were part of the Elim Foursquare Gospel 
Church.)
During the period of my fieldwork there were 120 satellite churches, most of them 
“planted” in the previous decade in an area bounded by the M25, the motorway encircling
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central London. These congregations did not own their own premises, meeting instead in 
rented church halls, community centres and members’ homes; the Covent Garden church, 
one of the most successful in the network with perhaps 50 regular attendees, met for a 
time in a branch of the Mongolian Barbecue restaurant chain. The names of the churches 
did not reflect their membership of the LCC: they have names such as New Way of 
Living Fellowship, Harrow Community Church, Jesus Reigns Gospel Centre and Bible 
Life Foundation Ministries. Moreover, closeness to the centre was not primarily a 
function of geography. It depended on a number of factors, including the age of the 
church (with those established first tending to be more independent); whether the pastor 
was a member of the Kensington Temple staff; how friendly he was with Colin Dye; and 
whether services were linked to the main church by satellite technology. Occasionally, 
churches left the network and placed themselves directly under the oversight of the Elim 
denomination; or the pastor might leave to found a fully independent congregation. When 
that happened, worshippers had to decide where their allegiance lay — with their local 
pastor, or with Dye and the network. I met several church members who faced this 
dilemma, and it reinforced an impression that Kensington Temple’s reputation as a 
dynamic organisation was achieved at the cost of structural fragility.
Some of this fragility can be attributed to the difficulties of holding together a 
community in which more than 100 nations are represented, and in which many 
worshippers are recent immigrants to the UK. When KT carried out its 1999 census of 
2,973 worshippers at Notting Hill Gate and the Tabernacle, it found that 48 per cent of 
respondents were African, 17 per cent Caucasian, 10 per cent Caribbean, 7 per cent Asian 
(including South Asian), 3 per cent Chinese and 1 per cent Hispanic.5 These figures 
probably exaggerate the presence of Africans in the whole network, given that the 
satellite churches (many of which are predominately white) were not surveyed directly. 
Even so, Africans are overwhelmingly the largest group in KT and the wider LCC. This 
has been the case since the 1980s, when Wynne Lewis preached at a number of 
Pentecostal mega-churches in West Africa; afterwards, the pastors of these churches 
instructed their members to attend Kensington Temple when they were in England. The
5 There are, in fact, several hundred Latin American worshippers at KT, but they presumably chose to 
represent themselves as Caucasian rather than Hispanic.
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resulting influx of worshippers has had an impact on services at KT. The church regularly 
adopts an African style of prayer, in which members of the congregation stand up and 
shout out improvised messages, shaking their fists. “The Africans are very good at 
aggressive spiritual warfare,” writes Colin Dye. “They bring their hand grenades to the 
meal table and blast the devil even when they are saying grace. We have learnt a lot from 
African believers in this way” (Hywel-Davies, 1997: 159). There are, however, other big 
Pentecostal churches in London that compete for West African members, and there have 
been large-scale defections to them in recent years. Likewise, the number of Chinese 
worshippers fell dramatically in the 1990s after community leaders transferred allegiance 
to another church.
Ethnicity aside, the picture that emerged from the 1999 census was of a community 
whose members were predominantly female, young and new to the church. Of the 
respondents, 45 per cent were single women, 20 per cent married women, 19 per cent 
single men and 15 per cent married men.6 As many as 61.7 per cent of respondents were 
between 20 and 40 years old, with only 5.7 per cent over 60; it is instructive to compare 
this to the 1999 statistics for English churchgoers in general, only 27 per cent of whom 
were aged between 20 and 44, and a quarter of whom were over 65 (Brierley, 1999: 4.9). 
Significantly, 70 per cent of respondents had been members of KT/LCC for less than 
. three years, a figure that the June 2000 issue of Revival Times attributed to “the mobility 
of the London population and the number of people coming to Christ”. Not everyone put 
such a positive spin on this: one Bible college student told me it was evidence of a 
worrying lack of commitment among the core congregation. The census provided only 
incomplete data on attendance at services, but it did identify 469 respondents (15.7 per 
cent of the total) who were “involved in KT ministry”; of these, 70 per cent were women, 
a slightly higher proportion than for the church as a whole. This actually tells us little 
about what these 469 people do: “ministry” is a deliberately flexible term in the network, 
encompassing everyone from the senior pastor to bookshop assistants and tea-makers. It 
does, however, provide a rough method of comparing the most committed church
6 The shortage of marriageable Christian men is a persistent topic of conversation among women at KT; 
during my time there I heard a number of stories about good-looking young pastors being pursued by 
several women at the same time.
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members with worshippers in general. Inevitably, not everyone who regularly attends 
services is deeply immersed in the life of the church. Simon Coleman, in his study of the 
Charismatic Word of Life Church in Uppsala, Sweden, found that many people who went 
to its services and bought its products kept some distance from the congregation, adding 
that “such distanced participation is built into the structure of the group through its 
provision of relatively short-term educational opportunities, conferences, consumer goods 
and media communications” (2001: 109). Likewise, at Kensington Temple, the range of 
events, products, educational services, ethnic fellowships and specialised ministries offers 
consumers a variety of modes of affiliation.
There is no single, approved way of being a member of KT: on the contrary, 
believers are faced with an array of spiritual choices that reflect new patterns of religious 
activity in modem society. As many scholars have noted, Western religious activity in 
general has become commodified, and no tradition makes more energetic use of 
commodities than Pentecostalism. The following observations about modem American 
fundamentalist churches, by the historian Joel Carpenter, could equally be applied to 
Pentecostalism:
Denominations, which were once in effect the full-service department stores o f  
American religious life, increasingly find that their members “shop around” to meet 
their religious needs. They order books and other educational materials from a variety 
o f  religious publishing houses. They support foreign m issions and domestic 
m issionaries organised independently by parachurch agencies, and they join  
nondenominational fellowships for prayer, Bible study, marriage enrichment and even 
recreation (1997: 240).
Much the same could be said of Kensington Temple. When Dye steps forward to 
preach on Sundays, he is well aware that many in his audience hold a dual allegiance: an 
official one to the local church and an unofficial one to a preacher based in America or 
Africa whom they encounter through television, books, videotapes and mailing lists. 
Significantly, KT’s response has been to exploit this trend rather than to oppose it: 
recognising the complexities of religious allegiance in modem evangelicalism, it has 
turned itself into a conduit for ministries and commodities that might be otherwise be
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regarded as competition for its “own brand” products. In doing so, it is prepared to 
overlook quite substantial differences of emphasis and even basic theology between its 
own message and those of visiting preachers or authors stocked in the KT bookshop. 
Thus, the Mission to London rallies it held during the 1990s featured some of the most 
extreme of the black “prosperity Gospel” evangelists. One year, the American preacher 
Crefloe Dollar had the whole audience shouting “Money cometh to me!”, to the 
embarrassment of church staff but to the delight of the Africans and West Indians in the 
audience. Another regular speaker was Grant Jeffrey, who used convoluted millennial 
arithmetic to demonstrate that the Rapture was imminent.
The diversification of religious taste is a feature of most Pentecostal congregations, 
and especially those, like Kensington Temple, which include a mixture of recent 
immigrants from other cultures. The everyday conversation of KT members yields plenty 
of evidence of what one might call the customisation of cosmology. We have already 
encountered the idea that some church members are “into the End Times”; others will 
talk about being “into” spiritual warfare, prosperity teachings or Bible study in much the 
same way as they might speak of being “into” a certain Christian rock musician. And 
they way they develop these specialist interests is through buying products — not just 
books, films and recordings, but tickets to rallies, seminars and training courses: 
worshippers are constantly writing cheques or signing credit card slips to enable them to 
pursue a particular path of spiritual development. The content of all these products 
changes in response to changes in the Christian marketplace; interest in particular 
subjects waxes and wanes, often in response to media-driven spiritual fads, and that, 
coupled with the rapid turnover of worshippers, gives a kaleidoscopic quality to 
congregational beliefs. In this context it is worth bearing in mind an observation made by 
Andre Corten and Ruth Marshall-Fratani: that while getting bom again represents a 
dramatic rupture in one’s life, being bom again is an ongoing existential project, not a 
state acquired once for all (2001: 7). In a religious setting and a wider society that 
bombard the believer with information, the maintenance of faith may require complicated 
ideological work and many small changes of spiritual direction. These changeable 
conditions do not make it impossible for a leader like Colin Dye to steer the faithful in a
93
particular theological direction; but they do mean that, in order to do so, he has to 
calculate risk and anticipate the reactions of his audience.
Managing charisma
Charisma, rationality and risk
The rest of this chapter will attempt to demonstrate, among other things, that the 
operation of charisma at Kensington Temple reflects the “common sense rationality” 
(Garfinkel, 1967) that governs religious choices in society generally. Colin Dye uses 
common sense when he frames his religious rhetoric: he asks himself how far he should 
go in advancing an argument and whether it is appropriate for a particular audience. 
Likewise, church members discriminate between the religious claims they encounter, 
their reactions ranging from unquestioning acceptance to outright rejection, with many 
subtle grades of response in between. These points might seem too obvious to be worth 
making were it not for the fact that it is often assumed — by hostile observers and the 
media — that charismatic religion involves the suspension of common sense on the part 
of self-deluded prophets and uncritical believers; the only rationality exercised according 
to this caricature is that of the charismatic leader who knowingly manipulates his 
audience or that of the ex-follower who “sees through” a preposterous claim.
In reality, the operation of charismatic authority in Pentecostal congregations is far 
from straightforward. In the first place, there is often considerable ambiguity regarding 
the source of the authority. As Bryan Wilson observes, no matter how vigorous the 
personalities and effective the ministries of Christian leaders, their claims are restrained 
by the pre-eminent charisma of Jesus Christ (1990: 111). Leaders such as Colin Dye are 
less restricted in this respect than ministers of the mainstream Churches, since the 
Pentecostal tradition holds that the miraculous powers of Jesus can be exercised directly 
through the action of the Holy Spirit. But the attempt to demonstrate these powers carries 
with it the possibility of discontinuation, and this means that the identification of the 
leader’s actions with the will of God is inevitably precarious. If charisma is a “quality 
projected onto a leader by virtue of situation, opportunity and events” (Craib, 1997: 134),
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then events can also lead to its retraction by the people who projected it — the 
charismatic audience. It is widely accepted in Pentecostal and Charismatic circles that 
supernatural gifts may be taken away by their divine giver at any time; as Csordas points 
out, this is “in effect a recognition that [the gifts] may vanish for a variety of reasons 
ranging from a failure of nerve to withdrawal of legitimating group consensus” (1997: 
133). In Csordas’s view, the perceptions of the audience are so crucial that charisma can 
be said to reside among participants in a religious movement rather than in the 
personality of the leader. Discourse and rhetoric play a crucial part in the creation of this 
charisma, which can be understood as “a product of the rhetorical apparatus in use of 
which leader and follower alike convince themselves that the world is constituted in a 
certain way” (139).
To understand the basis of Colin Dye’s authority, we need to pay attention to the 
way he deploys rhetoric and, in particular, to his use of reason to persuade his audience of 
the validity of his claims. There is a paradox here that is characteristic of the whole 
Pentecostal belief system. On the one hand, his arguments insist on the inability of the 
scientific paradigm and human reasoning to explain the workings of the Holy Spirit. On 
the other, they are based on the rules of evidence and tailored to the rational expectations 
of his listeners. The underlying rationality of Dye’s approach is detectable irrespective of 
whether his rhetoric moves towards or away from greater subcultural deviance — that is, 
whether he is engaged in a radicalisation of charisma that increases anticipation of 
miraculous events or, alternatively, dampening down unrealistic expectations. In both 
situations, he works hard to make sure that neither he nor his audience is confronted by 
cognitive dissonance.
Dye’s 1997 book Healing Anointing records a visit to Kenya during which he 
sought to exercise charisma in an immediate and dramatic way, as a channel for God’s 
miraculous healing:
A young man with a paralysed arm was the first person to be prayed for. I am not sure 
why, but I thumped his arm —  and he was instantly healed. With that, everyone in the 
room went quiet and still. The disorderly woman [who had kept jostling people] was 
pushed forward for prayer, and I suddenly realised why she had been bumping into 
people: she was completely blind ... I laid my hands on her eyes and prayed every
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type o f  healing prayer that I knew. When I took my hands away I asked her whether 
she could see. She blinked and gasped, “I can see!” ... There was almost a spiritual 
riot in the hut. O f the 50 sick people, all bar one completely deaf boy was completely 
healed (1997a: 14).
Dye comments that “the real Jesus has been at work” in the hut, thereby establishing the 
direct source of his power. During the same trip, however, that power appeared to fail. He 
and his party “prayed and prayed until we ran out of words” for a boy with a withered 
leg, but to no avail: the boy limped off unhealed. This experience left Dye feeling 
profoundly depressed:
The following morning I felt so low that I would not go out preaching with the team 
... After they left I tried to be pious and pray. Finally, I stopped pretending and blurted 
out, “Why didn’t you heal him?” Quick as a flash, God responded, “I have a purpose 
for that boy just as I have a purpose for you”. The issue was closed (12).
The effect of this divine message was to reduce cognitive dissonance. Significantly, 
something similar has happened when Dye’s organisational initiatives have run into 
trouble. The following observations come from a Kensington Temple pastor who worked 
with Dye on church growth programmes during the 1990s:
Colin takes enormous care over his initiatives from the moment he announces them to 
his inner circle, and the launch to the wider church is an important as it would be in, 
say, the publishing world. A few years ago we had something called “Group-Gather- 
Grow”, which was Colin’s new revelation from God about how individuals could 
attract other individuals and the church would grow. It was launched with immense 
aplomb by Colin, who announced that he was going to handpick lots o f  young men —  
it might have been as many as 100 —  to get this thing going. Anyway, basically it was 
a total failure, with only about 15 or 20 men coming forward, and only one or two o f  
them had the necessary charisma. In private, we admitted that it had failed. In public, 
however, Colin said that the Lord had revealed to him that cell groups were the way 
forward, and Group-Gather-Grow was a philosophy  rather than a specific programme.
Well, we already had cell groups, so that was OK.
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It is tempting to conclude that, in the cases of the boy with the withered arm and the 
Group-Gather-Grow initiative, God’s messages have had the convenient effect of 
excusing failure. Before we question Dye’s motives, however, it is worth noting Rodney 
Stark’s observation that, throughout history, religious leaders have commonly interpreted 
mundane mental phenomena as supernatural revelation, and that these revelations have 
usually bolstered their own authority (1992: 21-23). For Stark, this is evidence not of 
mental illness or trickery, but of rationality: prayer is used to test the rightness of certain 
ideas, and those that pass the test are reinterpreted as divine communications. Seen in this 
light, Dye was merely applying a typically charismatic solution — a fresh revelation — 
to a typically charismatic problem — the apparent disconfirmation of God’s promises. In 
talking about the Kenyan healing and the Group-Gather-Grow initiative, Dye implicitly 
conceded that it looked as if his powers had failed him; but he then presented new 
information that, once accepted by the audience, would reconcile faith and reason and 
preserve the community’s sense that “the universe is constituted in a certain kind of 
way”.
The whole Pentecostal system is predicated on the notion that God’s activity in the 
modem world is visible and measurable, and that belief in it is therefore reasonable. Dye 
offers his listeners evidence of the operation of supernatural forces in the world, in the 
form of “true stories” of signs and wonders, or demonstrations of the miraculous in front 
of their eyes — and they, for the most part, accept their validity. Indeed, their rational 
assimilation of this evidence forms a crucial part of their encounter with the sacred. As 
Gerard Roelofs argues, the experiential character of Charismatic Christianity explains its 
self-confidence: experiencing God “brings forth the certitude that He exists” (1994: 225) 
and forms part of an exchange in which praise and gratitude are given in return for 
religious experience (219). This notion of an exchange fits neatly into the rational choice 
paradigm and helps us to understand the process of individual belief formation; but it also 
has implications for leaders such as Colin Dye, who in the Pentecostal tradition bear 
enormous responsibility to produce, through rhetoric and the staging of events, the 
experiences that sustain belief. For the exchange to take place, the religious product on 
offer must be of the right quality, and this requires sound judgment. Church leaders know
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that a demonstration of the working of the Holy Spirit must be sufficiently dramatic to 
hold the attention of the audience, but they are also aware that the more ambitious a 
charismatic claim is, the more likely things are to go wrong. A healing miracle may 
simply fail to occur, or it may be so carefully stage-managed that even a sympathetic 
audience questions its authenticity; alternatively, a Charismatic manifestation may be so 
effective that it encourages extremes of behaviour and belief.
Throughout his stewardship of Kensington Temple, Colin Dye has frequently been 
faced with the dilemma of high versus low tension. He can encourage the radicalisation 
of charisma, with its attendant opportunities and dangers; or he can move towards a safe 
but unproductive routinisation of charisma. For the most part, he has chosen the former 
route: in the words of his predecessor, Wynne Lewis, he is a natural risk-taker (Dye, 
1997b: 10). Under his leadership, Kensington Temple has become associated with many 
of the strange phenomena about which Andrew Walker (1995c) warned the Charismatic 
world. Dye welcomed the thaumaturgical excitements that surfaced in the 1990s, 
including the Toronto Blessing and the mysterious appearance of gold teeth in the mouths 
of Christians. He has also invited controversial but crowd-pulling American evangelists 
to London, despite the reservations of some of his Elim colleagues about their “health and 
wealth” theology. In doing so, he has come under attack from the more cautious voices 
we encountered in Chapter 3, including Britain’s Evangelical Alliance ; the criticisms 
vary, but their common theme — echoed in private by some staff members — is that 
Kensington Temple has lent credibility to empirically dubious claims. Although Dye is 
aware of this criticism, he has been able to counter much of it by pointing to the 
spectacular results of his high-tension strategy: the much-criticised visits by the healing 
evangelist Morris Cerullo consolidated KT’s following among black Londoners, and the 
miraculous happenings swelled attendance at Sunday services for several years. In other
7 Kensington Temple lent prominent support to the American evangelist Morris Cerullo during his 
controversial Missions to London in the 1990s. Advertisements for the meetings claimed that the blind 
would see and the crippled walk again as a result of Cerullo’s healing ministry; but his “cures” were 
ridiculed by the secular media, and many evangelical Christians expressed unease at his methods. 
Eventually the Evangelical Alliance disowned Cerullo, at which point Colin Dye took Kensington Temple 
out of the Alliance in protest. For an account of the controversy, see Schaefer (1999). Howard (1997) 
devotes a chapter to attacking Cerullo.
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words, Dye has judged correctly that his constituency is comfortable with a relatively 
high degree of subcultural deviance.
On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that there are limits to the degree 
of tension that Dye is prepared to create. Certain risks are never taken, as the pastor 
quoted earlier points out:
Colin would never get a person in a wheelchair up on stage and say: “I f  God exists, 
you will get up and walk”. And the audience wouldn’t expect him to. It’s not spoken, 
but everybody tacitly agrees that this would going too far. People don’t prostrate 
themselves before fate, because if  they did their faith would be seriously damaged.
Furthermore, Dye has been careful not let subcultural deviance increase to a degree 
where thaumaturgical excitement becomes an end in itself. In September 2000 he 
preached a sermon in which he reviewed the miraculous happenings at KT since 1994:
There was laughing experience [the Toronto Blessing] —  w e became a church o f  holy 
rollers, the church was filled with joy. The Holy Spirit came upon me, too, and I fell to 
the ground, rolling up and down. We took the aisles away, so that nobody could say 
we were rolling in the aisles ... [Some months later] at every service for 18 months, 
spots o f oil came onto people’s hands. In some instances it was clearly oil, really thick 
anointing oil. I remember a man whose whole thumb was dripping with oil ... A no- 
nonsense, retired policeman saw it. The whole o f  his head was covered. It wasn’t so 
long after that that God sent holy gold, gold flakes: it’s exactly the kind o f  thing God 
will do so people can say, They’re a bunch o f  flakes!
The whole point of mentioning these events, however, was to stress how relatively 
unimportant they were:
You can see how affirming I am o f  these phenomena, but none o f  that is revival. 
These were the trappings, the externals o f  revival. Whether we shake, rattle or roll, we 
need the heart o f  Jesus Christ. I’m not concerned whether people fall, or have oil on 
their forehead, or see angels bringing oil. God is in these things, but it’s not what God 
is all about. We are so clever in Christian circles at taking things which are peripheral
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and making them central. We have got to have a revolution in our thinking and put 
first things first.
By talking in this way, Dye reveals an intuitive grasp of the need to reconcile the 
radicalisation and routinisation of charisma. While recognising the potential of Wimberite 
signs and wonders for providing the experiences that dominate the Pentecostal 
“exchange” with God, he subtly reduces their significance; this is one of the dissonance- 
reducing strategies described by Festinger (1964 [1956]: 25-6). In an interview in 1998, 
Will Napier, the young principal of Kensington Temple’s Bible college, explained to me 
that there were “three levels of doctrinal importance” in the church. The first level 
consisted of “those doctrines that are necessary for salvation”, such as belief in the 
divinity of Christ. The second level consisted of “fundamental and important truths”, such 
the inerrant authority of Scripture and the future bodily return of Jesus. The third level 
was reserved for “lesser doctrines” such as belief in a pre-, mid- or post-Tribulation 
Rapture, or belief in the validity of certain Charismatic gifts. We shall come back to the 
status of eschatology in the next chapter; the point to note here is the relegation of 
charismata to a low level in the hierarchy of Christian truth. Such phenomena are central 
to Kensington Temple’s popular appeal, yet they are also carry the risk of involving the 
church in controversies. Their “third level” status limits the damage done by 
disconfirmation, public criticism or — always a possibility in the Pentecostal world — a 
sudden change of fashion: put on the spot, church spokesmen can argue that these high- 
tension phenomena were always peripheral to the life of the community. Napier himself 
now takes the view that the hierarchy of doctrines he had outlined was essentially an 
insurance policy. In 1999, after a spectacular falling-out with Dye, he left the staff and 
ceased to identify himself as a Christian. Afterwards, he commented:
Kensington Temple wants to have its cake and eat it —  to take advantage o f  certain 
phenomena, but also to have a way o f  dodging the consequences when they are 
discredited. It’s paradoxical, when you think about it. KT is quietly ambivalent about 
the very things that make it culturally distinctive.
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To an outsider, or to an ex-believer such as Napier, the leadership’s fine-tuning of 
charismatic claims might appear manipulative. It does not strike most worshippers that 
way, however, because they themselves are engaged in an often unconscious process of 
charisma management. Like the Charismatic Catholics studied by Neitz (1987: 80), they 
test hypotheses. If an evangelist tells them that their finances will miraculously improve if 
they donate money to a certain cause, they may do so — but they will only carry on doing 
so if the experiment succeeds. Likewise, they may say specific prayers that are intended 
to bring about physical healing, and wait for results. Or they may listen to a sermon 
expounding a particular doctrine, and ask themselves whether it makes sense in the 
context of their own lives. Often a claim will fail a test of experience or rationality; but 
that does not mean that it brings the whole edifice of Christian faith collapsing around it. 
Just as Colin Dye performed ideological work that explained the apparent failure of his 
healing powers in Kenya, so many of his flock find methods of reducing cognitive 
dissonance. One young woman offered the following example:
Someone might find the house o f their dreams, put in an offer, and it’s accepted. So 
immediately it becomes “the house that God wants me to have”. Then the deal falls 
through, and they say, “well, that’s not what God had in mind after all — he has 
something else in store for me”.
There are, in fact, many ways of reducing and forestalling disappointment — thanks, in 
part, to those features of contemporary Charismatic religion that are sometimes described 
as postmodern: its juxtaposition of global and local sources of authority and its appeal to 
consumer taste. In such conditions, it becomes much easier to edit and customise one’s 
personal cosmology. Worshippers who are uncomfortable with a charismatic claim 
promoted by Kensington Temple need not expose themselves to it. A part-time pastor 
told me: “Because I’m not on the staff, I have the freedom to say, if you’re having Benny 
Hinn [a controversial healing evangelist] to preach, then I’m not coming.” By the same 
token, church members who dislike “health and wealth” theology may avoid guest 
appearances by Faith preachers — and those who are sceptical about the End Times 
subculture can avoid apocalyptic talks and literature.
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Yet the circulation of contentious, and some would say disprovable, religious 
claims remains an important feature of life at Kensington Temple. How can this be 
reconciled with the operation of common sense rationality? Two points are worth 
making. First, the process of hypothesis testing is far from scientific. People tend to 
search for evidence that reinforces their existing beliefs; as J L Simmons notes, 
“confirming evidence ... is sought and found because most situations are ambiguous 
enough to allow them to be interpreted as confirming evidence” (1964: 256). Neitz adds 
that “disconfirming evidence may go unacknowledged because the explanations provided 
by the non-conventional [ie, empirically disprovable] beliefs are ‘more satisfying* on
99 Qsome level than are conventional explanations (1987: 81). The second point has to do 
with the nature of worshippers’ engagement with controversial religious claims. Most 
members of Kensington Temple — including those who delight in “signs and wonders” 
and read popular prophecy literature — implicitly accept Dye’s argument that such areas 
are peripheral to the main life of the church. They approach them in the spirit of 
consumers searching for spiritual entertainment, whether in the form of satellite 
broadcasts by “health and wealth” preachers or the Left Behind thrillers. This almost 
light-hearted attitude to spiritual claims helps explain how high-tension theology can be 
popular and peripheral at the same time. Although Kensington Temple is open to spiritual 
risk-taking, there is a consensus among pastors, part-time ministers and many ordinary 
worshippers that things must not be allowed to get out of hand — and an unspoken 
agreement that individuals who manifest excessive enthusiasm should be discouraged 
from doing so.
Policing the boundaries
Even religious organisations that are judged deviant by society have their own deviants: 
individuals who, while belonging to the group, are distinguished from the rest of the 
membership by virtue of their unusual opinions or behaviour. These are the people 
described by their fellow members as “troublemakers”, “eccentrics”, “fanatics”, and so on
8 See also Sara Savage’s essay “A Psychology of Fundamentalism” (2002), much of which is applicable to 
Pentecostalism. Savage concludes that there is little evidence to suggest that fundamentalists as a whole 
lack cognitive complexity, though this may be true of highly committed fundamentalists who resolve any 
doubts they might have by avoiding disconfirming information.
102
— labels whose vague, subjective nature reflects the complex nature of deviance itself. 
Whether someone is labelled a troublemaker or a harmless eccentric depends partly on 
his or her personality and social skills. A dissident with persuasive powers represents a 
threat to authority and may be regarded as dangerous; someone who holds the same views 
but lacks personal magnetism may be written off as a harmless eccentric. Some people 
fall between these stools: while they have no significant personal following, they are 
mistrusted by the religious authorities because they waste time and sow low-level 
dissension among fellow worshippers. These potential troublemakers are familiar to 
religious leaders in many traditions: rabbis and imams as well as Christian ministers are 
forced to deal with “difficult” types in the congregation.
Charismatic Christianity, whose very name conjures up the exercise of disruptive 
powers, positively invites behaviour that disturbs the peace of the congregation. Certain 
worshippers become known for showing off or nurturing obsessions, and in doing so they 
create a degree of tension between themselves and the church environment that 
reproduces on a small scale the subcultural deviance of whole groups. Csordas (1997: 
185) lists some “pastoral slang” terms in use among American Catholic Charismatics, 
several of which identify mild forms of deviance. “Charismania” refers to the “over- 
extensive cultivation use or attention to Charismatic gifts”; “hothouse spirituality” is the 
“over-intensive cultivation of Charismatic gifts, with the danger of being carried to 
potentially destructive excess”; “superspirituality” is a surrender to the divine will so total 
that the believer is reduced to inactivity. This last term is used at Kensington Temple, 
though its resonances are different. Will Napier, while still principal of the Bible college, 
put it as follows:
Americans would use the word “flaky” and we would use the word “superspiritual” —  
people who tell you that God told them to do this or that, and the way you know that 
they are a bit flaky rather than wonderfully prophetic is that they don’t usually have 
the personal credibility to back up their claims. It’s very common for these people —  
in fact, it’s one o f  the signs o f  being one o f  these people —  that they will latch on to 
some particular doctrine. Often it’s Israel, often it’s also End-time stuff. A lot o f  
people in the world, and they are reflected in this church, are strange in that they are
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competent and intelligent enough to hold down responsible jobs, but you get them  
onto this one subject and they don’t seem to have a grasp o f  reality.
Note that, according to Napier, the people who claim to receive divine messages are also 
likely to be theologically unbalanced: this implies the existence of a sort of multi­
dimensional deviance, in which unsuccessful claims to charismatic authority go hand in 
hand with distorted opinions on other matters. In an interview in 2003, Napier spoke 
more frankly about the management of the theological margins at Kensington Temple. I 
asked him whether staff members tended to identify deviant ideas with deviant people. 
He replied:
Definitely, yes. I used to call them “fruit bats”, and they weren’t hard to spot. People 
who issued weird and wild prophecies were always suspect. In a Pentecostal church, 
the issuing o f  spiritual messages happens all the time, o f  course —  but ordinary church 
members would do so very cautiously. They might say: “This is going to sound 
strange, but last night I had a dream in which . . .” Whatever significance they attached 
to the dream, it would be surrounded by these apologetic phrases, to show that they 
weren’t fruit bats. If, on the other hand, someone related a dream which directly 
usurped the authority o f  the leaders, that might be a sign that they were a bit batty.
And there were other, rather obvious clues: they might smell, or look unkempt, and 
have poor social skills. As a Pentecostal pastor, I was always rather uncomfortably 
aware that hearing messages from God is one o f  the diagnostic signs o f schizophrenia.
In practice, however troublesome the “fruit bats” or superspiritual worshippers 
might be, they can at least be easily identified. The usual sanction is for a member of the 
KT ministry team to have a quiet word with a disruptive worshipper; in rare cases, people 
have been banned from services or the church premises. Policing the boundaries in these 
cases is relatively straightforward. Milder forms of deviance, on the other hand, pose 
more of a diplomatic challenge for the leadership. Dye’s radical approach tends to be 
copied by his proteges in the congregation, some of whom lack his innate sense of just 
how far to push a charismatic claim. Sometimes, they are encouraged to take risks — to 
indulge in attention-seeking street evangelism, for example, or use violent images in their
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rhetoric of spiritual warfare. At other times, they are reprimanded for overstepping the 
mark. One interesting case from the mid 1990s involved a young evangelist called Ravi 
Holy, an Old Etonian of Indian extraction who had been a teenage “punk anarchist” and 
drug-taker. Before his conversion, Holy dabbled in the occult and espoused an elaborate 
conspiracy theory in which both the American government and Hitler were 
representatives of the Satanic secret society known as the Illuminati; we shall look at his 
ideas more closely in the next chapter. The problem from Kensington Temple’s point of 
view was that Holy carried on spreading these conspiracy beliefs as a Pentecostal. In an 
interview after he left KT, Holy talked about the church’s attempts to moderate his 
opinions:
I was told by three o f  Colin D ye’s lieutenants on separate occasions that all this stuff 
about the Illuminati and a N ew  World Order was inappropriate —  they said it was 
giving Satan too much power in the physical realm. I felt it was a bit hypocritical o f  
them, because from time to time Colin him self would hint that there was a conspiracy 
in public life. He would drop some remark in the middle o f  a sermon about how  
prostitution and organised crime were controlled by Satanists, and it sounded as i f  he 
basically believed the same things as I did.
But there was a big difference, of course, between a senior leader hinting at a conspiracy 
from the platform and a junior evangelist “banging on to anyone who would listen” — his 
own phrase — about 33rd degree Freemasons travelling in the astral plane. Holy’s 
cosmology owed more to the cultic milieu than it did to evangelical tradition; it was the 
wrong sort of subcultural deviance, created by someone without any particular spiritual 
authority. Yet, at the same time, Holy’s adventurous spirit appealed to Dye. As Napier 
recalls:
Ravi was in danger o f  tipping over into being a fruit bat, and sometimes he was 
chastised. But on the whole KT encouraged him, because it was friendly to people 
who lived close to the edge. That was how we liked to think o f ourselves. It gave us a 
buzz to think o f  ourselves as counter-cultural, and to realise that the rest o f  the world 
thought o f  us as a bit strange.
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In the final analysis, though, you have to ask whether we were really as radical as we 
thought we were. Our view of what constituted extreme behaviour or ideas was 
heavily influenced by societal norms — we could recognise mental problems or crazy 
conspiracy theories as readily as anyone else. You might say that we employed a 
secular criterion of battiness.
In fact, my impression was that all sorts of societal norms were internalised by 
members of Kensington Temple. Worshippers did not just draw on their common sense in 
assessing religious claims: they were also influenced, sometimes unconsciously, by the 
boundaries of acceptable thought and behaviour associated with secular liberal 
democracies. Younger church members were strongly anti-racist and committed to the 
equality of the sexes, and they had some difficulty reconciling this with the evangelical 
doctrine of male headship. At one satellite service, to my surprise, I heard two young 
black women complaining about the anti-gay rhetoric of a visiting American preacher. 
One of them told the other that she was worried that visitors “might think we were all like 
that” (ie, vehemently anti-homosexual). Generally speaking, I found support for James 
Davison Hunter’s thesis (1987: 40), based on his fieldwork among American Bible 
students, that in modem society even members of conservative religions are keen to play 
down aspects of their cosmology that might be considered socially offensive, such as the 
doctrine of eternal damnation for all unbelievers. One of the questions Hunter asked his 
subjects was about Mahatma Gandhi: was he, too, burning in hell? I tried this litmus test 
on my interviewees and received the same response as Hunter: people were extremely 
reluctant to state that he was not in heaven, even though he was not a Christian. It was as 
if church members kept looking over their shoulders at secular society, supposedly the 
province of Satan but also the source of many of their social attitudes. This apparent 
contradiction goes to the heart of the debate about religion and secularisation; we shall 
return to it in the final chapter of this study.
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Conclusion
Although this chapter has hardly touched on the subject of the End Times, its description 
of the organisational structure and Charismatic theology of Kensington Temple provides 
an essential background to the next two chapters of this study, which discuss the place of 
apocalyptic belief within the congregation. Ideas about the end of the world are always 
rooted in a social context, and the context here is one in which the experience of high- 
tension religion is moderated by the operation of an underlying rationality. Members of 
Kensington Temple test hypotheses along lines dictated by their common sense. Leaders 
and most worshippers share a sense that certain boundaries should not be crossed, though 
these boundaries are not necessarily marked by specific doctrines: rather, the danger is 
that believers will concentrate too much on elements in the Pentecostal tradition that are 
regarded as peripheral to salvation. Eccentric or disruptive people are identified and dealt 
with in much the same way as they are in the outside world. Seen from a rational choice 
perspective, the situation is one in which worshippers seek to maximise the benefits and 
reduce the costs of belonging to a Charismatic community: they want to experience 
empirical proof of their status as God’s chosen people while retaining the freedom to 
reject or modify spiritual claims that strain credulity or are considered socially offensive.
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5. Living with the End
Introduction
This chapter asks how members of Kensington Temple relate to, and live with, the full 
range of End Times tradition they might encounter in their church, including biblical 
images of Rapture and Armageddon, theological arguments about divine dispensations 
and the shape of history, and conspiracy theories involving Antichrist and the New World 
Order. The first half of the chapter studies this question from the perspective of the 
church leadership. It examines the “official” treatment of apocalyptic doctrines in 
sermons and Bible classes and the “unofficial” material sold in the church bookshop; at 
both levels, there is evidence that the transmission of millenarian ideas is affected by the 
personal dispositions of pastors and church employees, many of whom find this a 
difficult area to manage. The second half is based on interviews with ordinary church 
members and survey data. It explores the different strategies employed by worshippers in 
dealing with potentially troublesome apocalyptic ideas: these include a policy of ignoring 
them, a focus on explanatory rather than predictive motifs, and the use of language that 
reduces millenarianism to the unthreatening proportions of a professional discourse.
Managing apocalyptic belief: the perspective of leaders
Official millenarianism: teaching about the End Times
Kensington Temple publishes a 30-page booklet1 for visitors which, in addition to 
introducing Colin Dye and describing the church’s activities, sets out a “statement of our 
beliefs” — in fact, the official credal formulation of the Elim denomination. The 
statement begins with the Bible: “We believe the Bible, as originally given, to be without
1 Welcome to Kensington Temple, published by Kensington Temple, London City House, PO Box 9161, 
London W3 6 GS, 1999 [address obsolete since the move from the Tabernacle].
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error; it is the fully inspired and infallible Word of God and the supreme and final 
authority in all matters of faith and conduct”. It declares belief in the Holy Trinity, the 
bodily resurrection of Jesus, justification by faith alone and the eternal, conscious 
punishment of the wicked. It affirms the five-fold ministry of Ephesians, the baptism of 
believers in water and “baptism in the Holy Spirit with signs following”. On the subject 
of the Second Coming, it says only this: “We believe in the personal, physical and visible 
return of the Lord Jesus Christ to reign in power and glory”.
Such a minimalist statement of eschatological belief might seem surprising for a 
denomination founded amid intense and detailed expectation of the Second Coming. 
Bryan Wilson, writing about Elim congregations in 1961, summarised their apocalyptic 
beliefs as follows:
Elimites expect the physical return o f  Jesus Christ to earth at any time. In their more 
cautious discussion it is conceded that the exact time is unknown, but ever since the 
earliest days o f  the movement it has been believed that all the usual signs portended 
the imminence o f  this event. Christ will appear in the upper air, the saints be caught up 
to him, and a period o f  woe and martyrdom will occur on earth. The righteous dead 
will be resurrected and caught up unto Christ, and this episode is literally awaited. 
“Watch the coffin lids fly open”, is the exhortatory vision o f  one writer. At that time 
the earth, without the leavening influence o f  Christians, w ill know a period o f  orgy 
and license, crime and war. The complex pattern o f  events which Elimites believe will 
then occur —  the emergence o f  the Anti-Christ; the battle o f Armageddon, to be 
fought between Britain and Russia; the ascent o f  the saints; the casting o f  the Beast 
and Anti-Christ into the lake o f fire; the Millennium itself —  are all depicted in terms 
familiar to those acquainted with fundamentalism. A brief revolt at the end o f  the 
Millennium will lead to the new heaven and new earth (1961: 25-6).
It is instructive to compare these ideas to Kensington Temple’s current position on the 
End Times. On the one hand, the church does offer its members some teaching on the 
subject, and this outlines a sequence of future events similar to that described by Wilson, 
though it reverses the sequence of the Rapture and the Tribulation. On the other, such 
teaching is no longer central to the life of the congregation. Church members who are
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interested in the End Times have to seek it out — and, when they do, they are likely to be 
told that they are free to disagree with their teachers on major points of interpretation.
During the period of my fieldwork, the major source of apocalyptic teaching at 
Kensington Temple was a series of six lectures by Pastor Bruce Atkinson entitled “End 
Times Truths”, originally delivered before the main Sunday evening services in 1997 and 
subsequently sold as tapes in the bookshop (Atkinson, 1997). Atkinson, a fiery young 
preacher from Yorkshire, is Colin Dye’s second in command and widely believed to be 
his anointed successor. He is well known for taking a specialist interest in the End Times: 
“It’s the Second Coming that drives me, that motivates me, that gives me hope,” he 
announces in the first lecture. It is also one of the reasons he is a classic Pentecostal 
rather than a Charismatic. In the same lecture, he criticises middle-class Charismatics 
who have become so preoccupied by their own spiritual journey that they have lost sight 
of the Second Coming. He also reveals himself to be a millenarian, in the sense that he 
expects the end of history to occur in his lifetime:
I believe that w e are in the beginning o f  the End Times revival that will herald the 
coming o f  Christ. We need to shake ourselves and wake ourselves. We are not just 
moving into another time o f  blessing or revival. I believe with every part o f  my being 
that we are in the beginnings o f  the revival to end all revivals ... Jesus is sending his 
Spirit stronger and stronger. I fully expect to be here when Jesus returns. I expect it, I 
feel it so close! I can’t doctrinally state that, o f  course I can’t —  no man knows the 
hour. But I feel it in my bones. I feel it so near, I don’t expect to die, I expect to see 
him come in the clouds o f glory. The End is coming.
We noted in Chapter 2 that many apocalyptic preachers and authors seem relatively 
uninterested in the millennial reward awaiting believers, concentrating instead on the 
world’s slide into chaos. This is not true of Atkinson. He tells his audience:
The Second Coming will deal once and for all with every injustice that has happened 
on this earth. It w ill deal with every trouble, every persecution, every enemy o f  Christ 
and his Church —  and o f you ... The bad guys don’t always win! ... At the Second 
Coming, sickness and death will finally be dealt with ... There’s coming a day when
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every saint in God who has ever lived and been sick will be raised up with a perfect 
whole body. There will neither be tears, nor fears, nor sickness. And Jesus’s Second 
Coming is great for those that have lost loved ones, who are Christians, for those 
struggling with sickness, to know that one day every believer will be raised from the 
dead with a new body, an immortal body.
The message could hardly be clearer: you will have a new body; you will see your 
enemies confounded. There is one promise, however, that Atkinson is not prepared to 
make. Unlike most premillennialists, he does not believe that the Church will be secretly 
raptured to safety when the Antichrist appears and the Tribulation begins (the premise of 
the Left Behind books). Both he and Dye believe in a post-Tribulation Rapture, a minority 
evangelical position sometimes known as historic premillennialism (Grenz, 1992: 127- 
147). One of the purposes of Atkinson’s lectures is to explain this “post-Trib” view to the 
congregation as simply as possible — but without demanding adherence to it, since the 
Elim church takes no official view on the matter. The lectures therefore tell us as much 
about the difficulties of locating the boundaries of KT’s official End Times theology as 
they do about its precise content.
Atkinson refers several times to the “confusing” nature of his topic. He wants to 
clear away that confusion, he says, by using the Book of Revelation to provide the 
skeleton of a single coherent narrative of the End Times, supplemented by references to 
Book of Daniel, the Gospels and Paul’s letters. His second lecture, entitled “Last Days 
Overview”, offers a condensed account of sacred history from the Day of Pentecost to the 
final defeat of Satan after the Millennium. Atkinson argues that Pentecost marked the 
beginning of the Church Age, which is now drawing to a close as the signs of the 
Church’s growth — and of the diabolical wickedness of the enemy — accelerate and 
multiply. He suggests that the visions which follow the breaking of the first five of the 
seven seals in Revelation depict events that have already occurred, though he is careful to 
add that there are “many possible interpretations”. The white horseman of the apocalypse 
may represent the spread of the Gospel throughout the earth, while the other three horses
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indicate the wars, famines and pestilence that reached a climax during the 20 century; 
the breaking of the fifth seal, which reveals martyrs slain for the faith, points to the 
persecution of the Church up to and including the modem era.
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In Atkinson’s view, it is only with the breaking of the sixth seal, with its vision of 
the sun growing black and the moon turning to blood, that the Revelation narrative 
reaches events that have still not occurred (though dispensationalists would disagree, 
arguing that none of the prophecies has yet been fulfilled). The key verses describe the 
servants of God, who receive a seal on their foreheads: “And I heard the number of the 
sealed, a hundred and forty-four thousand sealed, out of every tribe of the sons of Israel” 
(Rev. 7: 4-5). Dispensationalists usually identify the 144,000 as the saved Jews who are 
about to go through the Tribulation, reasoning that the Church has already been raptured 
(Grenz, 1992: 106). Atkinson insists that this is not the case:
This verse isn ’t talking about the Jewish people. It’s a number that talks about 
fullness, about the Christian population, who have been sealed so that during the 
Tribulation they can be protected and not punished in the judgment o f  God. We will 
have to go through the Tribulation persecution o f  the Antichrist, but none o f  the wrath 
o f God will affect us because we w ill be sealed ... Others will be touched by the 
demonic plague [and other punishments], but people will look at the Church and say, 
“Why isn’t this happening at Kensington Temple? Why isn’t it happening at Holy 
Trinity Brompton?”2
Some serious ideological work has gone into this argument. In order to make the 144,000 
sealed believers represent the Church, Atkinson has to move away from his usual literal 
interpretation of Scripture, explaining that neither the number nor the reference to Jewish 
tribes is to be taken at face value. He also has to explain that Christians, although they 
will not be touched by any of the punishments God visits on the earth, will be terribly 
persecuted during the Tribulation. Anyone who expects to be whisked up to heaven at the 
first sight of the Antichrist is in for a nasty surprise:
When the Antichrist is revealed, there’ll be a lot o f  Christians bouncing up on 
trampolines saying, “Take me, Lord! Take me!”, or skydiving out o f  planes hoping to 
meet the Lord in the air. But he’s not coming then. H e’s not coming before the
2 Holy Trinity Brompton, or “HTB”, is a successful Anglican Charismatic church in South Kensington, 
London, that enthusiastically embraced Wimberite “signs and wonders” during the 1990s.
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Tribulation. Y ou’ll just have to bounce on your trampolines for seven years. [Pause.]
And if  you disagree with me, just bless me.
This last comment rather undermines what has gone before. It shows that, although 
Atkinson believes passionately in a post-Tribulation Rapture, he has no authority to insist 
on this interpretation. The question of whether Jesus will pluck his Church to safety 
before or after the reign of the Beast has been relegated to one of the lower “levels of 
doctrinal importance” that Will Napier described in Chapter 4 — which is just as well, 
perhaps, because the majority of the world’s born-again Christians, including many of the 
international evangelists who preach at Kensington Temple, believe that the Church will 
be raptured before the Tribulation.
If the pre- versus post-Trib argument is largely a matter for evangelical scholars, 
the same cannot be said of the speculation surrounding the Antichrist, the seductive world 
leader depicted in the Book of Revelation who, after the nations bow down before him, 
reveals himself as a demonic “Beast”. For 2,000 years, Christians have attempted to 
identify the historical or contemporary figure who fits this description (see Boyer, 1992; 
McGinn, 1994; Fuller, 1995). In the process, they have created a culture of conspiracy 
belief that, in the eyes of modem society, is both more deviant and closer to popular 
culture than any scholarly theological discourse. The verses most often quoted by 
conspiracy theorists are as follows:
Also it [the Beast] causes all, both small and great, both rich and poor, both free and 
slave, to be marked on the right hand or the forehead, so that no one can buy or sell 
unless he has the mark, that is, the name o f  the beast or the number o f  its name. This 
calls for wisdom: let him who has understanding reckon the number o f  the beast, for it 
is a human number, its number is six hundred and sixty-six (Rev. 13: 16-18).
Interpretations of this passage bring us close to the border between official and unofficial 
millenarianism, where orthodox theology shades into the cultic milieu. Atkinson is aware 
of this and treads carefully, warning his audience that some Christian speculation about 
the Antichrist has got out of hand:
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We know that the Mark o f  the Beast will be an economic measure that affects buying 
and selling —  but we don’t actually know what it will be. It’s interesting to speculate, 
and many people do, but the problems start when they present their speculation too 
strongly, causing confusion. It’s like those people who presented Henry Kissinger as 
the Antichrist; when it turned out that he wasn’t, other people said, “This End Times 
stuff is a load o f  rubbish”.
There will be some sort o f  mark. Will it be a tattoo, or one o f  those electronic gadgets 
that you put in your wrist or forehead so you don’t have to use a credit card? I don’t 
know. But the Christians o f  that time [the Tribulation] will know what it is. What 
about this number, 666? Is it like those price tags on your loaf o f  bread, with three 
strips coming down that read 666? We don’t know.
Atkinson has singled out two ideas from the prophecy subculture ridiculed by the 
evangelical author B J Oropeza in 99 Reasons Why No One Knows When Christ Will 
Return (1994): Reason 75 is “There is no evidence that Henry Kissinger is the 
Antichrist”, while Reason 88 is “The current Universal Product Code is not the Mark of 
the Beast.” Atkinson and Oropeza are equally dismissive of the Kissinger allegation, 
which first surfaced in the 1970s and survived long into the former US secretary of state’s 
retirement.3 But, while Oropeza rejects the barcode theory, explaining that “the paired 
longer bars in the front, middle and end of the code are not secret configurations meaning 
the number 6 and adding up to 666” (1994: 164), Atkinson seems to regard it as 
legitimate speculation. He appears well disposed towards the prophecy subculture.
Perhaps the most revealing moment in Atkinson’s talks comes when he expounds 
on the meaning of the Whore of Babylon in Chapter 17 of Revelation: a “great harlot... 
with whom the kings of the earth have committed fornication”, bedecked in gold, jewels 
and pearls, drunk with the blood of the saints (Rev. 17: 1-6). He explains that the harlot is
3 The Kissinger/Antichrist link surfaced as early as 1972 in a tract by Julian E. Williams, Henry Kissinger
— Mystery Man o f Power. Two years later it was picked up by the best-selling prophecy author Salem 
Kirban, in. Kissinger: Man of Peace? (1974). Doug Clark, in his 1975 book Amazing Prophecies o f the 70’s
— It's Super K! further elaborates on the idea, as does Frank Allnutt’s Kissinger: Man of Destiny? (1976).
As recently as 1997, the prophecy website www.lasttrumpetministries.org implied that Kissinger was 
involved in a plan to make Jerusalem the headquarters of world religion headed by the Pope. But such 
references are increasingly rare: as Oropeza notes, “now that the Nixon years are long behind us, the 
Kissinger-Antichrist connection is getting old, and so is Kissinger” (1994: 151).
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the false church of the End Times, spreading the diabolical message of the Antichrist 
under the guise of a beneficent world religion. Then he adds:
It wouldn’t surprise me if  Rome brought forth this End Times false whore. That’s my 
opinion, it’s not the opinion o f  many pastors in this church, so don’t go away saying 
that Kensington Temple says it —  you can say that Bruce Atkinson says it. It wouldn’t 
surprise me i f  some later demonic Pope gets hold o f  this [idea o f  a new world 
religion], though it might be something different; it might be the World Council o f  
Churches ... I know there are many wonderful, beautiful, saved Roman Catholics. I 
know God is teaching his gospel through that church and blessing pockets o f  it. I’m 
not talking about individuals and specific priests, I’m talking about an institution that 
could possibly become that. I’m not bashing Catholics.
Atkinson is here restating one of the traditional beliefs of Elim and many 
Pentecostal denominations: the idea, central to the Reformation, that the whore of 
Babylon refers to the Pope. But the virulently anti-Catholic ethos of the early days of 
Kensington Temple has long since been routinised: the Elim denomination does not wish 
to be associated with the sort of subcultural deviance associated with extreme Northern 
Irish Protestants. Atkinson is probably the most anti-Catholic of the KT pastors — but 
note that he presents the idea of a diabolical Pope in a carefully modified form. He 
acknowledges that many Roman Catholics are saved (a concession that would have 
horrified the early Elimites) and goes so far as to suggest that God is working through 
“pockets” of the Catholic Church. Significantly, he is at pains to distance Kensington 
Temple from his theory: he backs it with his personal charismatic authority, qualifying 
his argument in much the same way as he did his prediction that Christ will return in his 
lifetime. Moreover, Atkinson seems anxious not to cause too much offence to any Roman 
Catholics who might be listening. It might be worth noting here that, according to James 
Davison Hunter, modem evangelicalism contains “both sectarian and accommodationist 
tendencies” (1987: 196); in other words, as we have already noted, it is pulled towards 
and away from the societal consensus. Atkinson’s lectures illustrate what a complicated 
process this can be: even when reviving a sectarian teaching about the apocalyptic role of
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tVithe Roman church, he seeks to establish common ground, in typical late 20 century 
fashion, between Pentecostals and “saved” Roman Catholics.
To what extent do Atkinson’s “End Times Truths” represent the theological 
position of Kensington Temple? On the one hand, the lectures were delivered during 
official teaching services, and sold as audiotapes bearing the KT logo. On the other, 
Atkinson is at pains to emphasise that his more controversial digressions express his 
personal views, not those of the church. But this raises another question. Why does 
Kensington Temple allow a leading pastor to express speculative, dissonance-inviting 
ideas from the platform that it does not itself teach? One possible answer is that it regards 
Atkinson’s fondness for prophecy speculation as the price it has to pay for his unusually 
fervent ministry. The historical record suggests that Pentecostal ministers can be just as 
susceptible to ideas emanating from the cultic milieu as rank and file believers: the 
British Israelism controversy in Elim (Wilson, 1961: 46-7) is an illustration of this. A 
pastor’s attraction to deviant ideas may form part of a broader commitment to the faith 
that benefits his colleagues. Atkinson’s flirtation with popular prophecy belief cannot 
easily be disentangled from his intense devotion to classic, high-tension Pentecostalism; 
therefore Dye is prepared to indulge him, allowing him to present mild conspiracy 
theories to a KT audience provided that they do not invoke the authority of the church 
itself. A second explanation, not incompatible with the first, is that apocalyptic belief 
simply does not matter enough to the authorities to make it the litmus test of orthodoxy. 
We have seen that Napier consigned belief in the bodily return of Jesus to a secondary 
level of doctrinal importance, describing it as a “fundamental and important truth” rather 
than a “doctrine necessary for salvation”, while belief in a pre- or post-Tribulation 
Rapture belonged to a third level of “lesser doctrines”. Atkinson’s lectures imply that 
some ideas hold an even lower rank in the hierarchy of truth: they are not doctrines at all, 
but “speculation” which may or may not be valid. Unlike many pastors, Atkinson takes 
some of these ideas seriously; but he does not invest heavily in them, being prepared to 
concede that they could be wrong.
My fieldwork suggests that the imminent return of Christ plays a less important part 
in the official teaching of Kensington Temple than it did in the first half of the 20th 
century. During the late 1990s — in some respects, a period of raised eschatological
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expectation — the End Times were barely mentioned in the main services: one 
worshipper told me that he had been attending KT for three years and had never heard 
Dye preach about them.4 Most of the satellite church leaders I interviewed displayed no 
enthusiasm for apocalyptic teaching: Larry Grant, who ran the Porchester Hall service in 
Bayswater, had spent 20 years in the Jehovah’s Witnesses and said that the experience 
had taught him the folly of speculating about the End; Ron Tomlinson, former pastor of a 
satellite church in South London, told me he had never thought seriously about the 
apocalypse, let alone preached about it. A member of KT who was determined to receive 
instruction in this area would therefore either have to wait for a teaching service on the 
End Times or enrol at the Bible college. But, even at the college, the topic did not loom 
large. During the academic year 1997-8, there were 160 students, most of them first years 
studying for a diploma of Christian ministry. The first year course consisted of 120 
lectures over two terms. Of these, only three or four were devoted to eschatology, and 
these reflected the non-committal position of the Elim denomination, which in 1994 
removed premillennialism from its list of fundamental truths (Kay, 2000: 133). In the 
Bible classes, not only was the timing of the Rapture left open, but so was the larger 
question of whether Jesus would come back before or after the Millennium. Napier said 
this was because the college wanted to attract students from evangelical churches whose 
theology was postmillennial. From an outsider’s point of view, this looks suspiciously 
like the loosening of doctrinal constraints to increase market share. (Not everyone 
appreciated the college’s laissez-faire eschatology. Metin Tilki, pastor of KT’s Covent 
Garden congregation, told me that, as a student, he was so confused by the presentation 
of contradictory theories about the Second Coming that he walked out of the lecture.)
In sociological terms, the marginalisation of apocalyptic teaching at the Bible 
college appears to be a textbook case of the routinisation of troublesome charismatic 
claims. Many sects have lowered the degree of tension between themselves and society
4 It is fairly safe to infer, from the greater prominence of apocalyptic themes in Elim literature of the mid 
20th century, that they also featured more often in sermons then than they do now. Even so, it is possible 
that, even then, Pentecostalism was less apocalyptic in practice than its reputation suggested. The 
anthropologist Malcolm Calley, in his 1965 study of West Indian Pentecostal sects in Britain, wrote that 
millennial doctrine “appears to be more significant as an ideological sanction for the maintenance of 
separation from the world than as a principle governing [church members’] day-to-day operation.” He also 
reported that “not once has the second resurrection or the thousand years’ reign of Christ been the subject 
of a sermon or testimony at a service I have attended” (1965: 69).
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by gradually distancing themselves from their millenarian beliefs, and it is often their 
educational institutions that lead the way: in the Seventh-day Adventist Church, for 
example, Bible colleges deliberately ignore their apocalyptic heritage (Lawson, 1997). 
Moreover, there is evidence of similar routinisation in the End Times teaching offered to 
the KT congregation, which rarely ventures beyond the sketchy statement of belief set 
down by Elim and has effectively designated once important doctrines — relating to the 
Tribulation, for example — as matters of opinion. We must, however, be careful not to 
over-simplify the picture. Several qualifications need to be made. First, it should be 
stressed that there is nothing historically inevitable about the playing down of millenarian 
themes at Kensington Temple; if Bruce Atkinson were to take over from Colin Dye as 
senior pastor, he might choose to emphasise them. As it is, the content of teaching is 
dependent partly on the accident of who is available to teach: there was one year when 
Bible college students received detailed instruction in eschatology, thanks to the presence 
on the staff of a premillennialist who kept bringing the End Times into his lectures on the 
Old Testament. Second, it is important to recognise that the routinisation of apocalyptic 
doctrines does not indicate an across-the-board lowering of tension between Kensington 
Temple and its environment. Although Dye places little emphasis on the End Times, he is 
prepared to take considerable risks with “signs and wonders”. Napier, likewise, assigned 
a low priority to eschatology in the Bible college, but happily embraced the controversial 
miraculous claims emanating from various American preachers. Third, the scarcity of 
explicitly apocalyptic claims should not blind us to the implicit millenarianism of Dye’s 
discourse: we shall consider evidence of this in Chapter 7. Finally, we should note that 
Kensington Temple not only permits its members to read the sort of flamboyant prophecy 
material that it refuses to endorse from the platform, but it also sells it to them in its 
bookshop. This unofficial millenarianism provides an interesting counterpoint to the 
official teaching of the pastors; we shall now look briefly at the range of material on 
offer, and the extent to which its content is monitored by the authorities.
Unofficial millenarianism: the KT bookshop
During the 1990s, members of Kensington Temple who were “into the End Times” were 
offered a choice of dozens of prophecy books and videotapes in the bookshop, situated in
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the basement of the old church building. The shop can be entered directly from the street; 
there is a constant trickle of customers even when there are no services upstairs. At any 
one time there are around 1,000 titles in stock; when I was conducting my fieldwork, 
around 50 of these were non-fiction books about Bible prophecy; this total has since 
shrunk, though the number of fictional treatments of the End Times, in the shape of the 
Left Behind sequence and its imitators, has greatly increased. Jim Saunders, the bookshop 
manager, said that apocalyptic material had never been as popular as books on prayer and 
spirituality; however, a number of prophecy authors sold steadily. Three in particular 
were well represented on the shelves in the late 1990s: the Korean evangelist Paul 
Yonggi Cho; Grant Jeffrey, a Canadian fundamentalist author specialising in Israel and 
the End Times; and Barry Smith, a New Zealand-based Christian conspiracy theorist. All 
of them have spoken at Kensington Temple services or events; their work is interesting 
because they represent different degrees of immersion in the cultic milieu.
Cho is one of the most successful pastors in the Pentecostal world; his church in 
Seoul, which claims 750,000 members, is listed in the Guinness Book o f Records. Colin 
Dye admires him, and in 1995 arranged for him to preach at a large rally at the Wembley 
Arena in London, at which large numbers of Cho’s book Revelation: Visions o f Our 
Ultimate Victory in Christ (1991) were on sale. Most of this book consists of 
straightforward exegesis of Revelation; but some passages are heavily influenced by the 
work of Hal Lindsey. Cho predicts that the Antichrist will assume power after the EEC 
(as it then was) is unified; there will be a peace treaty between Europe and Israel, but then 
Russia and the Arabs will attack Israel after the Jews try to rebuild the Temple (78-82). 
He believes that the Rapture of the Church will take place seven years before Jesus comes 
back to earth:
Unsaved husbands w ill awake in the morning to find their wives missing, or wives
w ill find their husbands missing. Some pilots w ill suddenly disappear from their
aircraft. In schools, some o f the teachers and pupils will be missing (1991: 9-10).
Given Dye’s vigorous promotion of Cho as one of the world’s great religious leaders, it 
would hardly be surprising if a KT member reading this passage were to treat it as
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authoritative. In fact, of course, this is precisely the “pre-Trib” view that Dye rejects, and 
that Atkinson mocks in his lectures.
The first edition of Grant Jeffrey’s Armageddon: Appointment with Destiny (1988) 
was available in the church bookshop for several years. The book is, essentially, an 
exercise in date-setting. Jeffrey argues that Christ’s apparent warning against calculating 
the time of the End, “But of that day and that hour knoweth no man” (Mark 13: 32), does 
not forbid “careful, prudent consideration as we see the signs of the approach of the last 
days” (164). He believes that it is his task to offer clues as to the date of the Second 
Coming. He does so by juggling scriptural numbers to demonstrate that the Second 
Coming may occur in the year 2000. Several calculations are built around the Jewish and 
early Christian notion that human history will consist of six “days” of 1,000 years each, 
running from Creation to the dawn of the millennial sabbath (see Campion, 1994: 323). 
Jeffrey shows that, because the Jewish year had 360 rather than 365 days, a biblical 
1,000-year “day” consists of 985.626 modem years. Taking Hosea’s prophecy that the 
Messiah will revive the people “after two days” (Hos. 6: 1) as a reference to Jesus, he 
adds two periods of 985.626 years to the start of Jesus’s public ministry in “AD 28.8”, 
and arrives at 2000 (177-8). (As we shall see in Chapter 7, Jeffrey radically scaled down 
his predictions when he came to revise the book in the 1990s.) Quite what the leadership 
of Kensington Temple makes of Jeffrey is not easy to establish. He has spoken at KT’s 
Mission to London rallies, and Bruce Atkinson quotes him as a recognised authority on 
prophecy. Other members of staff find his theories preposterous. One pastor told me that 
Jeffrey was a “complete parasite”, feeding off the latest fads in the secular world, such as 
the so-called “Bible Code” or the Y2K scare, and repackaging their dubious claims for a 
Christian audience. “With Benny Hinn or Grant Jeffrey I get the same feeling I would if I 
was on a plane being flown by someone with vague amateur experience,” he said. 
“Sooner or later they are going to crash. They don’t have theological subtlety in 
proportion to their grand claims.”
The third author is Barry Smith, a preacher from New Zealand who believes that 
Satanic Freemasons are plotting to take over the world. As this suggests, he is more 
deeply immersed in the cultic milieu than either Cho or Jeffrey. Yet, of the three, he has 
the strongest personal following at KT, thanks to his weekly broadcasts on a Christian
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radio station; the bookshop was selling three or four of his books every week during the 
late 1990s, and the KT survey results showed that 23 per cent of worshippers had read or 
listened to him. In Better Than Nostradamus, or The Secret World Takeover (1996), 
Smith argues that some of the 16th-century seer’s prophecies were correct — but only 
because his master, Lucifer, allowed him a glimpse of the future. He goes on to show 
how the Freemasons are working to establish a New World Order presided over by an 
Antichrist who will probably turn out to be Henry Kissinger. Smith is not certain of this, 
but offers supporting information: if A is 6, B is 12, C is 18 and so on, KISSINGER adds 
up to 666; tradition holds that Antichrist will probably be a Jew; and the former secretary 
of state has an “owl-like stare” that resembles the sinister gaze of Antichrist (1996: 158- 
173). Most KT pastors I spoke to regarded Smith as an eccentric and tended to smile 
when his name was mentioned. Jim Saunders, assistant manager of the bookshop in 1999, 
said Smith’s identification of Kissinger as Antichrist was “crazy”, and suggested that 
most of his theories could be put down to his lack of education.
Why sell his books, in that case? The obvious answer is that there was a demand for 
? them. Moreover, it appears that no one from the shop took the time to read Smith’s many 
titles before agreeing to stock them. When I asked Saunders what the bookshop was 
prepared to sell, he replied:
It’s a committee decision. I don’t think w e’ve discussed it for four or five years, and 
obviously not every person would agree with every single choice. There are really 
only three things we don’t stock. Anything that sets the date for Christ’s return is 
number one. Number two, we don’t stock anything by Rebecca Brown, which is very 
heavy spiritual warfare stuff.5 And, third, w e don’t stock books that give detailed 
descriptions o f what heaven and hell are like.
This is interesting because it draws a parallel between date-setting millenarianism and 
other theological extremes. Yet these boundaries are not policed with particular vigilance.
5 The American author Rebecca Brown, MD, is the author or co-author of several books arguing that 
Christians are under greater assault from Satan than they realise. See, for example, Unbroken Curses:
Hidden Source o f Trouble in the Christian's Life, which argues that even household pets can be attacked by 
demonic curses (1995: 108).
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Jeffrey’s Armageddon provisionally names the year of Christ’s return; the fact that it 
slipped through the net implies that the prohibition against date-setting was not taken 
very seriously, or that Jeffrey’s assurances that he was only suggesting a date were 
enough to satisfy the authorities, or that no one bothered to read the book before buying it 
in. I asked Saunders whether he ever found himself selling people End Times material 
that, in his opinion, would be unhelpful to them. He said: “Many times. It would be a 
different situation if I was in sole charge of the bookshop.” In the event, Saunders did 
take over the shop, and in 2001 he removed Barry Smith’s books and other colourful 
prophecy titles from the shelves. But, when questioned about this, he said I should not 
read too much into it. He had stopped stocking the End Times material, but only because 
he personally disliked it: it was not a policy decision by the church, and he had not 
discussed it with the leadership. (By 2002, prophecy titles had begun to reappear in the 
shop, though there was still nothing by Smith.) One is struck by the haphazard nature of 
the process: just as the doctrinal content of teaching depends on who happens to be giving 
the lecture, so the range of ideas expressed in the bookshop literature is affected by the 
vagaries of the ordering system and the tastes of the manager.
To what extent does the material in the Kensington Temple bookshop determine the 
boundaries of what it is permissible for church members to believe? This is a difficult 
question to answer. On the one hand, it is hard to see how the church’s pastors could 
discipline worshippers for discussing the possibility that Dr Kissinger is the Antichrist, 
given that it was happy to sell them a book floating this idea. On the other, we can be sure 
that anyone who used the KT organisation to publicise this conspiracy theory would soon 
find himself reprimanded. From the perspective of the leadership, what matters is not the 
content of unofficial apocalyptic ideas, but how they are held, and by whom. No great 
harm is done if church members read Barry Smith’s books for their entertainment value, 
treating his wilder claims with scepticism. But, if his theories become the basis of 
people’s personal faith, then there is a risk that they will become a source of tension 
between KT and other Christians, or between KT and society. Furthermore, while an out- 
and-out “prophecy nut” may do little damage on the fringes of the congregation, a pastor 
or evangelist holding the same views could create confusion among the faithful. Hence
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the warning to Ravi Holy to drop his conspiracy theories: they were seen as inappropriate 
coming from someone who was being groomed as a youth leader.
In the final analysis, apocalyptic belief does not require or receive much in the way 
of special attention by the Kensington Temple leadership: rather, its management is 
integrated into the broader policing of boundaries. There are one or two apocalyptic ideas 
that serve as warning signs that a particular worshipper is “superspiritual” or a 
troublemaker; John Starr, a senior member of Dye’s ministry team, told me: “As soon as 
people start talking about conspiracy or producing an exact date for the return of Christ, 
then I don’t want to know. That’s it, mate, you’ve lost your audience.” But he also said 
that someone with eccentric views on the End Times might be a formidable evangelist. 
Indeed, ministers generally emphasised that “over-the-top” views in any area — spiritual 
warfare and prosperity teachings as much as eschatology — were forgivable so long as 
they did not deny Christian orthodoxy, damage the unity or reputation of the 
congregation and, most important, were rooted in a commitment to evangelism.
Managing apocalyptic belief: individual strategies
As we have seen, apocalyptic doctrines tend to be played down in the official teaching of 
Kensington Temple. Yet anticipation of the Second Coming remains an important strand 
in Pentecostal tradition. For the believer, certain questions are hard to avoid. Is Jesus’s 
return really within sight — and, if so, what difference should that make to believers’ 
lives? When they watch the television news or read the newspapers, should they do so 
with one eye on the prophecies of Daniel and Revelation?
The rest of this chapter is based chiefly on interviews with a relatively small 
number of members of Kensington Temple. My sample of around 40 interviewees 
included people from different levels of the organisation and ranged across the many 
demographic groups represented in the church. It was not, however, a representative or 
random sample. Fortunately, I was able to compare the complex opinions gathered during 
the interviews with the data from the “census” of nearly 3,000 worshippers that KT 
conducted in October 1999. The census consisted of a four-page questionnaire designed
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to provide the church with a detailed picture of its core membership; Colin Dye kindly 
allowed me to add several questions about the End Times and related subjects to the last 
page. As the following pages suggest, there was a significant degree of correspondence 
between interview and survey data.
Deciding how to group the interview responses proved difficult. Only four or five 
of the 40 interviewees could be described as millenarians, in the sense that they firmly 
believed or thought it was likely that Jesus would return in their lifetimes; their ideas will 
be considered in some detail in the next chapter. Everyone else acknowledged that Jesus 
would return one day, though for some it seemed a distant prospect; the relevance of the 
Second Coming to daily lives varied, but rarely seemed very great. One way of 
organising the data is to say that most interviewees seemed to have a strategy for coming 
to terms with the potentially difficult eschatological teachings of Pentecostalism, even if 
that strategy was to ignore them. Some people adopted broadly the same strategy, 
performing similar ideological work on doctrines, or cordoning off those doctrines from 
their lives in roughly the same way. The following list of strategies is not exhaustive, 
however, and it should be stressed that the categories overlap: a person might adopt more 
than one strategy, or abandon one in favour of another.
1. Ignoring or marginalising apocalyptic doctrines
The strongest evidence for the general lack of interest in apocalyptic doctrines at 
Kensington Temple came from the survey data. The questionnaire presented 2,973 
worshippers with a list of spiritual activities or interests and asked them to number them 
in descending order of importance to their personal faith. Table 1 (below) shows how the 
respondents distributed their first preferences. The picture could hardly be clearer: the 
End Times are at the bottom of the list. But even this does not fully convey the 
unpopularity of the option: a full 45 per cent of respondents made it their last preference. 
Respondents were also asked a direct question about the Second Coming: “When do you 
think it likely that Jesus Christ will return?” The options were (a) within 10 years, (b) 50 
years and (c) not our place to speculate. Only 8 per cent of respondents chose the 10 year 
option, 9 per cent chose the 50 year option, while 73 per cent declined to speculate and 10 
per cent did not answer the question (see Table 2).
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Table 1: spiritual priorities, showing percentage o f respondents who chose each activity as their 
first priority. Figures shown are to the nearest percentage point.
Spiritual priority First preference (%)
Evangelism 9
Spiritual Warfare 4
End Times 2
Bible Study 9
Gifts o f  the Holy Spirit 11
Prayer 51
No response 14
Total 100
N  = 2,973.
Table 2: Responses to the question “When do you think it likely that Jesus Christ will return? 
(a) Within 10 years; (b) Within 50 years; (c) Not our place to speculate.” Figures shown are to 
the nearest percentage point.
Options Responses (%)
10-yr return 8
50-yr return 9
n/speculate 73
no response 10
Total 100
N  = 2,973.
These statistics, which became available towards the end of my fieldwork, could be 
interpreted narrowly as signifying no more than disapproval of date-setting. In fact, it was 
obvious from my first encounters with church members that many of them were 
genuinely uninterested in Bible prophecy. “I haven’t even read the Book of Revelation all 
the way through,” a middle-aged Nigerian man told me after a satellite service in
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Bayswater. “I know Jesus is coming back in my lifetime is a possibility, but it’s just not 
something I think about.” Most interviewees, when asked for a description of the end of 
the world as they imagined it, produced conventional statements along the lines of “the 
Bible says Jesus will come again, to judge the living and the dead” or “I believe there will 
be a Rapture, but I can’t say what form it will take”. Emmanuel Johnson, a Ghanaian in 
his 20s working as an estate agent in West London, offered a fairly typical response:
Well, it’s all a bit bizarre. I imagine what the Bible says about it: Jesus coming in 
clouds o f  glory. Every activity will be completely normal, and then he will just come, 
in the twinkling o f  an eye. There will be an angel o f  light coming dressed in royal 
clothes, majestically ... [Did he mean Jesus?] Yes, Jesus in the form o f  an angel. 
Armageddon? That will definitely take place, and the Rapture, too. We will be lifted 
physically up, as the Bible says.
Note the cliches — “clouds of glory”, “twinkling of an eye” — and the slightly defensive 
invocation of the Bible as an authority for these “bizarre” concepts. The reference to an 
angel was an unusual embellishment, but I suspected that Johnson made it up on the spot, 
and only added the clarifying detail that it was Jesus at my suggestion. No doubt I could 
have stimulated some worshippers into producing imaginative apocalyptic scenarios, 
rather as Charles Strozier did in his psychological study of fundamentalists (1994). But I 
was interested to discover what people would say about the Second Coming without 
prodding; the answer, in most cases, was relatively little.
Several interviewees told me that they had better things to do with their time than 
pore over the prophetic Scriptures. This was the line taken by Rajiv Gupta, a young South 
Londoner who converted to Pentecostalism from Hinduism:
Soul winning is the priority, you’re talking about winning a soul. Getting saved —  
that’s the whole purpose why w e’re here. End Times is good, but it has its place. 
W e’ve got the prophetic Scriptures, but in the meantime what do you do when those 
prophecies are being fulfilled? What’s the point o f  spending your life finding out who 
the Antichrist is?
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Adam Knight, 27, who was brought up in an evangelical family, made a similar point:
I believe that it’s every Christian’s duty to know the Bible well, and that includes the 
End Times, but an unhealthy focus on the End Times can make us neglect more 
important issues that God wants us to face: obedience, issues o f  character, prayer, 
daily battles for the Christian to fight.
Ron Tomlinson, who had pastored a satellite church with his wife, Sarah, said that 
apocalyptic teachings had never appealed to him:
I never had a strong sense o f  the End approaching. I ’m one o f  those people who 
believes that it may be quite a long way off, even though it’s a logical necessity that 
every day it must be a day nearer than it was. I was leading the church and I never 
recall thinking about the End being nigh —  it didn’t present itself.
Will Napier, while principal of the Bible college, told me in an apologetic tone of voice 
that he found it difficult to focus on the Second Coming:
Speaking very personally, I do find it a challenge to live in the light o f  the imminent 
coming o f  Jesus, and i f  you spoke to most Christians they would say the same: that 
they have to keep pinching themselves to remember that they are in the Last Days, and 
that time is precious, time is short ... I f  somebody said, “do you believe in the 
imminent return o f  Christ?” we would tick that box. But the extent to which that is an 
every day, every second, reality in our lives is a matter for personal discipline.
In an interview following the loss of his faith, he took a rather different line: he told me 
that, even at the height of his infatuation with Pentecostal signs and wonders, he had been 
uncomfortable with the End Times tradition, and tried not to think about it. (He felt the 
same way about Creationism, he added.) But, finding himself on the staff, he could hardly 
avoid the subject altogether:
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It’s a bit like joining a political party: there are going to be some com monly  
recognised beliefs o f  the party that are a bit o f  an embarrassment, but you are prepared 
to take diem on because o f the notion o f cabinet responsibility.
There is no reason to think, however, that Napier or other worshippers found it difficult to 
sideline these “embarrassing” beliefs. If church members had to keep pinching 
themselves to remember they were living in the Last Days, that was at least partly 
because they were rarely reminded of this fact from the platform. Even though it sold 
prophecy literature, Kensington Temple did not supply a strong plausibility structure for 
millenarian doctrines; nor — judging by the interview and survey data — was there any 
great demand for one. Some worshippers positively welcomed the lack of emphasis on 
the End Times. For Larry Grant, who had left the Jehovah’s Witness only four years 
earlier, it was one of the advantages of belonging to Kensington Temple:
I’ve spent too many years in the W itnesses listening to people talking about 
apocalyptic prophecy for me to feel comfortable with that stuff today. It’s put me o ff  
the whole area —  Barry Smith, Grant Jeffrey, they’re not my cup o f  tea. There’s been 
an utter change o f my central focus. My Christian faith is about my relationship with 
Jesus. I know H e’s coming back and that we should live accordingly, but now I have a 
more balanced view.
2. The stigmatisation o f “prophecy nuts ”
Many interviewees who distanced themselves from apocalyptic teachings had a ready 
excuse for doing so: they felt that the whole area had been taken over by extremists 
whose eccentric ideas might discredit evangelical Christianity. For the most part, this 
stigmatisation of popular prophecy belief went hand in hand with the playing down of 
eschatology we have just described; but some worshippers with quite a strong sense of 
the Second Coming were keen to balance it with criticism of “prophecy nuts”, so I have 
considered it separately.
One young woman expressed her doubts as follows:
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It’s important to study and understand Revelation, but there’s a fringe, not really in the 
church but in Christian society, who get an obsession with figuring out all the 
metaphors and figurative language ... I tend to write it o ff  when people start 
predicting when Jesus w ill come back. It’s very clear that man cannot know these 
things —  the Bible says that even the Son doesn’t know but only the Father.6
The reference to date-setting is reminiscent of John Starr’s reaction to attempts to date the 
return of Christ — “that’s it, mate, you’ve lost your audience”; almost no one I spoke to 
had a good word to say for predictive millenarianism. There was condemnation, too, of 
the excesses of explanatory millenarianism. Napier, while still part of the church 
leadership, spoke disparagingly of a small number of “Israel-watchers” in the 
congregation who were perfectly sane on most subjects; but, as soon as the subject of the 
Middle East came up, their eyes would “swivel upwards” and they would start talking 
about the fulfilment of prophecy in the Holy Land. (He added that an attempt to found a 
prolsrael fellowship at Kensington Temple had foundered through lack of interest.)
There was some confusion, as there is in evangelical circles generally, about where 
to draw the line between well-meaning Christians who got the End Times “out of 
proportion” and apocalyptic fanatics. Adam Knight implied that the main problem lay 
within the Church:
Some people can cover up their responsibilities by having too much o f  a focus on the 
End Times, or equally the beginnings, Creation, the start. I have a gut instinct that 
these things can be used as an excuse for Christians that can’t deal with the issues God 
is raising, so [they say] let’s find something in the Bible that I can be fascinated with. 
People in my childhood and the past were so stuck in their opinions on the End Times.
Tom Rayner, a Bible college student, saw apocalyptic extremism as both a Christian and 
a non-Christian phenomenon:
6 “But of that day and that hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, nor the son, but only the 
Father” (Mark 13:32; Matt. 24: 36). Geza Vermes (2001 [2000] : 203) writes that this text “flatly 
contradicts” all the warnings Jesus is supposed to have given in his eschatological discourse of Mark 13, 
Matt. 24 and Luke 21.
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W ell, sadly, there are a lot o f  books on eschatology both inside and outside the 
Church. Although I find it very strange, the Book o f  Revelation was Aleister 
Crowley’s favourite book7 —  it’s often used by occultists and the media, the idea o f  
the Beast and the Antichrist are figures in the popular imagination. On top o f  that there 
are people on the fringe o f  the Church who point out that this person is likely to be the 
Antichrist, and depending on who the author is, the actual identity o f  the Antichrist 
changes as well. I’ve heard everything from the Pope to particular grand rabbis to 
theories that the person would have to be Jewish or a leader o f the European Union, 
and a lot o f  the backgrounds are very spurious.
Emmanuel Johnson suggested that the worst excesses occurred outside the Christian 
mainstream:
Some sects, all they believe in is the End Times —  they have End-Time ministries, 
End-Time churches, which can be quite dangerous. Some people even look at specific 
dates, like that one in Korea or Japan where a sect said Jesus is coming on a certain 
date and everyone should get ready ... I ’ve seen people praying in the street, fanatics 
who say Jesus is coming back, repent! It’s not the way I would approach the issue. I 
used to work with the homeless, giving them teas and coffees and sandwiches, and we 
didn’t even preach the Gospel to them until they opened up. That’s my kind o f  
approach, not preaching to thousands in the street.
Surprisingly, though, the only apocalyptic believer Emmanuel had met recently was from 
the secular world, a young woman client of his who during a business meeting had 
suddenly brought up the subject of the End:
She said “I believe the world is coming to an end, you can see it all around you, with 
an accident here, a plane crash there”. She asked i f  I was religious, but I didn’t push. I 
do think there’s a question mark on the top o f  each human being about this subject.
This girl came out with it straight out o f  the blue, and she wasn’t even a Christian. A
7 Aleister Crowley (1875-1947), English occult writer and magician who liked to be known as “the great 
beast” and “the wickedest man alive”.
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fanatic would have wanted to preach to her, but I have to be professional in my job; 
that’s very important.
There was a sense that, for many worshippers, intense apocalyptic belief was a 
particularly unenticing form a subcultural deviance, demanding a price that was not worth 
paying. The people who used words such as “fringe” and “nuts” to describe the excesses 
of the prophecy subculture were not necessarily afraid of deviance per se. Some of them 
were happy to support Pentecostal preachers such as Cerullo, who had been denounced as 
snake-oil salesmen by the secular media, and accepted reports of the miraculous 
appearance of holy oil or gold teeth without subjecting them to serious scrutiny. 
Apocalyptic theology inspired more scepticism, and even downright hostility, than other 
charismatic claims. One reason for this was an awareness that Christian apocalyptic 
believers had been proved wrong in the past: not necessarily in a dramatic fashion, by the 
passing of specific deadlines, but by the slow dying out of generations that were 
convinced that they had been chosen to witness the parousia. “I can’t see the world going 
on for another hundred years, but I’m sure they thought that a hundred years ago,” said 
Adam Knight. Tom Rayner told me that he found it “sobering” to discover that Christians 
throughout history had used the Book of Revelation to justify their belief that the End 
would come in their lifetimes. Jim Saunders made a link between millennial 
disappointment and conspiracy theories involving the European Union:
The way that prophets always tie up the End Times with Europe is surprising because 
the Bible doesn’t talk about Europe, not in that context. It doesn’t talk about 10 states 
o f  Europe. They are only saying that because that is what is happening in their 
particular lifetime. They haven’t got enough historical imagination to realise that in 
almost every age people thought they were living in the Last Days.
Saunders was, however, unrepresentative of my interviewees. He holds a doctorate in 
theology, and his critique of prophecy belief was more sophisticated, and went further in 
the direction of mainstream theology, than any other I encountered. Other members of 
Kensington Temple, although not predictive millenarians, happily embraced End Times 
conspiracy theories.
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3. Explanatory millenarianism
The KT survey results suggested that a substantial minority of church members were 
receptive to conspiracy theories. On the last page of the census, underneath the question 
about Christ’s return, I had added two familiar statements of conspiracy belief: “The 
move towards a single European Currency is a sign of the Antichrist”; and “Supermarket 
barcodes may contain hidden Satanic information.” Of the respondents, 38 per cent 
agreed with the first statement and 27 per cent with the second — far higher totals than 
the 8 and 9 per cent who thought it likely that Jesus would return within 10 years and 50 
years respectively. This finding seemed to support an observation I had made during the 
interviews: that, while there a widespread reluctance to engage with the concept of the 
Second Coming in anything more than general terms (“the Bible says...”), there was a 
greater willingness to toy conversationally with conspiracy belief. The 73 per cent of 
respondents who said it was “not our place to speculate” about Christ’s return were 
almost as likely to espouse conspiracy ideas as those who did speculate: a third of them 
agreed with the European currency statement.
In short, it appears that explanatory millenarianism was far more popular at 
Kensington Temple than the predictive variety. The 1,121 respondents who agreed with 
the statement about the euro cannot be dismissed as a small fringe of “prophecy nuts”. It 
is true that they had consumed more apocalyptic material than other people — 36 per cent 
had read or listened to Barry Smith, as opposed to 23 per cent of the whole church — but 
in terms of sex, ethnicity and education they were close to the norm. All sorts of people 
made use of explanatory millenarianism in their analysis of the world around them. They 
ranged from mild-mannered KT office staff who would talk hesitantly about dark forces 
at work, but deny that they had a special interest in the subject, to colourful characters 
such as Ravi Holy who “banged on” about the Illuminati. Interestingly, some conspiracy 
theorists were also strongly opposed to predictive millenarianism and poured scorn on 
date-setters.
Anna Lomax, a single woman in her 40s who had converted from Roman 
Catholicism, was distinctly reserved about her conspiracy beliefs, which had to be coaxed 
out of her. She said she had known nothing about the End Times until after she joined the 
church, and was initially sceptical:
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I heard Barry Smith preach six months after becom ing a Christian at KT, and I 
thought: Is this what I’m supposed to believe in? I’ve joined this?
Instead of dismissing Smith’s ideas, however, she carried on reading conspiracy material 
and eventually decided that there was something in it:
He did open my eyes and help me to make sense o f  what is going on with Europe and 
the monetary system. He said there was going to be a single currency, and 10 years 
ago that wasn’t so obvious. It was the first time I had heard that, and also the things 
concerning Revelation. I didn’t know anything about that at all ... I do think we are 
approaching the End, the way things are going —  the issues o f  gay rights and the 
homosexual issue, just the way society is going ... There’s only so far you can go 
down that road before you get to the Mark o f  the Beast.
For Keith Dickinson, a 35-year-old warehouseman who was studying part-time at the 
Bible college, conspiracy theory represented a path back to faith after he drifted away 
from the Pentecostalism of his West Indian parents. He had always known about the End 
Times, but had never encountered Christian conspiracy writings until one of his sisters 
left a book by Barry Smith lying around:
The book talked about certain economic policies related to the Bible, so I started 
looking on TV for certain things that might correspond with what Barry was talking 
about. And I did find them. And me being a curious cat, I started asking more 
questions. I was led by the Holy Spirit. I walked into a Christian bookshop and asked 
the guy at the counter if  he had any books on the N ew World Order and he pointed me 
to the cults and religion section. And I went over and found a book that talked about 
Communism, Marxism, socialism. It talked about the beginnings, from Babylon as it 
were, and it came up the 20th century, what’s going on now. And so I applied it to 
today, and I saw what’s going down with certain governments right now.
Unlike Smith, however, Keith was dismissive of predictive millenarianism — partly 
because his parents had told him as a child that Jesus was coming back soon:
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I was always taught in the Seventies that Jesus would come back in the Eighties along 
with the silver car and the silver dress that we saw in the adverts. My mum and dad 
were always saying, when we talked about the Eighties, that Jesus would be coming 
by then ...
It’s risky to talk about dates. There are people who measure the years from Adam and 
get into the seven-day week. I think it’s interesting, but I w on’t go there. When Christ 
comes back it’s going to be a surprise; why should we speculate? I f  he did tell us 
[Christians], I’m coming back on the 12th o f  August, we wouldn’t be able to keep our 
mouths shut. W e’d blurt it out. People would go around murdering each other, then 
decide to get holy at the last minute, five to twelve.
Comparing the testimonies of Anna and Keith, it is difficult to say who was the 
more intense apocalyptic believer. Judged by his fondness for prophecy material, Keith 
was heavily “into the End Times”. But there was something light-hearted about his 
encounter with it. He was entertained by details of the New World Order; one might 
describe it as his hobby. Anna would not list the End Times as one of her interests, and 
viewed the subject with foreboding. Yet she employed an apocalyptic narrative to explain 
things that really troubled her, such as homosexuality. What united Anna and Keith was 
the way they used the apocalyptic analysis of current events to impose order on a 
disordered world and to neutralise the operation of evil, whether manifested in the 
machinations of foreign governments or the gay rights lobby. Conspiracy theory was here 
performing the historic function of explanatory millenarianism, reducing the dissonance 
between religious teaching and the world, rather than increasing it as date-specific 
prophecies tend to. Its logic might be flawed; but even the most unsympathetic critic 
would be unlikely to accuse Anna and Keith of exhibiting delusional behaviour. Even so, 
they were, in a sense, playing with fire: the currents of conspiracy theory run directly into 
the furthest reaches of the cultic milieu, where they are associated with fanaticism and 
paranoia. The fact that explanatory millenarianism deploys its arguments rationally is no 
guarantee against extreme subcultural deviance: on the contrary, its internal logic can 
drive Christians further along the spectrum of stigmatised knowledge — not towards
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doomsday millenarianism, necessarily, but into a worldview similar to that of conspiracy 
theorists on the political fringes. This danger was acknowledged at Kensington Temple, 
where the more extravagant conspiracy believers ran the risk of being reprimanded by the 
leadership, as Ravi Holy had been, or marginalised within the congregation. At the time, 
Holy felt that he had been unfairly treated, because Dye himself entertained conspiracy 
theories; but even a cursory glance at the book-length memoir he posted on the Internet 
helps explain why some members of Kensington Temple found his views disturbing.
As a teenage dropout, Holy had flirted with anarchism, punk rock, witchcraft and 
Satanism, and it was during this period that he was introduced to the “Illuminatus” trilogy 
of science fiction novels by Robert Anton Wilson (1975). These books, which have 
acquired cult status, draw on a vast range of subcultures to produce one dazzlingly 
complex conspiracy theory; many fans regard them as truth lightly clothed as fiction.9 
Holy certainly took this view, and offers his own summary of Wilson’s ideas in his 
memoir. At the centre of the conspiracy are the Illuminati, a secret society ostensibly 
founded by the Bavarian mystic Adam Weishaupt in 1776 but actually dating back 
thousands of years. Holy describes the Illuminati as “totally evil, pan-dimensional 
beings” who were once known as the Knights Templar and worshipped the dark God 
Baphomet. They also built the pyramids of Egypt, and there are still pyramids at the 
bottom of the Atlantic ocean, the last traces of the Illuminati-controlled civilisation of 
Atlantis. The society controls the US government through a vast pentagram centred on 
the Pentagon; its ultimate aim is to “feed” its evil gods by bringing about the eschaton, 
the end of the world, in the shape of a thermonuclear catastrophe. In a classic 
demonstration of the adaptability of the motifs of the cultic milieu, Holy carried out only 
minor adjustments to this narrative after he became a born-again Christian; indeed, it 
served as a bridge into his new religious culture. He recalls:
8 Holy’s memoir was still posted at www.RaviHoly.com at the time of writing (April 2003).
9 For a discussion of the place of the “Illuminatus” books in conspiracy circles, see Conspiracy Theories, 
Secrecy and Power in American Culture by Mark Fenster (1999). Fenster says that Wilson and his co­
author Robert Shea are by no means conventional conspiracy theorists: “In fact, their trilogy is an extensive 
parody of the fear of conspiracy ... a subversion of conspiracy theory through parodic humour and excess. 
As conspiracy folds into conspiracy and it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the political 
orientations and goals of groups and individual characters ... the trilogy emerges as an anarchic treatise 
about a world in which conspiracies have run amok” (203).
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Becoming a Christian helped me tidy up my mishmash o f  conspiracy ideas —  it gave 
me the full picture, instead o f  just glimpses o f  what was going on. I had to let some o f  
the occult stuff go, such as reincarnation and astral travel, but even then I’m not sure I 
really did let it go. Kensington Temple told me that astral travel didn’t exist, but I just 
concluded that you weren’t supposed to talk about it. At the time I arrived at KT, 
Barry Smith was in favour, and some o f his ideas were totally crazy, so you could say 
that the church’s worldview wasn’t very different from mine.
As his spiritual odyssey suggests, Holy’s experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was one of extreme disorientation; the usefulness of conspiracy theory in providing a 
moral and cultural compass for him is revealed by the way he clung on to it through 
several dramatic changes of religious allegiance. In the late 1990s, he left Kensington 
Temple and reinvented himself yet again, this time as a liberal Anglican; but, even then, 
he was still toying with the notion that world events were controlled by an international 
secret society.
Conspiracy theory also seems to have operated as a spiritual lifeline for Linda 
Symondson, a widow in her 60s who worked as a part-time tourist information officer. 
She told me that she had been struggling with her faith until she came across Christian 
literature which revealed that astonishing archaeological discoveries were being kept 
secret:
I was in a specially bad time in my faith ... when the Lord put me right next door to a 
Christian couple who had a Christian lending library with videos and tapes, and they 
had videos by these people. The Lord put it on my heart to borrow this tape. They 
found the undersea crossing where M oses took the children o f  Israel across. They 
found the road under the sea, and to their amazement the chariot wheels, wood  
wrapped in gold ... They also found Sodom and Gomorrah, and it still exists: the 
buildings are solidified ash. They found the Ark o f  the Covenant; that is a bit o f  a 
bombshell. The government is keeping it low key because they don’t want a holy war 
with the Muslims.
I asked her which government was keeping this secret. She replied:
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Let me think. It’s the government that’s ruling now where there is all the trouble. The 
Ark o f the Covenant is so valuable and so powerful that i f  the Muslims knew the Jews 
had it they would fight to get it o ff the Jews.
Linda went on to talk about an End Times conspiracy in which Satanic forces would 
arrange for fire to come down from heaven; it would look real but it would have been 
arranged by sending light rays through the ionosphere to come back as fire. Who was 
behind it? “It’s a conglomeration. The Pope is at the centre of it,” she said, though, 
tantalisingly, that was all the information she had.
As a conspiracy theory, this was not necessarily stranger than that espoused by Ravi 
Holy; the difference was that Linda possessed few of Holy’s persuasive skills. This 
became clear during my interview with her, which took place outside a service, in the 
Kensington Temple forecourt. We were overheard by Barbara, a Kenyan convert to 
Pentecostalism, who began to interject sceptical questions. “What is the evidence for 
this?” she asked. “If the government is keeping these discoveries secret, how do you 
know about them?” Barbara’s tone was incredulous, almost mocking; and I discovered 
later that Linda was regarded as a marginal presence in the KT community, a wandering 
eccentric rather than a permanent member of the church. She told me she had been a 
member of several evangelical congregations, but left them after deciding that they were 
“cult churches”. She did seem a troubled individual, and one could understand why other 
worshippers thought of her as only a step or two removed from those mental patients who 
think that the CIA is sending death rays through their television screens. Her explanatory 
millenarianism served only to explain things to herself; for her fellow worshippers, it 
confirmed an instinctive association of deviant ideas with deviant people.
4. Apocalypticism as an option
Many Kensington Temple worshippers seemed to occupy a middle ground: they neither 
ignored apocalyptic ideas nor made heavy use of them. Instead, they distinguished 
between helpful and unhelpful concepts, sometimes working on the End Times narrative 
until it made sense to them, and they dipped in and out of the apocalyptic paradigm as it 
suited them. We have already cited Neitz’s argument that converts do not suspend their
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rationality when confronted by the claims of the new belief system: doctrines are 
evaluated and tested against experience (1987: 78-90). My fieldwork suggested that many 
members of Kensington Temple — not just recent converts — used this sort of informal 
hypothesis-testing to evaluate apocalyptic claims. They asked themselves, in effect, 
“Does this proposition make sense to me? Does it go too far?” The answers were heavily 
influenced by their personal outlook. Claire Henderson, a Scots-bom businesswoman in 
her 20s, was particularly wary of conspiracy theories involving modem technology:
The End Times is very interesting, but I wouldn’t go much further than that. I know 
that one o f  the prophecies is o f  a One World Order, and you can see some o f  that 
coming together —  the way Europe is being formed, and Nato. But I stand back and 
watch with interest; you can’t be fanatical about it. When people say we are all going 
to get barcodes stamped on our hand, I tend to be very cautious; I should know more 
about it and think it through more. I don’t think the conclusion is that we are all going 
to get this [points to her hand]. Something will happen, but how it works itself o u t ... I 
almost don’t need to know. There’s a hundred and one theories, but people are missing 
the point. Yes, there’s going to be persecution, and we should start thinking about it.
But you hear o f people who shim all uses o f  technology and say the Internet is the root 
o f all evil and I personally think that’s fanatical.
A similar ambivalence was expressed by Sophie Kempff, a German woman in her 30s 
living in London:
I know from the Bible that Jesus is coming back, and I am conscious o f  living in the 
End Times. Everything is getting more global, with the Internet; we are receiving a lot 
o f news from other countries and w e see how dictators and leaders are misusing their 
countries. Jesus said, look at the signs in Matthew 24. I ’m very aware o f  wars, that 
people hate each other, there are other catastrophes ... [Did she feel that moves 
towards greater European union might be a sign o f the End?] No, it’s not my opinion.
I personally feel that it’s not good to put countries with different histories under one 
roof and currency —  but I wouldn’t say that this is the Antichrist. I’m very careful 
about that. [Did she expect Jesus to return in her lifetime?] It could happen, but Martin
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Luther said we should still plant apple trees even when w e expect the world will
finish.10
For Claire and Sophie, apocalyptic conspiracy theory had some ability to explain 
the shape of the modem world, but not as much as its most enthusiastic proponents 
imagined. They could see political events “coming together”, but worried that some 
Christians were misreading the signs and becoming fanatical. Each had her own sticking 
point: for Claire, the notion that people would be forced to carry computer chips 
implanted in the hand; for Sophie, the identification of moves towards a united Europe 
with the Antichrist. These were the points at which the strength of conspiracy theory — 
its rootedness in the real world — became a weakness; the moment at which it 
overreached itself and proposed an unacceptable hypothesis. The two women responded 
by performing the ideological work of drawing a line between its believable and 
unbelievable claims.
The survey data suggests that this sort of discrimination was common at 
Kensington Temple. For example, only 50 per cent of the people who thought that the 
single currency heralded the Antichrist also agreed that supermarket barcodes might 
contain Satanic information. We can sense the influence of secular society here. The euro 
was constantly in the news at the time of the survey, and was presented by its political 
opponents in a sinister light. This gave European conspiracy theories a surface 
plausibility that was missing from the rather dated apocalyptic warnings about the 
Universal Product Code. As a result, some worshippers though it appropriate to apply a 
prophetic paradigm to Europe, but regarded the barcodes conspiracy theory as a silly 
American notion aimed at the unsophisticated. (Interestingly, 70 per cent of people who 
assented to the barcodes statement assented to the euro statement; there were also slightly 
fewer graduates among them than in the church as a whole.)
The process of discrimination took people in and out of an apocalyptic framework 
for analysing the world. Sophie Kempff was reminded of Bible prophecy when she read
10 The point of this well-known saying is that someone living in accordance with God’s will need not worry 
about an imminent apocalypse. Whether Luther actually said it is not known: it has also been attributed to 
medieval rabbis and to John Wesley. Many references to it on the Internet ascribe it to Dr Martin Luther 
King, Jr.
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about dictators and the Internet, but not when Europe was being discussed. When I asked 
Adam Knight if he thought about the End Times when he watched the television news, he 
replied:
Only when I hear stuff about the Middle East, stuff on Jerusalem. Yesterday they 
talked about the Temple and I thought, this is classic prophecy stuff, they’re talking 
about peace but all sides are building up their armed forces to go to war.
But, where the European Union was concerned, Adam felt he did not know enough to 
make a religious judgment, so his understanding of it was based on whatever secular 
analysis he picked up from the media.
Sometimes, church members disagreed about whether it was appropriate to analyse 
current events in the light of eschatology. I attended a service at KT’s Royal Oak satellite 
in October 2000, just after Israeli troops had fired on rioting Palestinians, killing 
teenagers and children. The crisis dominated the headlines that Sunday; worshippers were 
not surprised to be asked about it, but hardly spoke with one voice. A young Nigerian 
told me he was certain that the End Times drama was being played out in Jerusalem: 
there was “nothing that human beings could do to bring about peace”. An English 
housewife thought it was only a “possibility” that prophecies were being fulfilled. “I need 
to do some more reading, to have a greater depth of knowledge about Revelation,” she 
said. “But I don’t feel that the world is coming to an end right now — it’s too soon.” 
Larry Grant, who was leading the prayers, said pointedly:
We pray for Israel, that it might show wisdom and restraint. There are those in the 
Church who say that whatever Israel does, praise it and bless it. But should that be the 
case now? Is that nation perhaps being punished for its excesses?
After the service, the apocalyptic and secular options came face to face in an animated 
debate between two middle-aged men: Joseph, a lifelong evangelical from Ghana, and 
Henry, an English convert. Joseph felt that the search for peace in the Middle East would 
fail because it ran counter to Israel’s prophetic destiny:
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The Jews are God’s chosen people, no matter what happens. We may pray for peace, 
but we have got to believe that the End is going to be ushered in through wars and 
rumours o f  wars. This may be a prophetic sign, in as much as the whole world is 
trying to get peace in the Middle East, yet every time they get close to it something is 
triggered o ff  and the peace is broken. That doesn’t happen for nothing —  there’s 
something powerful going on.
Henry took a different line:
Do you think w e should not interfere and just let them start a big war? This could just 
be another spat. Israelis and Palestinians are killing each other and I think we should  
interfere. The Israelis have very hard hearts towards the Palestinians when they should 
be showing some compassion. You [Joseph] see this as more prophetic than I do. If  
this is God’s way o f  starting the End Time, then there’s nothing we can do about it —  
but if  it isn’t, then we are missing an opportunity to be compassionate. We mustn’t 
say, this is God’s will so w e’ll just let them get on with it.
Joseph and Henry both believed that civilisation would enter its final crisis in the 
lands of the Bible, in accordance with the visions of Daniel and Revelation. But they 
disagreed on a crucial point: was it happening now? Much the same question was asked 
by church members after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In America, some 
fundamentalist prophecy writers hailed the destruction of the World Trade Centre as the 
beginning of the End Times (Barkun, 2003: 232-4). The response from members of 
Kensington Temple was far more muted. There was a brief flurry of interest in Bible 
prophecy, but by the late autumn of 2001, when various apocalyptic books based on 
September 11 appeared in the bookshop, it had died down. “We had an awful job getting 
rid of those books — no onewanted them because it was old news,” commented one staff 
member. According to Emmanuel Johnson, “September 11 didn’t make people think 
about the End Times — they saw it more as a wake-up call to the Church.” Jason 
Robinson, a young accountancy student from Jamaica, offered an unusual interpretation 
of the event that toyed with calendrical millenarianism while rejecting the prospect of an 
imminent apocalypse:
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After September 11, I thought about the year 2000. They had kept telling us that 
something significant would happen, and when nothing did I just thought that it was 
another wrong prediction. Then something did happen, even i f  there was a year in 
between. And I thought: this is God’s way o f  letting him self be known —  every 2,000 
years something really significant happens. But I didn’t think it was the end o f  the 
world. God works slowly. It’s human nature to want to make everything happen in our 
lifetime, it’s a way we have o f  exalting ourselves. But not even the angels know when 
the End is coming, so why should we?
This sort of relaxed speculation emphasises the freedom of manoeuvre enjoyed by 
members of Kensington Temple, as opposed to the tighter control of prophecy belief in 
the present-day Witnesses or the Pentecostal denominations early in the 20th century. KT 
worshippers were encouraged to reach their own conclusions about the usefulness of 
explanatory millenarianism; no one protested if they moulded aspects of apocalyptic 
tradition until they fitted more comfortably into their own worldview.
As we saw earlier, Bennett Berger (1981: 114) uses the term “remedial ideological 
work” to describe changes to received ideas that are made in order to resolve the 
intellectual or practical difficulties they cause. In a religion that makes as many empirical 
claims and interprets Scripture as literally as Pentecostalism, these adjustments are 
frequently necessary. Apocalyptic concepts are no exception to this. One motif that was 
subjected to frequent remedial work by KT members was the Mark of the Beast. The 
Book of Revelation says that everyone carrying the mark will “be tormented with fire and 
sulphur” (Rev. 14: 10). According to popular prophecy literature, Satanic agents are 
planning to insert computer chips (or some other device — the details are constantly 
being updated) under the skins of unwary people. But if the latter genuinely have no idea 
what the mark means, how can God’s punishment be fair? Several worshippers were 
mildly troubled by this contradiction. One pastor told me that the mark could not be 
something forced on people, but must correspond to some “inner corruption” that would 
merit divine punishment. A similar thought had occurred to Debbie Mowbray, a student 
from New Zealand:
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The Mark o f  the Beast has to be something in our hearts. I f  somebody forced me to 
have it, it’s not going to mean I denied Jesus Christ in my heart ... I was talking to 
someone who reckons that it could be something like w e discover aliens on another 
planet, and we start genetically modifying ourselves with aliens or plant species. The 
human race could become so deformed that God could only destroy it. I’ve been  
thinking about that ever since he said it.
This statement gives us an insight into how apocalyptic ideas are constructed in 
practice. Debbie had modified her concept of the Mark of the Beast as a result of a casual 
conversation with a friend that drew on current events and science fiction (she was 
speaking at the height of the controversy over genetically modified foods); in effect, she 
customised it so that it made better sense to her. But, although she had been “thinking 
about it ever since he said it”, it was not central to her faith. She told me she was vaguely 
aware of living in the End Times, but rarely gave the subject her full attention:
It’s there in the back o f  my mind, but I don’t think about it. When I read the 
newspaper I look around, for example at natural disasters, and think “This is really 
getting quite serious, it could be any time now.” But as far as my everyday Christian 
life goes, I just try to make every day as fulfilled as possible, so it’s not a huge focus 
o f mine. I’ve got tapes at home on the End Times [by Barry Smith], and I really 
should listen to them at some point.
What one notices here is the sheer ordinariness of the mental processes applied to the 
prospect of the end of the world. Even in its explanatory mode, millenarianism is 
constructed around intrinsically frightening notions; yet Debbie and many other church 
members worked on them in much the same way as they worked on other doctrines. It 
was as if the threat of cognitive dissonance, of ideas not making sense, bothered them 
more than the threats conjured up by the apocalyptic narrative, which in the version 
approved by Dye involved the shocking persecution of Christians during the Tribulation. 
On the occasions when Debbie applied a prophetic paradigm to the world around her, she 
reflected that “it [the emergence of the Antichrist] could be any time now”; but the series 
of eight audiotapes by Barry Smith that she had borrowed from a friend, which purported
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to reveal much secret information regarding the approaching crisis, remained unopened in 
their box.
5. Apocalypticism as rhetoric
During our interview, Debbie said something that pointed towards another aspect of 
apocalyptic tradition: the way that the words in which it is expressed can take on a life of 
their own. She told me:
Me and my girlfriends often say “Jesus is coming soon, it’s the End Times”, but none
of us are into studying it or have a particular interest in it.
What this statement implies is that the concept of the End Times, which is an exotic one 
by the standards of secular society, it is so familiar in the Pentecostal world that people 
throw it about in conversation almost without thinking about it — and, perhaps, without 
believing in it very strongly. As we saw in the Introduction, O’Leary (1994) argues that 
apocalypticism is best understood as rhetoric, an attempt to persuade an audience that 
history is structured in a certain way. But the analysis of apocalypticism as rhetoric need 
not be confined to the formal propositions of preachers and authors. As the social 
psychologist Michael Billig points out, rhetoric and argumentation are spread throughout 
social life. It is too readily assumed that in striking an attitude people are giving an 
outward expression to an inner mental state; in reality, they do not possess a single 
“attitude”, but use complex and frequently contradictory patterns of thought to 
accomplish different functions (1991: 15-17). For example, they might engage in a 
particular discourse without investing much in it, out of custom as much as conviction. A 
non-evangelical who overheard Debbie saying to a friend “It’s the End Times” would 
probably conclude that this young woman was living in the shadow of the apocalypse. 
But that was not really the case: her mention of the Second Coming entailed no serious 
practical consequences. Far from corresponding to some inner excitement or turmoil, this 
fragment of apocalyptic rhetoric formed part of what Billig calls “the chatter and 
argument of ordinary life” (1991: 11).
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Most worshippers do not find themselves referring to the End Times very often: I 
came across only one reference to the subject that was completely unprompted by me, 
and that was when a pastor was asked to clarify a complex question of eschatology. In 
doing so, he employed a specialist discourse quite unlike that of Debbie and her friends 
— yet there was a similar mismatch between the content of the rhetoric and what the 
person speaking it privately believed. I was sitting one morning in the office of Andrew 
Kenworthy, a Cambridge engineering graduate in his early 30s who was acting head of 
the KT Bible college. While we were talking, a member of staff came in and asked for the 
answer to an exam question that had been set for the students. Kenworthy turned to the 
Book of Daniel and started talking about the 70 “weeks” that Daniel is told by the angel 
Gabriel will elapse until the dawn of everlasting righteousness (Dan. 9: 24), a passage 
understood by many born-again Christians to reveal the amount of time left before the 
Second Coming. The colleague left, and I asked what his question had been. This is a 
transcript of Kenworthy’s reply:
The question was, at the end o f  the 69th o f  D aniel’s weeks, what happens? Is it (a) 
Rapture, (b) the Crucifixion, (c) something else —  and the answer’s the Crucifixion 
because the argument would be that you’ve got a literal time-span that you can peg 
from the calendar to the week. You can even take into account that they are different 
years, 360 days or 365: whichever one o f those you take it still fits, and the better one 
is to go from the decree o f Cyrus that Israel can be a nation again, which is found in 
Jeremiah or somewhere, and from that date until the Crucifixion is a literal 483 years 
using the year they would have had, without having to juggle things.11 So you’ve got a 
literal time there; i f  the next seven-year period is a literal one as well, it’s quite 
difficult to find a historical event that would match up with that. And because the 
prophecy is given from Gabriel to Daniel, saying “this is a plan for your people”, the 
70 weeks reflect God’s dealings with the Jews. So at the point o f  the Crucifixion, 
when the veil was tom in the Temple, that ushered in the Church Age, because people 
whether Jews or Gentiles were now able to have clear access to God, and the 
premillennial or pre-Tribulation would be ... actually, no, it wouldn’t depend on your 
belief about when the Rapture happens, it would simply be ... no, it w ould  be a pre-
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Tribulation Rapture because you could either say that the remaining week is a seven- 
year period, the seven-year Tribulation, so the end o f  the Church Age is when the 
Church is raptured, so the Church goes from the Crucifixion to the Rapture, and the 
Church is out o f  the way, so the Jewish time clock starts ticking again for the last 
seven years, even though there’s been a discontinuity. Or you could say that the 
Aramaic word for week, or seven, is more accurately translated as a number divisible 
by seven, so you could have a 483, 69 times 7, literal years at the beginning, and the 
last seven years could be more figurative: it could be 7, 14, 21 and so on. So you’re 
not quite sure how long that goes on for.
All this was spoken almost without a pause for breath; even when he hesitated, 
Kenworthy sounded like a mathematician solving a problem rather than someone 
genuinely confused. I confessed that I was unable to follow his argument after the first 
sentence or two, and I asked how much of it he had worked out for himself. He replied:
If you said to me, “what does that passage [in Daniel] mean?” I would give you that 
explanation. If you asked me when I believe the Rapture will happen, I would give 
you another answer. But that is the clearest explanation o f that passage, which I have 
probably gleaned from reading books since I’ve been here at this church.
Kenworthy was raised in the Church of England; I asked if this sort of millennial 
speculation would have meant anything to him before he was a Pentecostal.
No, I couldn’t have cared less. And I still couldn’t care less in one sense. The reason I 
started caring was not because o f a need to pin down my own eschatological belief to 
one party or the other, that’s not what’s driving me. But I wanted to be aware o f  the 
different arguments and approaches out there, and in order to do that you’ve got to 
familiarise yourself with them all, and in doing so you are likely to come down on one 
side or the other.
11 The basis for this claim is the suggestion in Dan. 9:2 that “seventy days” actually means 70 years, by 
which calculation “seventy weeks” (490 days) would equal 490 years. See Boyer, 1992: 29.
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But which side had he come down on? Let us look again at his odd statement that if 
he were asked to explain the passage in Daniel he would give one answer and if he were 
asked when the Rapture would occur he would give another. His explanation of Daniel’s 
“weeks” points to a pre-Tribulation Rapture, since the Church would be “out of the way” 
before the start of the 70th week, the Great Tribulation. Yet he did not actually believe 
that this was when the Rapture would happen. As he said later:
The reason I would come down on the side o f  a post-Tribulation Rapture is that the 
only way the Church w ill be purified is i f  it goes through hard times. Plus, in the 
Bible, God is always saving people out o f  things, he’s not saving people from  things.
In other words, his personal convictions led him to a conclusion different from that of the 
complex explanation of Daniel that he had “gleaned from reading books”. So why did he 
not reject that explanation? Partly, one suspects, because he wanted to be fluent in the 
eschatological discourse of bom-again Christianity. He was not driven by his own need to 
know exactly how the End Times would unfold; rather, having become a Pentecostal 
minister, he wanted to understand the “different approaches that are out there”. 
Eschatology was an area of knowledge rather than the key to salvation. “I still couldn’t 
care less in one sense,” he said — which may explain why he felt able to perform an 
exegetical exercise that he suspected was flawed.
That exercise was also a demonstration of how the intimidating raw material of 
Jesus’s prophecies has become routinised. Like one of the medieval clerks described by 
McGinn (1998 [1979]: 35), Kenworthy adapted apocalypticism to the requirements of a 
specialist discourse, demonstrating in the process that he was what Max Weber called a 
religious virtuoso. The blood-drenched images of the Book of Revelation lose much of 
their disruptive power once they are subsumed into a debate about the order in which they 
will occur. Not only is attention diverted from their more disturbing aspects towards 
hermeneutical technicalities, but the professional ethos of the debate discourages extreme 
reactions to them. Furthermore, the knowledge that there are recognised experts in 
eschatology relieves ordinary worshippers of some of the burden of thinking about the 
terrible things to come: the smooth flow of rhetoric renders the subject of the End Times 
manageable in everyday life.
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6. Apocalypticism as entertainment
Some members of Kensington Temple encounter the End Times chiefly as entertainment, 
in the form of taped sermons by celebrity preachers, prophecy books or novels. This 
mediation does not necessarily rob the apocalyptic narrative of its force; but, like the 
eschatological rhetoric discussed above, it can make the subject easier to manage. 
Admittedly, “entertainment” is a rather loose concept. Purely theological material can 
function as entertainment if it is packaged in the right way and that is how the consumer 
experiences it. Alternatively, fiction may convey a powerful theological message. For 
some people, novels and feature films based on the prophecies of Revelation are a way of 
sustaining a belief in millenarian doctrines, albeit at a comfortable distance; others may 
derive apocalyptic beliefs from secular entertainment.
When I first visited the KT bookshop in the mid 1990s, it stocked a small range of 
apocalyptic videotapes, including the made-for-television film A Distant Thunder (1986), 
which told the story of a young woman trying to escape being given the Mark of the 
Beast by the Satanic forces known as UNITE. There was no sign of any great appetite for 
this sort of material, which appeared to be aimed only at worshippers with a special 
interest in the End Times. By 2002, however, a bookcase in the centre of the shop was 
given over to the Left Behind novels and their spin-off comic books, DVDs and videos, 
supported by slick promotional material. The irony was that Jim Saunders had only just 
removed most non-fiction prophecy literature from the shelves; it was tempting to 
interpret this as evidence that, even in the conservative evangelical world, apocalyptic 
motifs were increasingly the stuff of fiction rather than literal belief. In fact, Left Behind 
did not enjoy a huge following at KT: the sales figures for 2003 showed that, in the past 
few months, the novels had sold only about 20 copies each. Most of the worshippers I 
asked about the subject had seen the feature film based on Left Behind but had not read 
the books. Their responses to the film were mixed. David, a rock musician in his 20s, said 
he was perfectly comfortable with the presentation of the End Times in a fictional form; 
he felt that the film had grappled with its difficult subject as realistically as possible. “I 
had been a Christian for a long time when I saw it, so I already had my own views about 
the End Times,” he said. Like Dye, he personally expected a post-Tribulation Rapture, a 
doctrine directly at variance with the central concept of Left Behind. This did not worry
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him: “It’s an area where people honestly disagree. It doesn’t matter, so long as people 
know that the End Times are coming and prepare for them.” In effect, David had agreed 
to differ with the film’s producers about the sequence of the apocalyptic events. 
Katherine, another young church member, had seen the film but had not even noticed that 
its depiction of a Secret Rapture contradicted Dye’s teaching; nor was she very interested 
when I told her. “I knew that the film wasn’t completely accurate, but I do believe that 
these things will really happen one day,” she said. She had heard someone criticise the 
theology of the Left Behind books, but could not remember what the criticism was.
These and other discussions implied that apocalyptic fiction had failed to intensify 
millenarian beliefs at KT: although it reminded worshippers that the End was coming, it 
acted as an agent of routinisation, allowing them to encounter it from a safe distance. 
Paradoxically, however, some interviewees derived an apocalyptic message from secular 
products that were intended purely as entertainment. I was occasionally told that 
blockbusters such as The Matrix and Independence Day contained subliminal clues to the 
development of a New World Order: Hollywood was hinting at things in its screenplays 
that could not be revealed directly — which was also what Ravi Holy believed about 
Wilson’s “Illuminatus” trilogy. As Michael Barkun observes, this way of approaching 
fictional material is very common on the cultural fringes of society. “The common sense 
distinctions between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ melt away in the conspiracist world,” he writes. 
“More than that, they exchange places, so that in striking ways conspiracists often claim 
that what the world at large regards as fact is actually fiction, and what seems to be 
fiction is really fact” (2003: 47). In the 1970s and 80s, the evangelist John Todd visited 
Pentecostal churches spreading the message that the Star Wars films represented a battle 
between Satanism and the false Christianity of the Illuminati (49); the apocalyptic 
believers of Waco and Heaven’s Gate also interpreted films and television in this way 
(see Thompson, 1999b). Yet the encounter between the entertainment industry and the 
cultic milieu was a two-way process: Hollywood during the 1990s was fascinated by 
conspiracy theories, many with millenarian overtones. Whether these ideas were taken 
seriously is another question. In Barkun’s view, conspiracy-orientated motion pictures, 
television series and books have increased the reach of “stigmatised knowledge” — but 
they may also have devalued the common currency of conspiracy theorists by placing it
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in everybody’s hands (2003: 56). The same could be said of the appropriation of the 
Christian End Times narrative by popular culture. As I shall argue in the final chapter, the 
presentation of apocalyptic ideas in such an accessible form represents a lessening of 
subcultural deviance: it is consistent with theories of secularisation and routinisation.
Conclusion
When they were asked about the End Times, the vast majority of members of Kensington 
Temple — pastors as well as ordinary worshippers — failed to strike the confident, 
unambiguous note of the fundamentalist Christians interviewed by Nancy Tatom 
Ammerman (1987) and Charles Strozier (1994), for whom a sense of an imminent End 
appeared to supply the hidden dynamic of their Christian life. One could not say of 
Kensington Temple, as Ammerman did of the fundamentalist church in New England that 
she studied, that “the doctrine of the Rapture ... produces a sense of impending doom that 
invades the sinner’s consciousness” (157). Nor did most KT members “feel the dangers 
of the signs of the end acutely, and [alter] their lives accordingly” (Strozier, 1994: 145). 
The most noticeable quality of eschatology at Kensington Temple was its ambivalence. 
Everyone appeared to believe (with differing degrees of intensity) that Jesus would return 
one day, and many people made the rhetorical concession that it might happen soon. But 
even those church members who employed the tools of popular prophecy to analyse the 
contours of the modem world did not say much about the imminence of the Second 
Coming. The survey results reinforce the message of the interviews: this was a church 
that, its traditions notwithstanding, assigned a relatively low priority to the End Times. 
Crucially, it did not provide a strong plausibility structure for millenarian ideas; and this 
lack of a social base was both a cause and a consequence of individual worshippers’ 
unenthusiastic response to the subject. In any religious community, the cost of expressing 
belief in an apocalyptic event is increased if other members of the worshipping 
community are reluctant to do so. In the absence of formal rhetoric and informal 
conversations that confer plausibility on counter-intuitive millenarian ideas, the ordinary 
member’s opinions will drift towards the secular consensus.
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Why was there such a contrast with Ammerman’s and Strozier’s findings? One 
possible explanation is that this study concerns Pentecostalists, not fundamentalists 
(though some of Strozier’s interviewees were Pentecostalists). The Pentecostal movement 
has an uneasy relationship with a prophecy subculture that it has borrowed from the 
conservative evangelical mainstream (Prosser, 1999; Poloma, 2001). Another factor is 
that Kensington Temple, despite its multi-ethnic congregation and American-influenced 
worship, is a British church, and prophecy belief has never played as prominent a role in 
evangelical churches in the British Isles as it has in the United States. It is worth 
examining the results of the KT questionnaire in the light of a survey of the pastors of 
Charismatic “new paradigm” congregations in America carried out in the early 1990s by 
the sociologist Donald Miller. More than a third of the pastors from the Vineyard 
movement (the least fundamentalist of the churches surveyed) thought that Jesus would 
return in their lifetimes (1997: 231). Meanwhile, only 12 per cent of KT ministers 
expected the Second Coming within 50 years. Although the figures are not directly 
comparable, the contrast is striking. Given that the middle-class Charismatic Vineyard is 
traditionally less orientated towards the End Times than classic Pentecostalism, the 
difference could possibly be accounted for in terms of America’s apocalyptic heritage.
Even so, I suspect that a through ethnographic study of the circulation of 
millenarian ideas in an American fundamentalist church would identify some of the 
patterns revealed by this chapter, such as a concentration on explanatory rather than 
predictive imagery and the use of a routinised rhetoric to take the sting out of the prospect 
of the end of the world. Above all, it might find that, in America as much as in Britain, 
the tension-inducing propositions of prophecy belief — irrespective of whether they carry 
the stamp of official theology — need some sort of management at the levels of both the 
group and the individual. This nature of this management is dictated partly by the special 
characteristics of millenarianism and the peculiarly intense cognitive dissonance created 
by the failure of prophecy. But, in the final analysis, many of the strategies for dealing 
with apocalyptic claims can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other high-tension claims.
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6. Millenarians
Introduction
A small number — maybe four or five — of the 40 people I interviewed at Kensington 
Temple communicated such an intense expectation of the Second Coming in their 
lifetimes that I felt it was possible to label them millenarians. I was not entirely 
comfortable ring-fencing them in this fashion, since the way they thought and behaved 
did not present that much of a contrast with their fellow worshippers; but it did seem 
worth asking how they came to possess an unusually heightened awareness of the coming 
apocalypse, and whether, in conjunction with the survey results, their testimonies threw 
light on the debate about the causes of millenarianism.
This chapter divides into three main sections. The first consists of a single case 
history: the story of Maureen, a woman in her early 60s who not only gave me a full 
account of how she was introduced to the concept of the End Times but also claimed to 
have received an apocalyptic message from Jesus. The second section uses the interview 
data to explore the social and psychological factors that might dispose a member of 
Kensington Temple to move beyond explanatory millenarianism to belief in an imminent 
parousia. The third section brings in the questionnaire data, treating responses to the 
question about the return of Christ as a dependent variable and examining the effect on 
them of sex, age, ethnicity and participation in the life of the church.
The making of a millenarian: Maureen’s story
Maureen Archer was doing the washing up at home when she realised that Jesus was 
coming back soon:
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Two years ago I was at the sink, not in prayer, and the Lord said to me: “I’m coming 
soon, I ’m coming soon”. It was like a thought, not audible. It was like a butterfly 
alighting on my thoughts. I told one o f  my friends, Angela, and she said to me that the 
Lord had told her “This is the Last Hour”. N ow  we know that with the Lord a 
thousand years is but a day, so if  you work it out there’s probably about 30 years left, 
if  you divide 1,000 by 24.
It is a strange little story, from the perspective of the secular world, and also a 
complicated one. The more we scrutinise Maureen’s words, the more questions we need 
to ask. Did the revelation really come out of the blue, or was Maureen — a part-time 
legal secretary living on her own in a distant suburb — somehow prepared for it by 
previous religious experiences? If her friend Angela had not told her about the Last Hour, 
would she still have attempted to work out when Jesus was coming back? How did she 
produce such a characteristic piece of millennial arithmetic, similar in many ways to the 
apocalyptic calculations of the early Church? And what should we read into the fact that 
she got her sums wrong? (1,000 divided by 24 is 41.7, not 30.)
Maureen’s revelation may have taken her by surprise, but it was hardly 
unprecedented: the history of apocalyptic thought is full of messages delivered to 
ordinary people at a time when they least expected it. It was not even the first time that an 
End Times revelation had been granted to a woman while standing at a sink:
Missionary Ms Young Shin Kim in New York area was not quite sure about His 
[Jesus’s] return in 1991 and she prayed about it for any possible certain answer ... 
Later one morning when she was going to wash her face she saw the vivid number 
10/28/92 in the water sink (Mission for the Coming Days: 36).
This quotation is taken from a typewritten anthology of visions and testimonies circulated 
by the Mission for the Coming Days, a South Korean church that attracted international 
ridicule after prophesying that the Rapture would take place in October 1992 (Thompson, 
1996: 239). The narratives of its members are similar to Maureen’s. They are not 
distinctively Korean, any more than hers is distinctively English; nor is their form 
determined by the precise content of the theology. They belong in a long tradition,
153
encompassing many religions and cultures, in which narratives of sudden enlightenment 
— not necessarily apocalyptic in character — are given rhetorical power by the 
ordinariness of the setting: other Koreans were playing golf, walking in the street or 
driving their cars when they heard the message. But, however unexpected these 
experiences, they did not strike members of the public at random. Most of the visionaries 
were active evangelical Christians: missionaries, pastors, pastors’ wives or deacons. They 
were already connected to a plausibility structure in which millenarian ideas were taken 
seriously.
Maureen is an unusually committed member of Kensington Temple. When I met 
her, she was half way through a course at the Bible college; she was more than twice the 
age of most of her fellow students, but as eager to leam as any of them. She witnessed to 
passers-by in the street and to people in shops:
The Lord gave me the gift o f  evangelism —  and I had been an introvert! The Lord has 
never stopped talking through me. Sometimes He will give me six or seven souls in a 
day. He gives me opportunities wherever I go: I set foot outside my front door, and 
there it i s . ,
Maureen was as close to the popular stereotype of the convert as anyone I met at 
Kensington Temple. The sudden awakening of her faith in middle age coloured her whole 
life. As a young woman, she had been a practising member of the Church of England, but 
she was more interested in parish social life than religious teachings. Then, when she was 
48 years old and no longer a regular churchgoer, she had a dramatic experience:
I was asleep in bed, the children were away at university, and I was awoken by this 
thunderous voice and a scripture from Isaiah which was very detrimental to me. When 
God’s got his hand on a person he never lets you go, and I realised I was in a total 
mess. Then the Lord led me to a [Pentecostal] hall on the comer o f  the road where 
they were all dancing and singing. I ’ve never seen such joy —  I was used to a vicar 
and a pew. I realised I could have a relationship with Jesus and that I had to be 
baptised according to what the Bible says. Baptism in the Holy Spirit seals you into 
the Kingdom o f  God. He gives you the gifts like the fire on the disciples in the upper
154
room. It’s such a privilege to be on fire for God. I ’ll say it from the rooftops: I ’m 
willing to die for Jesus.
She discovered the teachings about the end of the world some months after 
becoming a born-again Christian, and then almost by accident:
I first heard about the End Times when I went to a Jews for Jesus meeting at 
Westminster Central Hall. I wanted to learn about the Jews, and they gave me a little 
glimpse about the End Times and what would happen to the Jews, but it wasn’t a big 
thing.
Messianic or Christian Jews form a small but valued part of the culture of conservative 
evangelicalism (see Cohn-Sherbok, 2000). It is not surprising that Maureen should want 
to find out more about them, or that their meeting should deal with the subject of the End 
Times, a central preoccupation of many born-again Jews.1 What is mildly surprising is 
that until then Maureen — a new believer very enthusiastic about her faith — had 
managed to attend a Pentecostal church without learning anything about apocalyptic 
doctrine. But that situation was rectified when she moved to Kensington Temple:
When I came to this church they taught me about the End Times and the Book o f  
Revelation. It was all Bible-based, sermons and teaching. Revelation is a bit o f  a 
difficult book to comprehend without teaching: you have to find out from the Hebrew 
scriptures the deep meaning o f  Revelation —  beasts and horns that are nations, the 
correct interpretation.
This teaching was delivered during study sessions in the church and at the Bible college, 
where Maureen enrolled; she might not have encountered it if she had merely attended
1 As Dan Cohn-Sherbok notes in his study of the phenomenon, many Messianic Jews are convinced 
premillennialists who believe that the Antichrist will soon plunge mankind into the Great Tribulation.
During this time, “crises will occur for the Jewish people and the rest of humanity, including floods, 
famines, earthquakes and disease ... both traditional Jews and Christians will be persecuted and killed”
(2000: 172). This is what Maureen meant when she talked about “what would happen to the Jews”. But this 
is not a specifically Messianic Jewish prophecy: it is the standard fundamentalist Christian understanding of 
the role of the Jews in the End Times, which paradoxically honours and inflicts untold suffering on the 
(unconverted) people of Israel.
155
Sunday services. The reference to correct interpretation implies that the lectures were 
attempting to discourage over-the-top speculation; but, as we have noted, Kensington 
Temple has an ambivalent relationship with the End Times subculture, and acts as a 
channel for unofficial prophecy material. Maureen is one of the people to whom such 
material was channelled. In the early 1990s, she was in the audience when one of the 
evangelical world’s most controversial prophecy authors spoke at KT’s Mission to 
London rallies:
I ’ve heard —  what’s his name? —  Grant Jeffrey at M ission to London. H e’s a 
professor or something, a very, very clever man. H e’s studied scriptures and 
Revelation for years and written a lot o f  books. He gave us interpretations o f  
Revelation for about seven years [ie,  seven years running] and I received an 
interpretation o f  Revelation. H e’s very much a learned man, a doctor, I believe h e’s 
got a PhD.
As we have seen, Jeffrey’s work comes very close to explicit date-setting: he takes the 
view that, in these Last Days, the confusion surrounding the year of the Lord’s return will 
finally disappear; and, at one stage, he believed that 2000 was the most likely candidate 
(see Jeffrey, 1988). Maureen learned the rudiments of millennial arithmetic from him, 
and it is unlikely that it would have occurred to her to work out the rough date of the 
apocalypse if she had not been to his lectures .
Maureen told me that she hoped and expected to live long enough to witness 
Christ’s return. But what difference did this make to her daily life? It seemed to have had 
little effect on her actions, apart from possibly increasing the urgency of her witness. She 
used a familiar rhetorical strategy to distance herself from her prediction: “It’s my own
2 Maureen’s identification of a divine day with 1,000 years appears first in the Second Epistle of Peter, 
written in the second century AD, which says that “with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a 
thousand years as one day” (2 Peter, 3:8); this is a reworking of Psalm 90, verse 4: “For a thousand years in 
thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past.” Early Christian authorities such as Irenaeus combined this 
idea with the Jewish tradition of a Great Week to produce a structure of history consisting of six 1,000-year 
days followed by the sabbatical Millennium prophesied in the Book of Revelation (Campion, 1994: 324). 
Maureen made use of the day = 1,000 years equation but combined it instead with the 24-hour clock. When
I interviewed her, she was not sure where her inspiration came from; the most likely explanation is that she 
was taught about the Second Epistle of Peter in Bible college but learned how to work on the information 
from Jeffrey.
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interpretation, and I don’t live by that,” she told me, echoing Atkinson’s insistence that 
his expectation of the End during his lifetime was only an opinion. But apocalypticism 
did mould her understanding of the world:
I do believe I’m living in the time when Jesus will come again. I can see wickedness 
and degradation all around, a decline in respectability and the respectfulness o f  people, 
the rebelliousness o f  youngsters, the hopelessness o f  people. The general flaunting o f  
sex on the trains last thing at night, I see it on the British Rail trains, people doing 
what they shouldn’t. Even in broad daylight on a tram in Croydon. A couple o f  
teenagers, the girl hovering over him, his hand up her privates, it almost made me 
sick.
By this stage in the interview, Maureen had retreated to the safer territory of explanatory 
millenarianism; it is interesting to note the similarity between her diagnosis and Anna 
Lomax’s conviction that homosexuality was a sign of the End. Indeed, when I raised the 
subject of the survey questions, she talked more readily about conspiracy than she had 
about the Second Coming:
It’s not our place to speculate, so I just ticked that box —  but i f  you asked me what I 
think, I would say [Jesus will come back] in 50 years. [And the single European 
currency?] I do think that! It gives that in the Bible; it says in Revelation there will be 
one world rule, no money exchanged at all. This is where the thing in the wrist will go 
i f  you go to the supermarket —  and that’s when we flee to the hills. I don’t have a 
credit card. I like to pay cash or nothing; I never liked credit.
Did you know about Procter & Gamble? The director was interviewed on American 
television late at night, but one Christian saw it. He said he gave all his profits to 
Satan’s church. The interviewer said, don’t you think you will lose trade? He said, 
there’s not enough Christians to make an impact. On the actual packets o f  soap 
powder there was a goat’s head. I think I saw it once, then they decided to take it off.
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The Procter & Gamble story is one of the most persistent of recent urban myths; 
Maureen did not question its veracity — but, significantly, it had no effect on her 
shopping habits. Far from scrupulously avoiding Procter & Gamble products in the 
supermarket, which one might expect her to do if she believed that the money would go 
to Satan, she was unable to name a single item the company manufactured and must have 
bought many of them unawares. Once again, a professed belief failed to translate into 
social action. But this is very much of a piece with her attitude to apocalyptic calculation: 
having apparently discovered the key to the date of the Second Coming, which involved 
dividing 1,000 years by 24 to produce the length of the Last Hour, she did not even 
perform the calculation properly.
We might conclude from this that Maureen’s millenarianism was essentially 
rhetorical: the act of expressing certain ideas was the culmination, not the beginning, of 
her engagement with apocalypticism. Even so, the sequence of events that led her to the 
point of articulating those ideas is representative of important social processes, such as 
the mastering of an unfamiliar culture, negotiation with fellow believers and ideological 
work. There may be no single cause of Maureen’s belief that Jesus will return to earth in 
about 30 years; but that does not mean that the search for factors that predisposed her to 
reach this conclusion is pointless. On the contrary: Maureen’s case history is instructive 
because it displays evidence of three factors that appeared to incline other members of the 
congregation towards millenarianism: conversion, subcultural immersion and individual 
psychology.
3 Maureen was right to say that the company abandoned its logo a few years ago but wrong about the goat’s 
head: the logo showed a face on a crescent moon looking at 13 stars representing the original American 
states. The rumour that this contained Satanic symbolism surfaced in fundamentalist circles around 1980; 
within a few years it had become more elaborate, alleging that Procter & Gamble had made a pact with the 
Devil and given a share of the company’s profits to the Church of Satan. The company was eventually 
forced to employ four staff members to reply to the 500 complaints it was receiving every day. In 1985 it 
removed the logo from all its products, but the rumours continued. According to the sociologist Jeffrey 
Victor, “research sponsored by the company found that the rumours were transmitted primarily through 
informal communication networks beyond the reach of lawsuits: through flyers given out in churches and 
shopping centres and by word-of-mouth conversation. The persistence of the Procter & Gamble Satanism 
rumour stories demonstrates the power of the fundamentalist communication network in American society” 
(1993: 14).
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Factors influencing millenarian belief
1. Conversion
Maureen’s expressions of belief in the Second Coming were informed by, and difficult to 
distinguish from, “the zeal of the convert”. This figure of speech is rooted in a real 
sociological phenomenon: many scholars have observed that converts tend to hold to a 
group’s doctrines more firmly than those who have grown up with them.4 For some new 
believers, the fact that certain teachings are considered extreme or odd by the outside 
world adds to their appeal. Converts are often drawn to the controversial teachings of the 
movements they join; indeed, a high proportion of converts in a group helps to maintain a 
state of tension with the surrounding environment. By the same token, the birth of a 
second generation of believers often has the effect of lowering tension within a group, of 
knocking the rough edges off difficult teachings (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985: 152; 
Bainbridge, 1997: 81). Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, in their book The 
Future o f Religion (1985), argued that the difference between converts and later 
generations can be explained by the statistical phenomenon of regression to the mean: the 
unusual personality traits or social circumstances that lead converts to join a group — and 
perhaps to respond to its more distinctive teachings, such as millenarianism — are 
unlikely to be passed on in the same degree to their children (154). Bryan Wilson has 
made a similar point, arguing that “there is certainly a difference between those who are 
converted to a revolutionist sect, and those who accept adventist teachings at their 
mother’s knee” (1966: 207).
If millenarianism is the sort of high-tension concept that appeals to converts, then 
one might expect to find that, in groups with apocalyptic teachings, converts are more 
likely to be millenarians than non-converts. The evidence for this hypothesis is sketchy, 
but one ethnographic study can be cited in support of it. Adam Jacob Szubin (2000), who 
conducted fieldwork among the Lubavitch sect of Hasidic Jews, found that converts to 
the movement from non-orthodox or secular Jewish backgrounds were more likely than
4 See, for example, Dean R. Hoge’s study of religious change among American Catholics, which found that 
the attitudes of converts were “closer to the doctrinal teachings of the Church” than those of other active 
Catholics, and that religion was more important in their lives (1981: 42).
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those bom in the movement to be millenarians — that is, to believe that the sect’s leader, 
Rabbi Menachem Schneerson, who died in 1994, was in fact the Messiah, who would 
soon return from the dead (or, alternatively, never really died and was just about to show 
himself again). Szubin puts forward three complementary explanations for this. The first 
is that millenarianism prolongs the excitement of conversion. He quotes one convert or 
baal teshuveh (literally, “penitent”) as saying: “Coming into religion is an eye-opening 
experience which contradicts everything that you previously knew to be possible. So you 
are more open to a belief which also contradicts everything you know to be possible”. A 
non-convert told Szubin: “It’s like giving a child a candy. If you give a child one candy, 
he will want a second candy” — the first candy representing the transformative 
experience of becoming newly religious and the second the belief that God will 
imminently put an end to all worldly travails. Szubin adds:
Ba ’alei tehsuvah, particularly recent immigrants, are more prone to see the world in 
extremes o f  right and wrong, especially in the spiritual sphere. They tend to be drawn 
towards activist ideologies which promise revolutionary upheavals rather than gradual 
evolutions. Thus, the doctrine o f millenarianism, which predicts a sudden i f  not violent 
usurpation o f  human chaos by divine order, would particularly appeal to b a 'alei 
teshuvah (2000: 223).
Szubin’s second explanation has to do with time. The converts, most of whom grew up as 
secular Jews, had not acquired their religion through historical transmission; their faith 
was orientated towards their own generation and the short-term future. Millenarianism 
“complements this perception, depicting the present generation as the most spiritually 
significant generation in time” (2000: 225). The third explanation presents millenarianism 
as a way of overcoming marginalisation. Converts were eagerly sought by Lubavitch, but, 
once they become members of the sect, found themselves second-class citizens. The 
promise of millennial transformation rendered this irrelevant:
What could be more welcome news to the ba ’a l teshuvah ... who has barely lived  
among Hasidim, than to hear that the central requirement o f his faith is to publicise his 
belief in the Messiah’s imminent coming? (2000: 234).
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Needless to say, it is not possible to draw an exact parallel between Lubavitchers and 
members of Kensington Temple — not least because, in a tradition such as 
Pentecostalism, where everyone is supposed to go through a conversion experience, the 
distinction between those bom inside and outside the faith is not especially important. 
But my interviews did suggest that a millenarian worldview could be a natural 
accompaniment to the cosmology of the recent convert. Maureen was an example of this. 
The impact of apocalyptic teachings on her was magnified by the fact that she was 
encountering them for the first time; that made them fresh and exciting. The same could 
be said of another interviewee who can be classified as a millenarian: Tim Bradshaw, a 
26 year-old white South African studying at the Bible college.
Tim’s ideas about the end of the world were closely tied to a life-changing 
conversion experience; indeed, they formed part of his testimony. He first became a 
Christian in South Africa at the age of 20:
I only got saved because I was scared o f  dying. Some new Christians had said to me: 
“Where are you going when you die?” I stopped smoking, swearing, became part o f  a 
closed community in an Assemblies o f  God church.
Then one of his Christian friends showed him a video about the End Times, a subject that 
was entirely new to him:
I was a new Christian and the video made me really scared. It said w e’ll be taken up 
and forced to have a mark on our arm, and all the early signs o f that are here already.
That was when I first began to think, my gosh, the Lord is coming back! ... My 
friends said my mother [who was not a Christian] would die and I was scared o f  the 
persecution that was coming and hoped that we would be raptured before it. Then I 
backslid. I pushed those thoughts away. I was very scared. I didn’t want to think about 
the End Times, or about the Church and God. I got back into cocaine, ecstasy, 
smoking grass, and some o f my best mates are still into that.
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In other words, the prospect of the end of the world contributed to Tim’s decision to 
abandon his new faith: it was simply too painful to think about. But the subject also 
played a part in bringing him back to Christ after he moved to London:
After backsliding for three years, I was out drinking with my mates, my girlfriend was 
staying at our house, and I passed a guy preaching in Leicester Square. He looked at 
me and said “God is talking to you”. I walked past him, and I think that was when he 
said, “Christ is coming back, the Lord is returning soon”. And that hit me, and I 
thought, oh my gosh, it’s that Jesus Christ word again. I said to my mates, I don’t want 
to go drinking, I just want to go home. The guy said, Christ is coming back: that’s 
what got my attention, I couldn’t get it out o f my mind. That night I went back home, 
broke o ff with my girlfriend and said, what w e’re doing is wrong and I don’t love you.
And I recommitted my life a week later.
He now looks forward to the apocalypse and thinks the Church should make teaching 
about it a higher priority:
Very recently I’ve begun to realise that the awareness o f  the End Time truth in the 
Church is not that great. We hear about prosperity and holiness and personal 
sanctification, and people know there is an End coming —  but the message that we 
need to be prepared and ready is not getting across. I think there needs to be a great 
teaching on the fact that Christ is coming, and that it’s imminent although we don’t 
know when, and we need to be ready for that time. Christians generally shy away from 
persecution, and it’s a teaching which is not embraced fully in the Western Church.
The fact that Maureen and Tim were classic converts and millenarians does not 
prove anything in itself, of course; but the interviews also yielded evidence to suggest 
that “cradle” Pentecostalists or evangelicals who had been introduced to the subject of the 
End Times as children found it difficult to sustain an interest in the subject in later life. 
Keith Dickinson, whose parents told him that Jesus would return in the 1980s, was left 
with a strong distrust of predictive millenarianism (though he subscribed to conspiracy 
theories). Several African church members told me they remembered learning about the
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prophecies of Daniel and Revelation in the schoolroom and not taking them very 
seriously. For them, descriptions of homed beasts and apocalyptic battles were no more 
immediate than any other images in the Bible; they were passed on routinely as part of a 
conventional Pentecostal education, much as images of the Sacred Heart might be in a 
Catholic school.
Only one “cradle” Pentecostal said that she had lived in expectation of the Second 
Coming ever since her childhood. This was Silvia, a Brazilian Bible college student in her 
early 20s:
I was bom in a Christian family, Assemblies o f  God, and since I was little I heard 
about eschatology, and it was a subject that interested me but it was more like fear or a 
scare. When I started to read the Bible and got to the Apocalypse, I was frightened. I 
remember being nine years old and wanting to say to everybody “Jesus is coming” 
through my fear o f  the End. But then later I realised that we cannot have fear o f what 
is happening, because we can have confidence that we will not be confused or lost, 
because God is not a God o f  confusion and he will step by step reveal what is going 
on. We are almost there.
Two points are worth noting here. First, Silvia’s parents were first-generation converts in 
a Catholic society where Pentecostals often live in relatively closed communities (D. 
Martin, 1990: 285). The apocalyptic faith to which she was introduced was far less 
routinised than that of Keith’s parents, and this may help explain its lasting impact on 
her.5 Second, although Silvia’s expectation of the Second Coming may have been 
sustained, it changed its quality over time. Her fear dissipated as she learned to put a 
more positive and cheerful construction on the teaching; in effect, she adjusted it in a way 
that lowered its subcultural deviance, though without diminishing her expectation that she 
would live to see the return of the Lord.
5 We know from numerous historical accounts that the young children of apocalyptic believers can be just 
as carried away by millennial fear or enthusiasm as new converts. The young Edmund Gosse, author of 
Father and Son (1965 [1907]), shared all the convictions of his Plymouth Brethren father, and more: “I 
proposed at the end of the summer holidays that I should stay home [from boarding school]. ‘What is the 
use of my going to school? Let me be with you when we rise to meet the Lord in the air!’ To this my father 
sharply and firmly replied that it was our duty to carry out our usual avocations to the last, for we knew not 
the moment of His coming . . . ” (1965: 208-9).
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Clearly, familiarity with apocalyptic doctrines can play a part in reducing their 
impact; one of the reasons that recent converts find it relatively easy to embrace 
millenarianism is that, unlike some non-converts, they have not had time to grow bored of 
the rhetoric of prophecy belief, nor experienced the endless awkward adjustments of 
apocalyptic predictions in response to the flow of discontinuing events. Converts of long 
standing, in contrast, can find themselves subject to the same routinising pressures as 
non-converts. Larry Grant discovered just how difficult it was to sustain millenarian 
beliefs during his two decades as a Jehovah’s Witness. He joined the Watch Tower 
movement at the age of 19 in 1975, a year that many Witnesses believed would usher in 
the Millennium (Schmalz, 2000; Singelenberg, 2000):
I was baptised in ’7 5 . 1 remember, having only been associated with the Witnesses for 
about six months, telling a friend in the park —  I look back on this with horror —  that 
we were not going to be around in two years’ time and she had better become a 
Jehovah’s Witness. How does one imbibe that certainty after such a short period?
Although Grant rose rapidly in the organisation, he was increasingly troubled by the 
inflexibility of its prophetic eschatology:
The Witnesses went completely over the top in prophetic interpretation. It’s as i f  you 
compared the Christian to a ship in a storm, needing an anchor. I can understand that, 
but when you start explaining the precise significance o f  every stitch on the sails, then 
the mind can’t handle all the detail and you lose it. The Witnesses went to that sort o f  
extreme —  crazy, crazy speculation in which they didn’t just go for the big picture, 
but every single detail o f  a verse has to mean something.
The more Grant thought about the Witnesses’ intricate eschatology, the more he was 
struck by its inconsistencies. Similarly, several Kensington Temple members said they 
had gradually turned away from the less intense prophecy teachings of evangelical 
Christianity: they had gone through a period of expecting Christ’s return at any time, but 
had then “matured” or “grown up”. Adam Knight told me:
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As a young Christian [a teenager] I thought about the Second Coming, I thought: 
wow, this is new to me. But as I have grown in character it doesn’t come into my mind 
at all. That’s not to say I’m not interested, but I don’t base my life around trying to 
find out about the End Times.
Pedr Beckley, now an Anglican priest in his 40s, went thought a similar experience with 
conspiracy belief. He joined Kensington Temple as a student in the 1970s after 
developing an interest in popular eschatology:
I first went to KT because it was acceptable to talk about that sort o f  stuff. But after 
about three months common sense clicked in and I said to myself, some o f  this is 
absurd: Hal Lindsey is bizarre and just false.
These testimonies imply that the novelty of apocalyptic teachings is sometimes crucial to 
their acceptance by converts; adapting Szubin’s ideas, we can hypothesise that the 
challenge of mastering a new religious culture often leads the convert to express belief in 
an imminent Second Coming, perhaps as a way of compensating for previous 
unfamiliarity with apocalyptic ideas. But, once the novelty wears off, the convert may 
find that a mixture of common sense rationality and the weakness of local plausibility 
structures pulls him or her in the direction of routinisation.
2. Subcultural immersion
As a member of Kensington Temple, Grant found it easy to push apocalyptic theology to 
the back of his mind; all he had to do was stay out of the way of certain preachers, books 
and broadcasts. Worshippers who were “into the End Times” did the opposite: they 
sought them out. Will Napier told me that the millenarian beliefs of people in the KT 
congregation could usually be sourced to various ministries or authors:
If you speak to someone who has a particularly strong belief in the imminent return o f  
Christ, you will find that in order to support that interest they have read a lot o f  the 
popular prophecy literature or watch videotapes on the subject. Or they might have 
picked it up from one o f  the ministries —  Morris Cerullo, for example. You get a lot
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o f Africans who come to KT on Sundays, but on Tuesday or Fridays they might be 
going to some other ministry which is much more based on the idea o f  Jesus coming 
back soon.
Napier was keen to stress that the material used to support the apocalyptic worldview 
originated outside Kensington Temple. But, as we have seen, the church often acted as a 
conduit for such material, and most of the millenarians and conspiracy believers I 
interviewed derived at least some of their ideas from books or tapes purchased through 
KT. To cite an example: one morning when I was in the bookshop, a Nigerian prophecy 
enthusiast called Francis dropped by to see whether any new titles by Barry Smith had 
arrived. He told me that he had been introduced to Smith’s work by his brother, who 
worked for Morris Cerullo. Whenever Francis bought a new videotape by Smith he 
would show it to his KT prayer group in South London, thus helping to extend the 
circulation of apocalyptic ideas in the church network. A bookshop assistant commented: 
“People who buy Barry Smith will often buy nothing else in a particular transaction. I 
suppose they might buy other End Times stuff as well.”
Thie crucial question is whether, in addition to sustaining millenarian belief, the 
church environment was responsible for creating it. Let us look again at Maureen’s story, 
and the social processes that surrounded her personal revelation. The words of Jesus 
might have appeared to come out of nowhere; but she was prepared for them, in the sense 
that she was already thoroughly immersed in the subculture of Pentecostalism and had a 
passing knowledge of prophecy belief. We cannot say that this immersion directly caused 
her revelation, since that would involve pronouncing on its authenticity.6 What we can 
say is that by the time it happened she had acquired specialist knowledge that enabled her 
to make sense of, and to interpret further, the words “I am coming soon”. This is what the 
anthropologist T. M. Luhrmann calls interpretative drift — “the slow, often 
unacknowledged shift in someone’s manner of interpreting events as they become 
involved with a particular activity” (1989: 312). First came Maureen’s visit to Jews for
6 According Eileen Barker (1984: 36), the expertise of social scientists is confined to empirical reality. 
They cannot assess non-empirical claims that are incapable of being refuted. Maureen’s claim that Jesus 
was speaking to her comes into this category.
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Jesus that introduced her to the End Times; then the KT sermons and lectures that fleshed 
out this concept with Biblical references; then the talks by Jeffrey that legitimised a do-it- 
yourself approach to dating the Second Coming. Moreover, Maureen’s personal ties to 
Pentecostalism continued to shape her understanding of the revelation after it happened. 
She consulted her friend Angela, a fellow member of a KT satellite church, and it was 
only after Angela told her about the Last Hour that it occurred to her to work out how 
much time was left before the apocalypse.
This tells us something important about immersion in a subculture: that it is a 
process whose outcome is determined partly by accidental social encounters. As the 
symbolic interactionist school points out, ideas are often hard to divorce from the people 
who express them or act on them; “communications are at the very centre of action, and 
must form the basis of a true perspective on social events” (Skidmore 1979: 192). If 
Maureen had not talked to Angela, her understanding of the message from Jesus would 
have been different. As it was, the meaning of the words “I’m coming soon” was, in 
effect, negotiated by these two ladies over coffee. It is easy to forget that, although 
millenarianism envisages the end of the world as we know it, its prophecies are issued in 
and through everyday life. (The historian Garry Wills made this point in his book about 
religion and American politics, Under God, by describing how the Republican candidate 
and End Times author Pat Robertson drank steaming cups of tea and coffee while 
formulating his theories; the chapter is entitled “Coffee-cup Apocalypse” [1990: 172-3].) 
By following the story of Maureen’s gradual accumulation of social ties to 
Pentecostalism, we can join the dots, as it were, between the housewife who knew very 
little about the Bible, let alone the apocalypse, and the millennial believer who suspected 
that Jesus would return in her lifetime. The more we know about her engagement with the 
subculture, the less surprising her eventual position becomes. We can see that she moved 
in a succession of small steps, none of them particularly remarkable. As the sociologist 
Howard Becker puts it:
The pathway that leads to any event can be seen as a succession o f  events that are
contingent on each other ... You might envision it as a tree diagram in which, instead
o f the probability o f getting to a particular end point getting smaller the farther you get
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from the starting point, the probability o f  reaching point X  increases the nearer you get 
to it (1998: 33).
Becker offers an example from the work of James Driscoll (1971) that is roughly 
comparable with Maureen’s odyssey, though she would no doubt find the analogy 
distasteful: the decision by a young man to have a sex-change operation. Driscoll 
demonstrated that the final result was “the end of a long line of prior decisions, each of 
which ... did not seem so bizarre in itself’. These decisions involve moving in new 
company (that of cross-dressing homosexuals) and learning new behaviour (dressing in 
women’s clothes). In Becker’s words, “each step is intellectually and emotionally 
understandable to people who themselves are nothing like this young man, once the 
circumstances are made intelligible to them” (1998: 27).
But, just as there was nothing inevitable about this outcome, so the experience of 
immersion in a Pentecostal environment need not (and usually does not) lead to 
millenarianism. Interaction with fellow worshippers may move the believer in another 
direction right from the beginning; alternatively, he or she may develop a temporary 
belief in the imminent Second Coming but then gradually move away from this 
conviction in response to disconfirming events and discouraging conversations. In short, 
it is dangerous to generalise about the effect of subcultural immersion on the individual. 
The Pentecostal environment in particular is not nearly “closed” enough for high-tension 
beliefs to flourish unquestioned. The testing of hypotheses can lead individuals towards a 
reduction of subcultural deviance that reproduces, on a small scale, the routinisation that 
takes place in organisations over decades. Or, like Maureen, they can move in the other 
direction. Either way, decisions are not made in a vacuum: millenarianism is created and 
sustained by social interaction.
3. Individual psychology
Having recognised the role of historical accident and subjective rationality in the 
development of Maureen’s* beliefs, we need to add an important qualification. It is 
obviously not the case that everyone passing through the same force field of encounters 
and influences would develop roughly the same opinions as Maureen. Although her
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millenarian rhetoric was heavily influenced by socially acquired religious ideas, it was 
also an expression of her own unusual personality. The consensus among those of my 
informants who knew her was that she was essentially a loveable eccentric. This verdict 
did not surprise me: the first time I met her she expressed her enthusiasm for Jesus by 
jumping up and down like a little girl in a playground, which did indeed look strange 
coming from a woman of retirement age in a dark skirt and sensible shoes. One pastor 
described Maureen as “the sort of person who gets things out of proportion”. It was 
widely assumed — as it was in the case of Linda Symondson’s conspiracy theories — 
that her unorthodox ideas reflected a gullible and unsophisticated outlook on life. Indeed, 
several people assured me that a preoccupation with the End Times was one of the marks 
of such a personality. Paul Wallis, an Assemblies of God minister with ties to Kensington 
Temple, said he associated millenarianism with two sorts of people: “new Christians”, 
who might well lose their fascination with the subject as they grew spiritually; and “time 
wasters” — “people who always have some urgent thing to occupy the time of their 
minister. Often it’s End Times stuff. They say, ‘This is something you should be aware 
of, pastor, you should watch this video and show it in church.’ ”
The notion that millenarians are psychologically distinctive is well established in 
the scholarly literature, though there is less of a consensus as to whether this can be 
ascribed to nature or nurture. Norman Cohn’s Pursuit o f the Millennium (1991 [1970]) 
paints a picture of mass psychological disturbance caused by extraordinary 
circumstances, of ordinary people radicalised beyond recognition by social dislocation 
and the arguments of demagogues. It is an explanation that works well for the 
revolutionary millenarians he describes; but, as we noted in the Introduction, it was never 
intended to account for the routinised rhetoric of stable religious movements with an 
apocalyptic tradition. A much closer parallel with Kensington Temple’s millenarians is 
provided by Strozier’s interviews with Christian apocalyptic believers in New York. He 
found that all of them “described their narratives as broken in some basic way ... Their 
stories were discontinuous and full of trauma; faith healed them”. He also suggested that 
the mythical transformation of the future offered by millennialism played a part in that 
healing (1994: 43-46). These observations are similar to those made in the scholarly 
literature about religious converts, who since the pioneering work of William James
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(1985 [1902]) have often been portrayed as people responding to intense mental stress 
(see Lofland and Stark, 1965; Rambo, 1993); and also about fundamentalist Christians, 
who have been accused of manifesting a range of undesirable psychological traits 
(Savage, 2002). The problem with these ideas, as we have already noted, is that they are 
difficult to demonstrate empirically: not only is stress virtually universal, but it is hard to 
record people’s mental states before they assume the beliefs in question. The psychologist 
Sara Savage argues that there is “little or no hard evidence of significant mental 
disturbance for individuals before conversion relative to the general population” (2000: 
11). She has also drawn attention to the lack of evidence demonstrating that Christian 
fundamentalists are psychologically unusual, despite many attempts to produce it (2002). 
Any systematic attempt to discover psychological factors that predispose people to 
millenarian belief is likely to run into the same methodological difficulties.
It is, in any case, impossible to generalise from my own tiny sample of 
millenarians; but I was still left with a subjective impression that, in at least three cases, 
the subject’s apocalyptic hopes and fears resonated with other distinctive personality 
traits. Thus, Maureen’s message from Jesus seemed to reflect a more general receptivity 
to unorthodox ideas, and perhaps an unwillingness to scrutinise them. Tim’s impatience 
with other Christians for not looking forward to the Second Coming fitted comfortably 
into his all-or-nothing approach to faith: it was as if millenarian theology, which had 
earlier encapsulated his own fears about the future, now stood for the sort of total 
commitment to Christ that more faint-hearted believers could not achieve. The third case 
is that of Sarah Kim, a young Korean woman whom I met at a Sunday afternoon service 
at the Tabernacle. She was the only interviewee whose experience seemed to bear out 
Strozier’s argument that the promise of millennial transformation can help to heal 
individual suffering (1994: 43-46). Sarah’s conversion to Christianity was opposed by her 
family. Her spiritual crisis began in childhood and lasted for years:
I had trouble with spirits since I was 12 and it was getting worse. A lot o f  people
thought I was a witch doctor; I used to see ghosts and hear them, I couldn’t go to bed
without a light. I saw millions o f ghosts and demons.
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Then Jesus appeared to her:
I saw this vision; something white, I can’t explain, it was so splendid, so bright, like a 
garment; I couldn’t see his face. He opened his arms. It was so powerful, I fell over —  
but it was like falling into clouds.
She was certain that Jesus would come back soon, though she was less sure about the 
mechanics of it:
He will come back, as the Bible says. One day people will wake up and lots o f  people 
will have gone. I believe that I w ill go up to the sky with Jesus —  or maybe we will 
disappear and be transported to heaven.
What is striking about Sarah’s testimony is the consonance between her conversion story 
and her vision of the apocalypse. Being taken up into the sky with Jesus would complete 
the salvific experience that began when the radiant stranger opened his arms to her; 
where once she fell metaphorically into the clouds, she would now soar physically into 
the heavens. There is strong sense here of the easing of tension.
But if Maureen, Tim and Sarah were psychologically unusual in some respects, 
their thought processes were usually unremarkable. Maureen may have had the rare 
experience of receiving a message from Jesus about his Second Coming; but Pentecostal 
Christians frequently claim that Jesus talks to them about other subjects, and these 
messages usually take the low-key form that Maureen’s did, of words intruding on 
everyday thoughts rather than the hearing of voices. Furthermore, Maureen did not feel 
that the message required her to do anything beyond telling a few fellow worshippers 
about it, any more than she changed her purchasing habits after deciding that Procter & 
Gamble was Satanic. She did not take practical steps, such as stockpiling goods in 
preparation for the Tribulation or boycotting certain goods, that would have significantly 
increased the degree of tension between herself and society. Her millenarian and 
conspiracy beliefs remained confined to the level of rhetoric — unlike her commitment to 
evangelisation, which did lead her to tension-inducing actions, such as witnessing to 
strangers in shops. As for Tim, it was interesting to discover that, like Will Napier, he
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sometimes found it difficult to sustain his sense of living in the Last Days. In a second 
interview, he told me that “I don’t spend much time thinking about the end of the age, 
although Jesus talks about it ... Even with my mates, it’s not too much in our thinking, 
although it should be: we should be living our lives for Christ’s return.” Sarah, 
meanwhile, spoke confidently about her belief that she would be raptured, but also 
criticised the Korean evangelist Paul Yonggi Cho for flirting with date-setting, which she 
thought was “dangerous”. She described “attempts to put barcodes into human beings” as 
one of the signs of the End, but when I showed her the barcode on my notebook and 
asked her if that was Satanic, she laughed and said, “No, actually”.
In short, however intense their beliefs, the Kensington Temple millenarians 
managed apocalyptic ideas in much the same way as other church members did. They 
drew a line between rhetoric and the actions that might spring from it; they distinguished 
between acceptable and unacceptable ideas emanating from the prophecy subculture; and 
at least one of them struggled to keep the “end of the age” uppermost in his mind.
Survey data
Until now, we have avoided speculating about the effect of the standard demographic 
variables — sex, age, ethnicity, education and so on — on millenarianism. My interview 
sample was far too small and not sufficiently random to permit such generalisations; it 
was not until the questionnaire data became available in 2000 that it was possible to look 
for demographic patterns that might throw light on the formation of millenarian belief. 
The interview and survey data, different in so many respects, had one thing in common: 
they were measuring expressions of millenarian belief. The questionnaire asked 
respondents whether they expected the return of Jesus within 10 years, 50 years, or 
whether it was not their place to speculate. As we have seen, 8 per chose the first option, 
9 per cent the second and 73 per cent the third. (For the sake of convenience, I am going 
to call these respondents 10-year millenarians, 50-year millenarians and non­
speculators.) Willingness to assent to the first or second of these options is not a very 
profound measure of millenarianism, and it does not correlate neatly with the expressions
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of belief recorded in the interview data: Maureen, for example, was a non-speculator. On 
the other hand, the responses do constitute a form of apocalyptic rhetoric; questionnaires 
covering this area are extremely rare — the only other example known to me is Miller’s 
survey of American evangelical pastors (1994) — and there has never previously been an 
opportunity to subject one to extensive multivariate analysis. And, as I hope to 
demonstrate, there is a limited but significant degree of overlap between the interview 
and survey data. The following analysis is broken down into sections based on 
independent variables: sex, age, ethnicity, education, religious upbringing and 
participation in ministry; it also examines the correlation between responses to the 
statement about the Second Coming and those dealing with conspiracy and Creation.
Sex
In his interviews with American fundamentalists and Pentecostalists, Charles Strozier 
found that the women were “generally more gentle in understanding the apocalyptic” and 
they “deflected end time violence onto more immediate human concerns like personal 
salvation and morality” (1994: 124-9). My own interviews did not pick up this difference: 
men and women were equally keen to emphasise the primacy of personal salvation, 
irrespective of whether they also attached importance to the apocalyptic narrative. The 
survey questions could not address subtle points of interpretation, but they did ask people 
to list their spiritual priorities: the results show almost no difference between the sexes, 
with a mere 2 per cent of both men and women making the End Times their top spiritual 
priority, and a similar distribution of preferences overall. Nine per cent of men and 8 per 
cent of women were 10-year millenarians, though the gap was wider for 50-year 
millenarians: 11 per cent of men and 8 per cent of women. This suggests that men at 
Kensington Temple might have slightly stronger millenarian impulses than women, 
though it would be foolish to build a theory around such small variations in the data.
Age
Early in my research, John Starr, a senior staff member, had told me that the greatest 
enthusiasm for the Second Coming was among young members of the church. Another 
pastor suggested that church members might look for the return of Christ at roughly the
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time they might expect to die. One of the reasons for offering respondents a choice 
between 10- and 50-year deadlines for the return of Christ was to see if the old would 
gravitate naturally to the first and the young to the second. Table 2 shows how different 
age groups responded to the question about the return of Jesus. The findings bear out 
Starr’s observation — up to a point. Young people were no readier than anyone else to 
predict the return of Jesus within the decade, but they were more likely to opt for 50-year 
millenarianism: 11 per cent of people aged 20-35 chose this option, as opposed to 5 per 
cent of people over 65. But the oldest respondents were no keener than any other age 
group on the idea that Jesus would return within 10 years. So, despite the relative 
popularity of 50-year millenarianism among young adults, the figures offer no real 
support for the notion that millenarians in general imagine Christ coming back at around 
the time they might expect to die.
Table 3: Responses o f  age groups to the question: “When do you think it likely that Jesus Christ 
will return? (a) Within 10 years; (b) Within 50 years; (c) Not our place to speculate.” Figures for 
people who did not give their date o f birth are not shown. “No response” indicates no box ticked.
Bom  
after 1979 
(%)
Bom
1965-79
(%)
Bom
1950-64
(%)
Bom
1935-49
(%)
Bom  
pre 1935 
(%)
Whole
church
(%)
10-yr return 8 9 7 9 7 8
50-yr return 9 11 7 8 5 9
N/speculate 72 72 75 73 77 73
No response 10 8 11 10 11 10
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
(n=149 (n=1377) (n=909) (n=299) (n=82) (n=2973)
Chi square test: p = 0.954; reject null hypothesis (p<0.05): no
Ethnicity
Table 4 (below) shows a breakdown of responses according to the ethnic background of 
KT members. The most striking detail here is the contrast between Africans, the largest
174
group in the church, and Caucasians, who dominate its leadership. Only 5 per cent of 
Africans expected Jesus to appear within 10 years, compared to 13 per cent of 
Caucasians; 6 per cent of Africans expected him within 50 years, compared to 16 per cent 
of Caucasians. This was an unexpected result: Colin Dye told me before the questionnaire 
was administered that he thought African worshippers would be more apocalyptic than 
others because “they have been exposed to more of that sort of material” back home in 
Africa. How can we explain it? Further analysis of the figures does not reveal a 
significant intervening variable; the answer may lie in the special qualities of African 
Pentecostalism.
Table 4: Responses o f  ethnic groups to the question about the Return o f  Jesus. Some smaller 
ethnic groups and people who did not state their ethnicity are not shown but included in the Chi- 
square calculation.
Caribbean
(%)
Chinese
(%)
African
(%)
Caucasian
(%).
Asian
(%)
W hole church 
(%)
10-yr return 11 9 5 13 10 8
50-yr return 7 8 6 16 16 9
N/speculate 74 82 79 62 61 73
No response 9 2 10 8 13 10
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
(n=307) (n=104) (n=1415) (n=519) (n=180) (n=2973)
Chi square test: p = 0.000; reject null hypothesis (p<0.05): yes
Pentecostalism spread to Africa within a year of the Azusa Street revival in Los 
Angeles in 1907. Large independent churches sprang up which, as in Latin America and 
the Far East, reinterpreted animist traditions of territorial spirits, magical healing and 
ancestor worship in the light of Christian teaching about the action of the Holy Spirit 
(Cox, 1995: 243-262). Sometimes their spiritual message was anti-colonial; occasionally 
it was messianic, as in the case of the Congolese preacher Simon Kimbangu, whose 
followers cast him in the role of black messiah during his long imprisonment by the
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Belgian authorities (Wilson, 1975 [1973]: 367-373). But African Pentecostalism has 
rarely been millenarian. According to Paul Gifford, Africa has been exposed to 
dispensationalism; its chief tenets are widely known, and when Barry Smith undertook a 
tour of Uganda “his assumptions and methods came as no surprise to his listeners”. But 
the message was, and is, largely ignored:
The popular Christianity [Smith] encountered was personalised, not cosmic. It was not 
concerned with a renewed order or any “new Jerusalem”, but with a job, a husband, a 
child, a car, an education, a visa to the West. It was about succeeding in this realm, 
through faith or (increasingly, at least in West Africa) through faith and deliverance 
from Satanic blockages ... On the face o f  it, it might be thought that there are 
millennial images that could resonate powerfully with African’s truly apocalyptic 
plight (Rev. 6: 1-8), or (at least in the optimistic interlude o f  1989-93) the imminent 
dethroning o f  evil powers and the dawning o f  a new order. But these images have not 
been widely developed (1998: 339-340).
If anything, millenarianism is losing ground in Africa. Rather than employing prophecy 
belief to help them cope with the turmoil of the last decade, African Pentecostalists have 
turned to two other American spiritual imports: the Faith movement, with its promises of 
victory over poverty and sickness, and the church growth movement, with its emphasis 
on the dynamic potential of mega-churches (Gifford, 1998: 41-2). Both movements 
emphasise this worldly-success over the promise of the millennial kingdom. The fastest- 
growing Pentecostal churches in Africa today are no longer the older independent 
denominations that celebrated traditional culture; they are new churches linked to large 
congregations in the West — such as Kensington Temple — whose patronage helps their 
members to acquire Westem-style prosperity. In Nigeria and Ghana, the focus of these 
churches is relentlessly international. Part of their appeal is that they offer a route out of 
poverty through overseas mission contacts: going abroad to study or work is seen as a 
special mark of God’s favour (Gifford, 1998: 92).
The typical West African Pentecostalist living in Britain is far removed from the 
stereotype of the illiterate peasant compensated for material deprivation by promises of 
apocalyptic transformation. Stephen Hunt, in his study of Jesus House, a West London
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congregation of the (overwhelmingly Nigerian) Redeemed Christian Church of God, 
found that membership of the church was “solidly middle class”. Nearly 60 per cent had 
degrees or professional qualifications. The church’s teaching reflected the emphasis on 
personal purity and hard work that characterises the new wave of Pentecostal churches in 
Nigeria. The promise of financial prosperity was held out, but not in a crude way; instead, 
members were given help with controlling expenditure and managing debt (2000: 11). 
Much the same could be said of the West African fellowships of Kensington Temple. 
Many members are engineers, doctors, lawyers and academics, and there is a similar 
stress on professional success and financial probity. For example, 46 per cent of African 
survey respondents had read or listened to tapes by the “health and wealth” evangelist 
Kenneth Hagin. This is a higher percentage than for any other ethnic group, and seems to 
confirm the observations of KT bookshop staff that African customers are particularly 
interested in financial and practical subjects. Seen in this light, it is hardly surprising that 
Africans were less likely than anyone else to speculate about the return of Christ: there 
were more pressing things to worry about.
Education
Moving on to education, we are confronted for the first time by what looks like a 
coherent pattern, one suggesting that less qualified people were more likely to expect 
Jesus to come back soon. Fourteen per cent of respondents with no formal qualifications 
were 10-year millenarians, compared to 9 per cent of those with only school 
qualifications, 8 per cent of current students and 7 per cent of graduates (see Table 5, 
below). This brings to mind an observation of Strozier’s: that, while the working-class 
people he interviewed imagined an apocalypse in the near future, middle-class believers 
tending to postpone the End well beyond their anticipated lifetimes (1994: 116). The KT 
survey did not provide a measure of social class (which is an elusive concept, anyway, in 
a congregation made up of worshippers from such widely differing societies). But, if we 
assume that social class increases with educational level, then these findings are broadly 
consistent with Strozier’s theory.
The picture becomes more complicated, however, when we look at how different 
groups felt about the return of Jesus within 50 years. Eight per cent of those with no
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qualifications were 50-year millenarians, compared to 8 per cent of those with only 
school qualifications, 8 per cent of current students and 10 per cent of graduates. In other 
words, the neat inverse correlation between expectation of the Lord’s return and 
educational level has disappeared: although still overwhelmingly reluctant to speculate, 
graduates were more likely than any other group to plump for the return of Jesus within 
50 years. The impression that the latter is in some respects an “educated” option is 
confirmed when we turn the figures round and look at the educational levels of 10-year 
millenarians, 50-year millenarians and non-speculators: 45 per cent of 50-year 
millenarians had degrees, as opposed to 36 per cent of 10-year millenarians and 43 per 
cent of non-speculators.
Table 5: Educational levels o f  respondents to question about the return o f  Jesus. “Other” includes 
people who did not state an educational level or wrote in an alternative description (e.g. 
professional qualification).
No
qualification
School Student Degree Other Total
10-yr return 
(%)
9 39 12 36 4 100
(n=247)
50-yr return 
(%)
5 31 16 45 4 100
(n=264)
N/speculate
(%)
5 34 14 43 4 100
(n=2169)
No response 
(%)
8 38 10 34 10 100
(n=293)
Whole church 
(%)
5 35 14 42 5 100
(n=2973)
Chi square test: p = 0.219; reject null hypothesis (p<0.05): no
Religious upbringing
The theory derived from the interview data that millenarianism can be the product of a 
conversion experience receives partial support from the survey. Although the whole 
notion of converts is a difficult one in a conversionist religion such as Pentecostalism, in
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which it is possible, even commonplace, to be bom into the tradition and be dramatically 
bom again, the survey did distinguish between respondents brought up in Pentecostal or 
evangelical households and those who came from other traditions or none. In the church 
as a whole, religious upbringing had no effect on the way respondents answered the 
question about Jesus’s return. But it did make a difference for white church members, 
albeit not a dramatic one: 74 per cent of Caucasian 10-year millenarians were brought up 
outside the evangelical or Pentecostal tradition, compared to a figure of 65 per cent for 
Caucasians in general. The explanation may lie in the status of Pentecostalism in Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the countries of origin of most white KT 
members. It does not represent the natural religious allegiance of middle-class white 
people in these societies; those who convert to it have crossed a significant cultural 
barrier. Szubin’s observations may be relevant here: the challenge of mastering a new 
religious culture could lead some converts to express belief in an imminent Second 
Coming as a way of compensating for previous unfamiliarity with apocalyptic ideas.
Participation in ministry
So far, we have been looking at demographic variables such as sex, ethnicity, age and 
education whose effect on millennial belief, however profound, is likely to be indirect. 
Now we move on to independent variables that signify religious commitment and 
immersion in a religious subculture. The effect of such factors on belief, while not always 
easy to measure, is likely to be much more direct, since it is often the subculture that 
communicated the belief in the first place and now provides its plausibility structure.
According to Peter Berger, ideas which the wider society regards as deviant often 
require a sectarian structure to sustain them (1969: 45-51), and the applicability of this to 
millenarianism is obvious. In modem society, anyone who attempts to date the return of 
Jesus is regarded as eccentric — it is “a mark of marginality, a step beyond the 
boundaries of public discourse” (O’Leary, 1994: 132). We might therefore expect those 
who did so in the questionnaire to be deeply committed to the group or the subculture that 
legitimates such an activity. We might even hypothesise that, since society regards 10- 
year millenarianism as more deviant than 50-year millenarianism and non-speculation as 
not deviant at all, we should expect 10-year millenarians to be the group most immersed
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in Pentecostalism, non-speculators the least immersed and 50-year millenarians 
somewhere in between.
One way of testing this hypothesis is by finding out how people actively involved 
in the Kensington Temple community — the 469 “ministers” who include office staff, 
musicians, stewards, part-time preachers, street evangelists and the church leadership — 
answered the question about the Second Coming. Table 5 sets out the responses of 
ministers and non-ministers:
Table 6: Responses o f ministers and non-ministers to the question about the return o f  Jesus.
Ministers
(%)
Non-ministers
(%)
Whole church 
(%)
10-yr return 9 8 8
50-yr return 12 8 9
n/speculate 72 73 73
no response 8 10 10
Total 100 100 100
(n=469 (n=2502) (n=2973)
Chi square test: p = 0.691; reject null hypothesis (p<0.05): no
There is no real support here for the idea that 10-year millenarians must by virtue of the 
intensity of their apocalyptic expectation be the most immersed in the Pentecostal 
subculture. Ministers, like everyone else, were overwhelmingly non-speculators: we can 
discount the one percentage point separating them from other church members in their 
support for 10-year millenarianism, and although they were more likely to favour the 50- 
year option the gap is not very large. The picture changes, however, when we distinguish 
between men and women ministers. For women, being in the ministry made little 
difference to responses on this question: levels of belief were very close to the average 
for women generally. Men in ministry, on the other hand, were slightly less likely to be 
10-year millenarians than men outside the ministry but considerably more likely to be 50- 
year millenarians: 16 per cent of them chose this option, compared to 10 per cent of the
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other men. So the 5 per cent gap between ministers’ and non-ministers’ levels of belief in 
50-year millenarianism was produced almost entirely by men.
If we narrow our sample even further, we find that 38 per cent of Caucasian male 
ministers were 50-year millenarians — the highest level we have encountered so far, and 
nearly four times the percentage of African male ministers who believed the same thing. 
Admittedly, by this stage the numbers are small: we are talking about 8 out of 21 
Caucasians and 7 out of 54 Africans. The significance of the statistic lies in the fact that 
white male ministers occupy most of the important positions of authority at Kensington 
Temple. The 21 male Caucasian ministers included some of Colin Dye’s closest 
associates, though the senior pastor himself did not complete the questionnaire. At least 
one of Dye’s inner circle opted for 50-year millenarianism; in addition, Andy Kenworthy, 
former principal of the Bible college, told me that he would have made the same choice if 
he had been in London when the questionnaire was administered. But not one male 
Caucasian in KT ministry opted for the return of Jesus within 10 years.
A similar picture emerges if we choose another indicator of commitment: past or 
present membership of the International Bible Institute of London. Once again, we find 
an above-average level of support for 50-year millenarianism (14 per cent) but not for the 
10-year variety (8 per cent). In this respect, Bible college students and alumni were like 
young church members, graduate church members and men in ministry: they slightly 
favoured the longer-term millenarian option but not the more imminent one.
Conspiracy belief
Judged by the interviews, conspiracy theories often functioned as an alternative to, or a 
milder version of, doomsday millenarianism. The survey, which included statements 
about the euro and supermarket barcodes, gives us a clearer idea of how the two forms of 
millenarianism related to each other. We have already seen that 38 per cent of all 
respondents agreed that the single currency was a sign of the Antichrist, while 27 per cent 
thought barcodes were Satanic. If we treat conspiracy belief as an independent variable, 
we suddenly find significant gaps opening up between people who speculated about the 
Second Coming and those who chose not to. As Table 6 shows, 60 per cent of 10-year 
millenarians assented to the statement about the euro, as opposed to 53 per cent of 50-
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year millenarians and 35 per cent of non-speculators. Thirty-three per cent of 10-year 
millenarians agreed with the barcodes statement, compared to 28 per cent of 50-year 
millenarians and 27 per cent of non-speculators, a gentler gradient than for the euro 
statement, but in the same direction. Looking at the figures the other way round, 
conspiracy believers were only slightly more likely to be 10- or 50-year millenarians — 
further evidence that, within the church, predictive millenarianism was generally 
considered to be a more deviant option than conspiracy theory.
Table 7: How church members with different views about the return o f  Jesus responded to the 
statement “The move towards a single European Currency is a sign o f the Antichrist”. “Neither” 
signifies “neither agree nor disagree”.
Agree Disagree Neither No response Total
10-yr return 
(%)
60 9 26 5 100
(n=247)
50-yr return 
(%)
53 11 34 3 100
(n=264)
N/speculate
(%)
35 15 45 5 100
(n=2169)
No response 
(%)
23 9 34 33 100
(n=293)
Whole church 
(%)
38 14 41 7 100
(n=2973)
Chi square test: p=0.000; reject null hypothesis (p<0.05): yes
The survey also asked respondents to indicate which popular prophecy authors and 
broadcasters they had encountered, and here the evidence is unambiguous. Forty per cent 
of 10-year millenarians had read or listened to Barry Smith, as opposed to 29 per cent of 
50-year millenarians and 22 per cent of non-speculators. There is clear support here for 
the proposition that prophecy material plays a crucial role in making apocalyptic beliefs 
plausible.
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Creationism
Alongside the conspiracy statements in the questionnaire was the following assertion: 
“The world was created in seven 24-hour days, just like the Bible says”. Sixty per cent of 
respondents agreed with this statement; presumably the total would have been higher if 
the question had not taken the hard-line Creationist position that the days of creation were 
exactly as long as normal days (see Pennock, 1999). (The Kensington Temple position on 
the subject was summed up by John Starr as follows: “People might not call themselves 
Creationists, but if you were to use the word “evolution” it wouldn’t go down very 
well.”) The real point of putting this statement in the questionnaire was to see whether 
belief in the return of Christ corresponded to Creationism, which is often regarded as an 
indicator of “fundamentalism” (ie, adherence to a strictly literal interpretation of 
Scripture). The interview data suggested that there might be such a correlation: not only 
did several prophecy believers stress their rejection of evolution, but the two interviewees 
who were most sceptical about the End Times, Will Napier and Jim Saunders, also made 
it clear that they did not reject the theory of evolution. In the event, the survey results 
were broadly compatible with this hypothesis: 67 per cent of 10-year millenarians, 64 per 
cent of 50-year millenarians and 62 per cent of non-speculators agreed with the Creation 
statement.7 Again, note the pattern in which 10-year millenarians were most likely to 
agree with another “high-tension” statement of belief, non-speculators were least likely to 
agree with it, and 50-year millenarians were somewhere in the middle. The survey also 
showed that people who assented to either of the two conspiracy statements were slightly 
more likely to be Creationists. On closer inspection, however, respondents who said they 
disagreed with the euro and barcodes statements were also more likely to be Creationists, 
a finding that underlines the dangers of generalising about the fundamentalist mindset.
7 The total of those who assented to the Creationism statement in the whole church —  60 per cent — is 
lower than these figures because it includes respondents who did not answer the question about the return 
of Christ.
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Conclusion
To what extent do the survey results reinforce the tentative findings of the interview data? 
My impression after talking to a small number of millenarians was that conversion, 
subcultural immersion and individual psychology were important factors in moulding 
their apocalyptic worldview. The questionnaire could tell us little about the psychology of 
the people who answered it, but it did produce a small but intriguing piece of evidence to 
support the conversion thesis: white church members bom outside the Pentecostal or 
evangelical community were less likely to express belief in the imminent return of Christ 
than those brought up in it.
The evidence pointing to the significance of subcultural immersion was more 
substantial. Consumption of apocalyptic books and videotapes, for example, was a much 
better clue to the likelihood of someone holding millenarian beliefs than any 
demographic factors; acceptance of apocalyptic conspiracy theories was also an 
important clue. One might almost say that, rather than being produced by deep-seated 
social predispositions, millenarianism at Kensington Temple was “caused” by other 
expressions of millenarianism. As this study has stressed again and again, the apocalyptic 
argument is constantly threatened by discontinuation, and there is evidence to suggest 
that some church members, having initially been won over by it, eventually found it less 
persuasive. For those who remained committed to an apocalyptic framework, however, it 
appears that being “into the End Times” was, like being bom again, “an ongoing 
existential project, not a state acquired once for all” (Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001: 
7). It required frequent infusions of new analysis — in the shape of Barry Smith’s latest 
book, or other products of the prophecy subculture. On the whole, the most intense 
millenarians, who expected the Second Coming within the decade, were the most likely 
to assent to the statements about the single currency and barcodes; those who expected 
Jesus within 50 years were less likely to agree, but still more so than non-speculators. The 
same pattern is observable in responses to the Creationist statement. On this evidence, 
predictive millenarianism may be an indicator of an all-round commitment to high- 
tension doctrines; but it is important to bear in mind that, at Kensington Temple at any
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rate, this commitment was primarily rhetorical, so we must be careful not to portray these 
people as dangerous fanatics.
One of the most striking survey findings was that 38 per cent of white male 
ministers — the pool from which the church leadership emerges — were 50-year 
millenarians. This finding, coupled with slightly raised levels of support for this option 
among graduates, young people and Bible college alumni, raises an interesting 
possibility. In Chapter 2, we discussed the conflict between, on the one hand, deviant, 
high-tension or “strict” doctrines that enact a high price from believers but also produce 
commensurate rewards, and, on the other hand, a process of accommodation or 
routinisation that reduces uncomfortable tension with society but also eats away at 
cultural distinctiveness (see Iannaccone, 1998; Swenson, 1999; Stark and Finke, 2000). 
Different groups will reach their own decisions about the optimum level of strictness — 
and, within groups, people will reach different points of balance. The survey suggests 
that, for certain enthusiastic young people, Bible college alumni and university graduates, 
and especially for those who were eligible to become leaders, expectation of Christ’s 
return within 50 years offered just the right degree of tension with the surrounding 
environment. The risk it entailed was a small one: for, while people who predict the 
Second Coming within a decade are quite likely to be humiliated in front of those to 
whom they made the prediction, the cost of being proved wrong about the 50-year option 
will, by definition, be deferred for half a century. For some respondents, the 50- and 10- 
year alternatives represented the difference between a full-blooded (but sensibly cautious) 
commitment to the doctrine of the Second Coming and the foolhardiness associated with 
“prophecy nuts”. It came as no surprise to discover that Bruce Atkinson, whose lectures 
on the End Times trod such a fine line between boldness and caution, was a 50-year 
millenarian.
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7. The year 2000
Introduction
This chapter examines the special importance that Western society, Pentecostal 
Christianity and Kensington Temple attached to the dawn of the third Christian 
millennium. It begins with the historical background, showing how 2000 gradually 
became the focus of secular and religious visions of the future. But, as the 1990s 
unfolded, it became clear that much of the anticipation of 2000 was unrealistic; various 
schemes associated with it had to be abandoned. Born-again Christians, in particular, had 
nurtured ambitions to “win the world for Christ” by the end of the millennium; these 
became progressively more modest as the deadline approached.
Kensington Temple provides a case study in this trajectory of disappointment. For 
years, Colin Dye’s Restorationist imagery had encouraged church members to believe 
that a last great wave of the Holy Spirit would coincide with the dawn of the calendar 
millennium. The church drew up a plan to plant 2,000 church groups in London by the 
end of the year 2000. This scheme was abandoned in 1999, at which point only 25 per 
cent of the target had been reached; the next year, KT was forced to move out of its 
Tabernacle headquarters. This experience had some of the qualities of an apocalyptic 
drama: a build-up of expectation was followed by disappointment and, on the part of the 
authorities, some frantic ideological work. The chapter also examines worshippers’ 
private interpretations of 2000, which were characterised by the ambiguity that marked 
their eschatological beliefs. In October 1999, over a quarter of census respondents agreed 
that the year 2000 marked “the beginning of the End”. Yet nearly everyone I spoke to 
dismissed the media’s inflated expectations of 2000, and many interviewees insisted that 
it was “just a date”.
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The calendar millennium: secular and sacred perspectives
Historical background
The measurement of time is inextricably bound up with religious belief and the pragmatic 
ordering of everyday affairs. In primitive societies and early civilisations, the calendar 
symbolised the integration of sacred and secular spheres. “Almost everywhere in the long 
development of human societies, priests were the first specialists in active timing,” wrote 
Norbert Elias (1993: 53). In societies as different as imperial Babylon and the Mayan 
city-states of Central America, religious professionals regulated the calendar in 
accordance with the sacred significance of numbers themselves; yet their expertise had 
implications for the most prosaic areas of social activity. In the ancient Middle East and 
in Eastern religions, concepts of time were essentially cyclical, inspired by the rhythm of 
the seasons; but the Hebrews gradually evolved an understanding of history that was both 
cyclical and linear. Their cycle of six days of activity to one day of rest was expanded 
into the concept of jubilee, in which every 50th year — following seven “weeks” of seven 
years each — was the moment for bringing human affairs into line with sacred time, by 
remitting debts and freeing slaves (Campion, 1994: 149). Jewish culture, borrowing from 
Zoroastrianism, also developed the literary genre of apocalypse, in which the sacred 
timeline came to an abrupt and miraculous end (Schmithals, 1975 [1973]; Cohn, 1993). It 
bequeathed this to Christianity, along with the notion that the whole of history could be 
encompassed in a Great Week consisting of six 1,000-year days and a 1,000-year 
Sabbath. This structure was adopted by many early Christian thinkers, who identified the 
Millennium of the Book of Revelation as the last of the seven “days”, and it is still 
influential in conservative evangelical Christianity: books proposing versions of it were 
on sale at Kensington Temple in the 1990s.
Any attempt to fit human history into a teleological structure raises questions about 
when, precisely, the End will be reached. Typically, apocalyptic believers perform 
calculations involving the calendar of their own society. In early medieval Christianity, 
calculators used the Jewish-inspired Anno Mundi (AM) system, which stretched back to a 
Creation a few thousand years in the past. As Richard Landes (1988) has demonstrated, 
the Western Church twice abandoned AM counts as they inched towards the highly-
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charged year 6000, dawn of the millennial Sabbath: the first time, the Church pushed 
forward the date of Creation by a few centuries, initiating a new AM count; and, when 
this moved towards 6000, they switched to the little-known Anno Domini (AD) calendar, 
which was dated from Christ’s birth and had reached only its eighth century. We can 
infer from this that religious leaders were already worried by the potential of calendar 
anniversaries to inflame apocalyptic expectations. In these two cases, the expectations 
were pegged to a specific theory; but we must also take into account the possibility that 
“round number” dates are powerful enough in themselves to create the sort of anticipation 
that worries the authorities.
There is insufficient evidence for us to reach a firm conclusion about apocalyptic 
expectation and the year 1000 AD. Although the concept of a thousand bears a heavy 
symbolic weight in Zoroastrian, Hebrew and Greek literature (Miller, 1987: 13), and 
although the Millennium derived from the Book of Revelation lasts for 1,000 years, there 
was no strong tradition in the early Church that Christ would return in the year 1000. 
Nineteenth-century accounts of lords and peasants kneeling together at the dawn of the 
new millennium, waiting in terror for Doomsday, are romantic fabrications: the 
consensus among modem historians is that 1000 was a year like any other, and that most 
people in Christendom would not even have been aware of its arrival (Schwartz, 1990; 
Thompson, 1996). However, according to Landes (1997), this insistence on 1000 as a 
non-event is based on too literal a reading of the evidence: he suggests that contemporary 
reports of miracles, peace rallies and pilgrimages point to intense apocalyptic expectation 
clustered around the anniversaries of Christ’s birth and resurrection in 1000 and 1033. He 
concludes that, while it was in the interests of the ecclesiastical authorities to play down 
these anniversaries, their appeal would have proved irresistible to a population that was 
constantly being reminded of the imminence of the Last Judgment. The question is 
unlikely to be settled. We should note, however, that the romantic legend of the year 
1000 survived its 20th-century debunking: it appeared in unreconstructed form in several 
popular books published in the 1990s,1 and it was quite common to hear people say that
1 For example, Millennium Prophecies by Stephen Skinner (1994: 69) made the following claims, none of 
which is supported by the historical record: “December [999] saw fanaticism reach new heights ... Bands 
of flagellants roamed the countryside; mobs called for the execution of supposed sorcerers or unpopular
188
the society-wide panic that gripped Christendom in the 990s would be reproduced in the 
run-up to 2000.
Occasionally it was also claimed that the eschatological tensions tended to rise at 
the end of centuries as well as millennia; there is, however, very little evidence for this. 
The concept of centuries did not fully evolve until after the Reformation (Schwartz, 
1990), and the first mass end-of-century celebrations, in 1899-1900, were no more 
apocalyptic in tone than the average New Year’s Eve. According to the historian Arndt 
Brendecke (1998), the century has never been an important eschatological category in 
Christian culture. He argues that “centenarianism”, a secular celebration of society’s 
achievements, has a completely different social function from millenarianism, an 
expression of religious hopes and fears which might be inspired by calendrical round 
numbers but is by no means dependent on it. But the year 2000 was in a special category. 
With is approach, secular centenarians and some millenarians found their gaze fixed on 
the same horizon, because the date that the secular world was preparing to celebrate 
possessed an apocalyptic significance of its own — indeed, a more substantial one than 
the year 1000. This significance was partly derived from a particular application of the 
concept of the Great Week. Hugh Latimer, the Protestant Bishop of Oxford executed 
during the reign of Queen Mary, wrote in 1552: “The world was ordained to endure, as 
all learned men affirm, 6,000 years. Now of that number there be passed 5,552 years, so 
that there is no more left but 448” (quoted in Jeffrey, 1988: 178). Latimer was working 
on the assumption that the world was created in 4000 BC, which would place the Second 
Coming in 2000. A century later, Archbishop Ussher dated the Creation to 4004 BC, a
i t .
calculation accepted by the Church of England until the 19 century; this modest 
adjustment produced a Second Coming (or, in some versions, the Rapture) in 1996. One 
of the attractions of this model, irrespective of the precise date of Creation, was its 
symmetry. It could be divided into three 2,000-year segments: from the Creation to 
Moses, from Moses to Jesus, and from Jesus to the End.
burghers, and even some farm animals were freed to roam through the towns, giving a slightly surreal air to 
the proceedings.”
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By the late 19th century, such anticipation had largely been superseded by secular 
visions of 2000. These did not envisage the dawn of Christ’s kingdom, but they were 
scarcely less apocalyptic in their desire to associate the calendar millennium with an ideal 
society. As Hillel Schwartz notes, the year 2000 became “the site of Edward Bellamy’s 
co-operative utopia, William Morris’s socialist revolution, Winnifred H Cooley’s 
feminist welfare state, Friedrich E Blitz’s universally deployed nature cure, and Edward 
Berwick’s vegetarian farmer’s paradise” (1990: 269). In the 20th century, 2000 formed 
the backdrop to innumerable science fiction fantasies and optimistic or pessimistic 
predictions: the millennial year was variously associated with galactic warfare, ecological 
devastation and the ending of world poverty. These visions combined millenarian and 
centenarian impulses, and, together with the reappearance of explicitly apocalyptic ideas 
about the return of Christ in or close to 2000, ensured that the anniversary itself would 
create a uniquely poignant mixture of expectations.
Trajectory o f disappointment
In this section I suggest that the secular and sacred experiences of 2000 followed a 
similar trajectory of expectation and disappointment. The crucial point is one that most 
commentators failed to grasp at the time: that the hopes for the anniversary, apocalyptic 
and non-apocalyptic, peaked some years before it happened, and had already been scaled 
down by the end of the 1990s.
One scholar who did understand this was Michael Erard, then a PhD candidate in 
the English department of the University of Texas at Austin, who in 1997 published an 
essay entitled “Millennium, Texas” based on interviews with residents of the small town 
of Alpine. He wrote:
The year 2000 is now close, and conceivably so. That fact ... influences how people 
think and talk about the end o f the millennium, and it is the reason why, as 2000  
approaches, the various fevers and fervours will cool, not intensify ... In all cases [ie, 
for all his interviewees], 2000, while still a chronological and historical limit, no 
longer constituted “the future” for people living in 1995, because it was too close, too 
visible, to wear well with their hopes and fears. The year 2000, around the comer, falls
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inside the range o f  plans for individual lives. It is just another kind o f tomorrow, in its 
more quotidian sense as a unit o f the absolutely unknowable (1997: 281).
Erard’s observation is reminiscent of the distinction we considered in Chapter 2 between 
two types of future: the long-term (le futur) and the short-term (Tavenir). For centuries, 
the year 2000 was synonymous with the exotic, far-off future; indeed, the notion of 2000 
as a utopian or dystopic landscape survived into the 1990s — the Hollywood film 
Strange Days (1995), set in 1999, depicted a society transformed by bizarre technology. 
But, inevitably, the increasing proximity of the deadline brought 2000 closer to the reality 
of everyday life. In both secular and religious spheres, we might say that excitement 
reached a peak when the millennium was distant enough to retain its futuristic aura but 
near enough to be imagined in plausible detail. There was, of course, no single moment 
when this was true for everyone: as early as the late 1960s, an influential volume of 
essays edited by the sociologist Daniel Bell (1968) argued that the world of the year 2000 
had in crucial respects already arrived. But, for many commentators, the late 1980s and 
early 1990s were years in which predictions about life at 2000 could be simultaneously 
exciting and believable. To offer just one example, a book called Achieving Peace by the 
Year 2000, by a senior official of the International Monetary Fund, argued in 1988 that 
international treaties, UN peacekeepers and sanctions could achieve a war-free world by 
the magic deadline (Huddleston, 1992 [1988]). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 
seemed to justify such optimism; and the new mood was given intellectual expression by 
the publication in 1989 of Francis Fukuyama’s The End o f History, which suggested that 
ideological conflicts had become obsolete. By 1992-3, however, recession and ethnic 
cleansing made such optimism seem misplaced, and Fukuyama’s essay was already being 
held up as an example of failed prophecy.
It would be wrong to suggest that the expectations of people in the West rose 
during the 1980s and then fell uniformly in the next decade. There was talk of fin de 
siecle anxiety in the early 1990s, but most of that could be attributed to the economic 
downturn; significantly, in the boom years that followed there were fewer media 
references to Pre-Millennial Tension, despite the increasing closeness of the deadline. On 
the other hand, memories of the recession were fresh enough to rule out a mood of
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sustained exhilaration. For most people, December 31, 1999 was essentially New Year’s 
Eve on a grander scale than usual, an enjoyable experience perhaps tinged with regret that 
a long-anticipated moment had come and gone in an instant. The real trajectory of 
disappointment tended to affect leaders and institutions who had been seduced by the 
deadline into rhetorical excess and unrealistic aims.
In Britain, the clearest illustration of this dynamic was the Millennium Dome at 
Greenwich, the most ambitious millennial project undertaken anywhere. This giant 
fabric-covered structure, the size of 15 Albert Halls, was intended to surpass the Great 
Exhibition and the Festival of Britain. It would be not just a showcase of technology, but 
a glimpse of the future and a voyage of discovery into the human mind and body. Early 
suggestions for its contents included a hollow humanoid figure bigger than the Statue of 
Liberty; a replica of a British seaside resort, complete with sun, sand and fish and chips; 
and Dreamscape, a boat journey “floating along a river of dreams through environments 
intended to surprise, excite and entertain, setting minds free in a way that only dreams 
can achieve” (Thompson, 1999b: 328). By 1998, however, it was already clear that the 
project was running out of time, money and ideas; there was no consensus about what the 
Dome was for, or what should go in it, until it was too late to build anything sufficiently 
impressive to appeal to jaded late-20 century tastes. In effect, the project’s organisers 
had made a series of charismatic claims that they were unable to substantiate. The 
Dome’s “zones”, when they opened in January 2000, were far more cheaply constructed 
than, say, the Disney World attractions familiar to millions of tourists; visitor numbers 
remained depressingly low all year.
One thing the Millennium Dome revealed was the weak and divided state of British 
Christianity. The “Spirit Zone” section of the exhibition was visibly the result of an 
unhappy compromise between Christians and other faiths. An account of its genesis by 
Stephen Lynas, Millennium Officer for Churches Together in England (2001), underlines 
the wider context of the Churches’ failure to come to terms with the anniversary itself: a 
plan to distribute candles to the entire population of England, to be lit just before 
midnight on New Year’s Eve, was beset by logistical difficulties, and never caught the 
popular imagination. At the root of the problem was the fact that, while the mainstream 
Churches were vaguely conscious of “owning” the year 2000, they could not agree on
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how to assert their ownership. Moreover, their own expectations of the year 2000, never 
great, had collapsed long before the Dome was built: various programmes of 
evangelisation launched in the early 1990s had produced negligible results. I had a 
number of conversations with Anglican churchmen about the year 2000 during the late 
1990s and was struck by how vigorously they distanced themselves from it. They were 
eager to stress the artificiality of the anniversary; one diocesan bishop said he had every 
intention of being asleep in bed by the time midnight struck. Spokesmen for the Roman 
Catholic Church in England and Wales sounded much the same note, and seemed uneasy 
with the Pope’s quasi-apocalyptic insistence that the Great Jubilee of 2000 was an 
important milestone in the life of the Church (see John Paul II, 1996).
Evangelical responses
In contrast, for many born-again Christians the year 2000 was a genuinely thrilling 
prospect when they first began to think about it in the late 1980s. It might be useful to 
imagine a spectrum of evangelical attitudes to the approaching anniversary. At the nori- 
apocalyptic end were sceptics for whom 2000 was a purely human construction — 
roughly the position of liberal churchmen. At the apocalyptic end were those who, 
subscribing to the 6,000-year thesis, expected the Rapture or the physical return of Christ 
in or around 2000. In the absence of survey data, it is not possible to say where the 
average church member was located on this spectrum; but most pastors and evangelists 
who pronounced on the subject were ranged somewhere in the middle. While rejecting 
date-setting prophecies, they did not see the calendar millennium as meaningless. On the 
contrary, they initially treated 2000 as a deadline for extravagant schemes to win the 
world for Christ. These schemes were implicitly apocalyptic in character, since they were 
based in the “Great Commission” of Matthew’s Gospel: “The Gospel will be preached 
throughout the whole world, as a testimony to the nations; and then the end will come” 
(Matt. 24: 14). Reaching out to the unchurched therefore assumed the awesome 
significance of an act that would help bring on the Second Coming. But, as the 
impossible scale of the task sank in, the Great Commission rhetoric was toned down. 
Between 1988 and 2000, the centre of evangelical gravity moved along the spectrum to a
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point where most preachers attached little importance to the calendar millennium; even 
incorrigible date-setters abandoned their predictions in good time.
The number of evangelical predictions of the end of the world in 2000 was always 
very small, though one might not have gathered this from the media coverage. The first 
edition of Grant Jeffrey’s Armageddon: Appointment with Destiny (1988) remains the 
fullest statement by a well-known evangelist of the arguments for the return of Christ in 
or around the millennial year. In Chapter 5 of this study we encountered one of Jeffrey’s 
calculations, involving the Book of Hosea; in fact, there were seven charts in his book, 
each employing different arithmetic and Biblical verses, but all arriving at a probable date 
of 2000 for the reappearance of the Messiah. Jeffrey cited the early Christian writer 
Lactantius in support of a 6,000-year span of human history, aligning the start of the fifth 
millennium with the birth of Christ (173). He did, however, allow himself some leeway, 
by stressing that “these are only interpretations and not prophetic revelations” (194) — 
and, interestingly, he took advantage of this room for manoeuvre when he revised the 
book nine years later.
In the 1997 edition of Armageddon: Appointment with Destiny, all the time charts 
had disappeared. Lactantius and Latimer were quoted, but Jeffrey’s own calculations no 
longer converged on the year 2000. Instead, he wrote: “It is unfortunate, but perhaps 
providential, that changes in the calendar make it impossible to calculate with precision 
when the two thousand year period [between the First and Second Comings] will end, 
except to note that it must occur in our generation” (1997: 223). It is not hard to account 
for this change of emphasis. By 1997, the claim that Jesus would return in 2000 invited 
swift disconfirmation: indeed, from a Darbyite perspective it was already disproved, since 
there was no time left for the seven-year Tribulation. Therefore, when he revised his 
book, Jeffrey retreated from predictive millenarianism into less costly explanatory 
rhetoric: the new edition offered an expanded list of signs of the times, including the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the Middle East peace process. He may also have taken into 
account the generally reduced appetite for date-setting in fundamentalist circles since the 
embarrassment of Whisenant’s 88 Reasons Why the Rapture Will Be in 1988, which had 
been read by millions. Arguably, predictive millenarianism in general reached a peak in 
the late 1980s, not only on the born-again Christian fringes but in the New Age
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movement: the Harmonic Convergence of 1987, which was supposed to usher in a new 
global consciousness, was identified by some enthusiasts as the Second Coming of the 
Christ.2
In more cautious evangelical circles, meanwhile, missionary fervour also peaked in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s and dissipated as prophecies failed or were abandoned as 
unrealistic. In 1989, 300 senior Pentecostal and Charismatic pastors and church growth 
experts met in Singapore to plan AD 2000, a global initiative to “reach”, if not to convert,
tVithe world’s 1.3 billion non-Christians by the end of the 20 century. There was a 
precedent for this idea, though not an encouraging one. In 1888, Protestant missionaries 
had drawn up a scheme to evangelise the world by 1900 that ran out of steam long before 
the deadline was reached (Gary, 1989: 35). The leaders of AD 2000 were determined not 
to suffer the same fate, but their project was marred by theological differences and the 
difficulty of agreeing goals. There was some talk of doubling the numerical size of 
Christianity by 2000 (Braun, 1992: 153) and of finally penetrating that least fertile of 
mission fields, the Muslim world. But many participants were convinced from the outset 
that such aims were unrealistic, and the movement’s eventual mission statement, “A 
Church for Every People and the Gospel for Every Person by the Year 2000”, was 
deliberately vague: although the small print talked about planting a church in every 
unreached “ethno-linguistic group”, the precise meaning of this term was unclear 
(Thompson, 1996: 157).
Reading between the lines of the AD 2000 literature, it is obvious that some of the 
movement’s leaders did expect the return of Christ to happen in the early years of the 21st 
century. Ralph Winter, founder of the US Centre for World Evangelism, admitted in 1995 
that, although the return of Christ was “off limits” in official AD 2000 documents, many 
supporters were discussing it behind the scenes — and rightly so, in his opinion. He 
criticised those pastors who ignored the eschatological dimension of the project. The day 
of Christ’s return would be a surprise, he wrote; but “an expectant mother is not 
completely in the dark about the time of the birth, since there are many signs leading up
2 Jose Arguelles, chief proponent of the Harmonic Convergence, described it as “the return of Quetzalcoatl. 
But the elimination of Armageddon as well. To some it may even be as another Pentecost and second 
coming of the Christ. Amidst spectacle, celebration, and urgency, the old mental house will dissolve, 
activating the return of long-dormant archetypal memories and impressions” (1987: 169-70).
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to it” (Winter, 1995). As the anniversary approached, however, such arguments were 
heard less and less frequently. By the late 1990s, the AD 2000 movement had 
fragmented. Evangelical Christians moved from specific goals towards more general, 
disconfirmation-proof prophecies of revival. The dawn of the long-anticipated year was 
an anti-climax: the rallies and marches held Pentecost 2000 were far more modest events 
than originally envisaged.
In Britain, there was a distinct sense of unfulfilled hopes. In the late 1980s, British 
Charismatics had fallen under the spell of Restorationist prophets who had forecast an 
outbreak of revival in the British Isles (Smail, Walker and Wright, 1995). There was 
embarrassment when this did not happen, and an evangelistic drive by classic 
Pentecostals intended to win 250,000 souls for Christ reached only 10 per cent of its 
target (Thompson, 1996: 165). The mass swooning and uncontrollable laughter of the 
Toronto Blessing in 1994-5 revived eschatological hopes: “We could be on the brink of 
the greatest revival in the history of the Church, the revival that precedes the return of 
Christ,” said one leading Baptist (141). Some commentators suggested that the Blessing 
could be an outbreak of end-of-millennium madness; but, if so, the fever was over well 
before the actual millennium, leaving few traces in the form of conversions (Bruce, 2002: 
173). Pentecostals were not surprised: they felt that the Toronto Blessing was a 
Charismatic phenomenon, and, although it did have some influence on them, they 
preferred to take their cue from Pentecostal revival movements in America (Poloma,
1999) — which, in turn, fizzled out.
By the late 1990s, few British evangelicals or Pentecostals reposed any great hopes 
in the year 2000. Nor was there much sense of the Pre-Millennial Tension that the media 
talked up at the time. There was some concern about Y2K, the “Millennium Bug” that, 
left untreated, might cause computers to crash on the dot of midnight on December 31,
1999. In America, the Y2K panic, fuelled by books with titles such as Time Bomb 2000, 
filtered through to the fundamentalist community via the survivalist fringe: prophecy 
conferences in 1997 and 1998 presented the sudden unravelling of global networks as 
God’s judgment on a blasphemous world (Thompson, 1999b: 336-7). By 1999, however, 
most churches had satisfied themselves that the crisis would be of modest proportions,
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thanks to preventative measures, and this was certainly the case in Britain, which had 
never really bought into the panic.
In July 2000 I interviewed the Rev Paul Wallis, the Assemblies of God pastor 
quoted in the previous chapter. He made an interesting comment:
In the years running up to 2000, I didn’t come across a single Christian who was 
terribly interested in the date. But I did come across a lot o f  non-believers who were 
slightly anxious and asked me what Christianity taught about the year 2000
The obvious explanation for this lack of interest is that Wallis’s Christian friends knew 
something that the non-Christians did not: that, although freelance prophets have 
speculated about it, orthodox Christianity has never taught anything much about the year 
2000. Another possible explanation is that born-again Christians had already considered, 
and been forced to reject, an apocalyptic interpretation of the calendar change. As I have 
tried to show, evangelical hopes for the anniversary were progressively scaled down in 
tandem with a number of high-profile secular ambitions, as the date drifted from le futur 
to Vavenir. The experience of Kensington Temple offers an illustration of this sequence.
The millennium at Kensington Temple
The public dimension: 2,000 by 2000
By the time I began my fieldwork, in 1997-8, members of the Kensington Temple 
ministry team were stressing that 2000 had no intrinsic significance, though they 
conceded that some Christians took an apocalyptic view of it. Andrew Kenworthy and 
Will Napier were introduced to me as the church spokesmen who could answer my 
questions on the subject. Kenworthy told me:
There are lots o f  cross-currents in our church and in Pentecostalism generally. For 
some people, the year 2000 comes right in the middle o f  the Tribulation, worked out
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from 4004 BC and the Trib beginning in 1996.3 Someone might be simultaneously 
affiliated to KT and be a follower o f  Morris Cerullo, who doesn’t talk much about 
what w ill happen after 2000 ... But for us, the date is a good target. Human 
psychology shows that i f  people have a finite amount o f  time they work harder.
Napier was positively scathing about the alignment of the year 2000 with the Second 
Coming. He said it was the sort of idea that appealed to “people who are weird or 
superspiritual or what the Americans call flaky”, though he added: “Personally, I have 
never heard anyone I know seriously propose that Jesus will come back because it’s the 
year 2000.” We should bear in mind that Kenworthy and Napier were hardly typical Elim 
pastors. They were both former Anglicans who, even after joining KT, were 
uncomfortable with what they saw as the more eccentric claims of their adopted tradition, 
especially in relation to the End Times. Under normal circumstances, they found it 
difficult to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate prophecy rhetoric. But the 
identification of 2000 with Doomsday was an obviously silly notion which could be 
safely dismissed: it served as a useful marker of theological deviance — and deviant 
people.
Bruce Atkinson, in contrast, felt more at home in the world of prophecy belief than 
either Kenworthy or Napier. But, despite this, he was determined not to be associated 
with date-setting. In his “End Times Truths” lectures of 1997, he suggested that 
millennial fever was the Devil’s way of diverting attention from the imminent Second 
Coming, by reducing the subject to a joke:
The Devil doesn’t want this message to be preached, because it’s sooner than it ever 
was. He wants us to stay in slumber, to say: “Oh yes, millennial fever. O f course, 
when it gets to the year 2000, i f  any church is going to start talking about Jesus’s 
return, it’s going to be that old Kensington Temple. And if  any o f  those preachers get
3 It is interesting to compare this position with that of Jeffrey (1988). It accepts Ussher’s Creation date of 
4004 BC rather than Jeffrey’s 4000 BC, but actually produces a later Second Coming, since it envisages 
6,000 years between the Creation and the Tribulation rather than the parousia. Kenworthy was not sure 
where he had heard this theory; I did not encounter it anywhere. If he came across it before 1996, then 
possibly it involved a pre-Tribulation Rapture; but it is more likely that its supporters took a post-Trib view 
and thought that the persecution of the Church had begun in 1996.
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millennial fever, it’s going to be Bruce Atkinson. Let’s face it, he’s an extremist, and 
h e’s using this millennial thing to push a doctrine. H e’ll be naming that date next.”
No, I won’t be naming the date next. But I’m telling you, Jesus is coming, it’s sooner 
than you think.
In fact, as I gradually came to realise, the basic approach of Kensington Temple 
towards 2000 was both pragmatic and, despite protestations to the contrary, implicitly 
apocalyptic. Colin Dye’s pronouncements during the 1990s left his listeners in no doubt 
that the building of the London City Church network was in some sense a preparation for 
the return of Christ to claim his bride. At the heart of this enterprise lay a plan to found
2,000 LCC groups — churches, ministries and fellowships — by the end of the year 
2000. Therefore, although the calendar millennium possessed no intrinsic sacred 
significance, it stimulated apocalyptic hopes, just as it did for the AD 2000 movement 
(with which KT was loosely associated). Dye outlined the vision in a book entitled I t ’s 
Time to Grow: Kick-starting a church into growth:
Our vision at Kensington Temple is to become a fully functioning city church by the 
end o f  the decade —  and to do this we need to be a network o f  2,000 churches and 
groups. We believe that God gave us this vision through a mixture o f  prayer, 
discussion, realistic assessment o f  our situation, and an inspired off-the-cuff comment 
by a trusted and highly respected leader. It is a big vision, but it is realistic. Why, if  
each o f  our churches planted one new church a year, we would have 3,000 churches 
by the end o f the year 2000! (1997b: 83).
By this stage, Dye was describing himself as “apostolic leader” of the London City 
Church, and his senior staff as “apostolic overseers”. Kensington Temple was living 
through “the most exciting period yet in church history”, he wrote; Jesus was re­
establishing a Biblical church, a “mature bride” for whom he would return (1997b: 36). 
This is the language of Restorationism, not classic Pentecostalism. As we saw in Chapter 
3, many Pentecostal churches in the 1980s and 90s espoused the belief that the early 
Church was being restored in all its apostolic purity, but on an immeasurably greater 
scale, in time for the return of Jesus (Walker, 1985; Hunt, 2001). This vision of the
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worldwide triumph of the Church was, however, hard to square with the traditional 
pessimism of Pentecostal eschatology. The solution for the new Pentecostal 
Restorationists was to envisage a future in which the activities of God and the Devil both 
grew in intensity: to use a favourite phrase of Dye’s, “things will get better and better and 
worse and worse”.
Where did these ideas come from? The leading exponent of this style of 
Restorationist eschatology was the American “prophet-apostle” Bill Hamon, who had 
preached at Kensington Temple and influenced Dye’s thinking about the End Times. In a 
1997 book entitled Apostles, Prophets and the Coming Moves o f God (1997), Hamon 
presented the return of Christ as the culmination of an accelerating 500-year purification 
of the Church:
Restorational movements since AD 1500 have accelerated in their frequency o f  
occurrence from three hundreds years to one hundred to fifty to every ten years during 
the last half o f  the 20th century ... The Protestant Movement prepared the way for the 
Holiness Movement, the Pentecostal for the Latter Rain Restoration, the Charismatic 
Renewal and Faith Movement for the present Prophetic Movement, which is now  
preparing the way for the Apostolic Movement, which will in turn prepare the way for 
the Saints Movement, which enables the saints o f  the Most High to fulfil Daniel 2:44;
7:18,22, 27; and Revelation 11:15; 1:5-6; 5: 9-10 (1997: 19).
In other words, the apostolic order was due to be restored at the turn o f the millennium,
4 •Pafter which the End Times drama would begin. But, unlike the sponsors^jAD 2000,
Hamon did not attempt to predict the dimensions of the revival.
It is difficult to say precisely what influence his theory had on Kensington Temple. 
Metin Tilki, pastor of the Covent Garden satellite, told me that he took his eschatology 
wholesale from Angels, Prophets and the Coming Moves o f God; Tim Bradshaw, who 
expected the Second Coming in his lifetime, said that apostolic gifts were being restored
4 Hamon prophesies a war that will bring about an effective theocracy: “Unless a tremendous revival 
happens within these nations [China and the Islamic world], a great war between East and West will take 
place around the turn of this century ... The end result will be the exaltation of the righteous nations, while 
the wicked nations are subdued and come under the mle of the righteous” (21).
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to the Church in the order established by Hamon. On the other hand, Dye himself never 
endorsed Hamon’s detailed timetable, and, while it is true that he predicted revival 
around the time of the millennium, the connection with the calendar was to an extent 
unavoidable: it was difficult for anyone predicting imminent moves of the Holy Spirit 
from the vantage point of the 1990s not to locate them rhetorically “at the end of this 
century” or “in the new millennium”. A sermon preached by Dye in February 1999 shows 
how careful he was to distinguish between legitimate hopes of an end-of-millennium 
Restoration and illegitimate date-setting. He began by saying:
I stand amongst you as a prophetic person today. Over the last 10, 15 years I have 
given m yself sacrificially, given 110 per cent, that at the close o f  this decade, the close 
o f  this century and the close o f  this millennium, w e would see the fulfilment o f  
everything that God has spoken to us ... All across the world, men and women are 
being raised up by the thousand. God wants to see a global harvest before Jesus 
returns, a new level o f  apostolic anointing, so that we w ill be lifted up to the faith 
realms o f  early Christianity ... God wants to restore to the Church the things that we 
have lost: a mighty Spirit-filled apostolic move will sweep the nations o f  Europe —  a 
revival o f  apostolic doctrine and the purity o f  the apostolic word as we prepare to 
celebrate the 2000th anniversary o f  Christ’s birth.
But, almost in the same breath, he added a qualification:
Jesus was bom in the reign o f  Caesar Augustus, who died in 4 BC, so before you get 
too carried away with the millennium celebrations —  you’ve missed it! It was in 
1996.5 It is about 2,000 years since Jesus came, a b o u t 2,000 years since the 
Resurrection, since Pentecost.
5 In fact, it was Herod the Great, not Augustus, who died in 4 BC. Matthew dates Jesus’s birth to the period 
of Herod’s death, which is why most scholars believe that Jesus was bom between four and seven years 
before the notional start of the AD calendar. E. P. Sanders (1995 [1993]: 11-12) points out that the sixth- 
century founder of the calendar, Dionysius Exiguus, did not know when Herod died. Luke (3:1) tells us 
that John the Baptist began preaching in the 15 year of Tiberius, in 29 AD. He also says (3: 23) that Jesus 
was about 30 years old when he began his ministry. Dionysius probably calculated that Jesus began his 
ministry a year after John, making him 30 in the year we now refer to as 30 AD.
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We might draw an analogy here between Dye’s approach to the end of the millennium 
and that of Pope John Paul II, who also presented the anniversary as a moment of historic 
spiritual transformation without ever really explaining why God had chosen this 
particular time (Thompson, 1996). The Pope, like Dye, tried to harness the energy created 
by anticipation of the calendar change for programmes of evangelisation. The difference, 
apart from the obvious one of scale, was that the Catholic Decade of Evangelisation was 
safely vague about its objectives; Kensington Temple, in contrast, had effectively been 
bounced into adopting an unrealistic goal by a single chance remark.
According to Dye, 2,000 by 2000 grew out of “an inspired off-the-cuff comment” 
by a respected leader (1997b: 83). The leader was Wynne Lewis who, at some stage in 
the early 1990s, overheard the Kensington Temple ministerial staff planning to plant 200 
churches by the year 2000. He is reported to have said, in a comment that entered KT 
folklore: “Two hundred? Why not make it two thousand?” When I began my fieldwork, 
this story was related to me as an example of how the will of the Holy Spirit could be 
revealed by a chance remark. Later, it was presented as a piece of hyperbole that led to a 
disastrously ill-conceived project. From the moment the goal was adopted, there were 
people in the ministry who felt that it was unattainable: planting 2,000 churches was 
unprecedented in British church history. According to one former pastor:
We tried redefining things, so that instead o f  2,000 churches it became 2,000  
“groups”. We already had 500 groups across the network, so that was a start. You  
might call it creative accounting. But we couldn’t get anywhere close. I think the 
problem was that, after years o f  sustained growth, KT had reached a state o f  
equilibrium. There was still talk o f  expansion, but I don’t think there was much real 
growth by the middle o f  the 1990s.
In other words, Dye had committed the church to an extremely ambitious programme of 
expansion at a time when KT had stopped growing (thanks, in part, to the increased 
competition for worshippers from London’s new Nigerian churches). The Tabernacle 
building in Acton, with its warehouse-sized auditorium, was supposed to accommodate
4,000 people at Sunday evening services (Hywel-Davies, 1998: 176-7). The reality was 
different, says the former pastor:
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I admire Colin’s guts for taking on the Tabernacle, but it never fulfilled its potential.
As soon as we moved there [in 1997], we lost that feeling o f  services packed to 
capacity. We were getting 800, 1,000, maybe 1,200 people, but it no longer felt full.
We had these huge black curtains that we would pull across in order to hide the empty 
space. We tried to get all the satellite churches to attend every week, but they didn’t.
As the 1990s progressed, there was mounting anxiety among the Kensington 
Temple about the slowing rate of growth. But it was not until a rally or “convocation” of 
the London City Church network on 2 October 1998 that those worries were made public. 
Kensington Temple had hired Wembley Arena for the meeting, entitled “Grace for the 
City”; it was the first time for five years that the whole church network had come 
together. Around 6,000 people were present, which looked impressive, though many 
galleries had been closed off to maximise the impact of the crowd. Colin Dye seemed 
disappointed by the turnout; but within an hour he had worked up the audience to a pitch 
of excitement. The music was belted out at terrific volume, and became more intense and 
ecstatic as the evening wore on, prompting young worshippers to jump up and down like 
punk rockers.
Dye’s speech began with a description of a vision — strictly speaking, a “mental 
impression” — that he had experienced seven years earlier. In it, he was shown an angel 
holding a bowl as wide as the (circular) M25 motorway outside London. “I knew about 
the bowls of God’s wrath in the Book of Revelation, and I thought: we’re done for, we’re 
finished,” he said. But the bowls didn’t contain wrath; they poured out “liquid glory”, 
which the angel proceeded to splash over the city. Dye’s voice dropped and, over the 
rumbling of an electric organ, he explained that Londoners urgently needed to repent of 
their sins — otherwise the promised revival would not happen.
We are approaching the end o f  this century. The time is now. Don’t hold on to your 
sin —  your sin is blocking the revival ... Why is that angel not yet allowed to pour out 
God’s grace upon this city? What is blocking him? You are blocking him. God is 
raising up a city-wide church, a network o f  hundreds and thousands o f  churches and 
ministries and groups and families who are united as one body. But we have a long
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way to go. The Lord showed me that we need to be 2,000 by the year 2000, and there 
are now 800 churches and ministries and groups linked together as one body. We have 
1,200 to go in the next year and a half or so. The foundation was laid well, but in 
recent weeks and months the building has stopped and discouragement has set in, an 
intimidation, a spiritual intimidation straight from the pit o f  hell, and we mustn’t give 
in to i t ...
Now  I’m going to tell you the rest o f  the vision. I saw the face o f  the Lord ... The 
Lord showed me that there are seven other angels gathering around the city. These are 
not angels o f  mercy —  please, nobody move! I will not be able to share this: I’m on a 
knife edge right now. N ot angels o f  grace but angels o f  judgment. I wanted to see. I 
asked God, and the moment he gave me just a tiny sight I said [yelling] I can’t see! 
Take it away! It’s too terrible! The judgment has already begun. Only one thing can 
stop if: i f  my people will humble themselves and seek my face and turn from their 
wicked ways, and even then we will not be able to avert the judgment in its fullness.
He showed me three signs o f  his judgment that are coming ... Fire is coming to this 
city, It shall strike in the City o f  London, in the heart o f  the corrupt financial 
institutions —  I would not be personally surprised i f  it was one o f  the financial 
buildings themselves ... Then there will be a judgment concerning the water o f  the 
city. It will affect our water supply and sewage. God is saying the stench o f  the city 
has reached his nostrils. And then there will be a major incident related to a bridge, 
and consequent traffic disaster. God says: this city traffics in sin ... if  we pray, God’s 
mercy will soften the effects, but they will still be there for the discerning.
This is a textbook example of the radicalisation of charisma, in which a charismatic 
leader abandons the striving for security that lies at the heart of routinisation (Csordas 
1997: 101). In his speech, Dye presented 2,000 by 2000 as a divinely ordained goal 
revealed to him personally, rather than to Wynne Lewis, and inserted it into an 
apocalyptic vision replete with imagery from the Book of Revelation. Yet he chose to 
unveil this fresh symbolism at a time when, by his own admission, the project had already 
run into trouble. It is not the job of the sociologist to comment on the authenticity of the 
vision of the angels (which in any case took a form closer to pure thought than to an
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apparition), but we can still observe that even Dye had rarely taken on such a degree of 
risk. The terms in which he spoke about 2,000 by 2000 left little room for manoeuvre. 
Admittedly, one could interpret the vision of the wrathful angels as a preparation for 
failure (and here Dye did allow room for the non-fulfilment of prophecy: he said that the 
punishment would be averted or modified if enough people repented). But he left his 
audience in no doubt as to his heavy personal investment in 2,000 by 2000.
The historian Albert Baumgarten (2000: x-xi) uses an image from gambling to 
explain the moment when apocalyptic prophets deliberately increase millennial 
expectations. A player “ups the ante” when he increases the amount bet, forcing everyone 
who wishes to stay in the game to increase their wagers as well. Millennial movements 
up the ante when they make their members accept new risks that will increase solidarity 
and loyalty, perhaps in response to previous minor discontinuations. This is a fair 
description of what Dye was doing at the Grace for the City rally — or trying to do. 
Observing members of the audience after the meeting, I suspected that some of them had 
not raised their own wagers: they seemed sceptical of Dye’s claims. I talked to Jonah, a 
young Londoner who worked as a receptionist for a mobile phone company. When I 
asked him about the vision, he laughed and said Colin was “a bit of a showman”; he 
wasn’t sure how seriously to take “the stuff about the angels”. On the train back to central 
London, I overheard one middle-aged member of a satellite church say to his friends: “I 
could do with one of those bowls for the washing up.” This unexpected irreverence made 
me reflect that audiences bestow charisma on leaders rather than the other way round. 
From a distance, the worshippers at the rally could have been mistaken for willing 
receptacles of ideology. Close up, it was by no means clear that they had absorbed the 
quasi-apocalyptic narrative that Dye had just constructed around a faltering programme 
of church growth. If, as Csordas maintains, the locus of charisma lies in the interactions 
of participants (1997: 139), then something was missing from this encounter: a sense that 
the audience had truly engaged with Dye’s demands. I felt that I had witnessed a 
demonstration of the fragility of charismatic authority.
By March 1999, when I had lunch with Colin Dye in his office at Kensington 
Temple, he had decided that 2,000 by 2000 would have to be abandoned in its present 
form. I asked him whether he was confident of reaching the target, and he replied that no,
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he wasn’t, which was why he had made so few references to it in recent sermons. He 
admitted that growth had slowed down and added that he was not prepared to boost the 
total simply by defining groups of three or four people as a church. I was surprised by 
how casually he dismissed the project; but he was obviously still optimistic that the turn 
of the century would herald the worldwide restoration of apostolic faith. On Easter 
Monday, April 5, 1999, Kensington Temple staged its “Revival Healing Meeting” in the 
Albert Hall; the circular hall was filled almost up to the top tier, mostly with Afro- 
Caribbean worshippers. Dye’s mood was upbeat, and he had good news to announce. 
God had told him that, following the announcement of his impending judgement at the 
Wembley rally, he had decided to show mercy to his people. I suggested in my field notes 
that “some sort of storm has passed”; to return to the gambling analogy, KT’s senior 
pastor had decided to lower the stakes.
The subject of 2,000 by 2000 was now dropped from the everyday rhetoric of the 
community; but it could not be swept under the carpet completely. In the January 2000 
issue of Revival Times, Dye explained what had gone wrong:
We set ourselves the target o f  2,000 churches, fellowships and ministries by the year 
2000. It looks as i f  we will fall short, having reached only 25 per cent o f  that goal.6 
The hold-up has been the lack o f  mature leaders willing to die to their own desires and 
personal plans in order to serve the corporate vision o f  the London City Church. Also, 
there has been a failure to mobilise the members o f  LCC into effective discipleship. 
Despite years o f  preaching, prophesying and praying, there is still a basic  
unwillingness among the ordinary attenders o f  the London City Church to get 
involved in the serious business o f  reaching the lost and discipling them into the body 
o f Christ.
As Csordas points out, the radicalisation of charisma is usually presented as a sacred 
process, while retreat from radicalisation tends to be attributed to human error (1997:
6 Twenty-five per cent of the total is 500 groups, rather than the 800 Dye had spoken about at Grace for the 
City; it seems reasonable to ask what had happened to the other 300. According to a former pastor, the 800 
total included every cell group in the LCC network. Later, however, it became clear that even “creative 
accounting” would not produce the desired result, and it looks as if Dye went back to a stricter method of 
counting that reduced the total to 500.
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130). In this case, it seems to be attributed to anyone but Dye, and we are faced (not for 
the first time) with the possibility that he had manipulated religious ideology to disguise 
his own failure. It is difficult to make a judgment about this, but what we can certainly 
observe is that — in his actions, if not in his words — Dye recognised that with 2,000 by 
2000 he had taken a step too far. His attempts to blame others notwithstanding, he 
showed an instinctive grasp of the limits of his own charismatic authority. According to 
Csordas, the radicalisation of charisma can create “a kind of centrifugal force that results 
in the spin-off of those unwilling to follow the tightening spiral of charisma” (1997: 130). 
The years from 1991 to 1999 had witnessed a steady inflation of Dye’s claims, which 
seem to have peaked rather later than those of Pentecostal Christianity as a whole; but 
now he was unable to conceal the threat of approaching discontinuation. The 2,000 by 
2000 project placed an unacceptable strain on his charismatic authority and threatened to 
spin off large numbers of unconvinced worshippers, perhaps into other churches; it was 
clearly unworkable, and so this particular investment had to be written off.
Aftermath: the loss o f the Tabernacle and the Jezebel spirit
The calendar change itself passed uneventfully at Kensington Temple — as it probably 
would have anyway, given that hopes' for miraculous growth had focused on the end of 
2000, not its beginning. There had been a brief flurry of anxiety about the Millennium 
Bug, but that was over long before New Year’s Eve. The mood of the church in January 
2000 was not noticeably different from that of a few months earlier. By the spring of that 
year, however, it had darkened considerably in response to an unexpected setback.
The November 1999 issue of Revival Times had unveiled a programme called 
“Building the London City Church Tabernacle of Glory”. If every LCC member bought a 
“Tabernacle brick” for £250, then the church could buy the Acton warehouse after the 
lease expired in 2000. “We are going to see the Lord move in miraculous power and 
financial provision,” predicted Dye. Instead, disaster struck. Kensington Temple did not 
have enough money to buy the building and was outbid on the renewal of the lease. At 
Easter, it was forced to vacate the building, which housed its auditorium, administrative 
headquarters and Bible college. Accounting for this failure required more concentrated 
ideological work than the collapse of 2,000 by 2000. The message went out that God
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wanted Kensington Temple to “re-dig the wells” by returning to Notting Hill Gate; but 
my impression from talking to worshippers was that this explanation rang hollow. A 
junior member of the ministry team told me:
I have to be careful what I say, but I feel we started organising funds too late, making 
appeals for donations too close to the time we had to move out. There’s a place for 
good planning in God’s work. People didn’t catch the vision. We shouldn’t have lost 
the Tabernacle, because w e’ve had to come back to this place, which is quite small ...
God wanted us to re-dig the apostolic well here —  that was what was being said from 
the pulpit. But we lost our headquarters, a great facility. I believe that God wants us to 
participate in the plans that he has for us, and that through negligence we can forfeit a 
specific part o f  that plan.
In February 2000, Dye withdrew from preaching engagements and began a 40-day 
fast, a gesture that was widely interpreted as a response to the shock of the loss of the 
Tabernacle. In the April issue of Revival Times, he reported that during the fast he 
received “some wonderful promises and reassurances about my life and ministry” — but 
also “some surprising revelations concerning the unseen powers that are controlling 
London”. Dye identified these powers as the Jezebel spirit, named after the wicked 
consort of Ahab in the First Book of Kings who encouraged the worship of Baal. In a 
book of seminar notes entitled Satan Unmasked (later turned into a paperback book), Dye 
wrote that, during his time of reflection, God had shown him that this spirit had taken 
control of his life, making him feel “confused, frustrated and, to a large extent, burnt out” 
(2000: 7). The origins of this malign force lay in the Devil’s temptation of Eve, though 
Dye stressed that men and women were equally susceptible to it. The Jezebel spirit had 
taken control of the arts, commerce, religion, philosophy and politics; it lay behind 
pornography, homosexuality, adultery, drug addiction and organised crime (9). 
Fortunately, Christians could defeat it with weapons of spiritual warfare — but these 
would not become truly effective until they renounced their sins. The cover of Satan 
Unmasked, reminiscent of a 1970s horror film, showed a broken mask with the face of a 
handsome blond young man and, behind it, a glowering black-browed villain, also male. 
The concept of the Jezebel spirit was not invented by Dye, and he himself had warned
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church members about it some years earlier (Hywel-Davies, 1998: 170-2). But the sudden 
elaboration of the concept bore the hallmark of the ideological work that follows 
prophetic disappointment. Where human fallibility had been sufficient to account for the 
collapse of 2,000 by 2000, the loss of the Tabernacle required a full-scale theodicy 
involving the clash of divine and Satanic powers.
The summer of 2000 brought an interesting postscript to the prophecies of divine 
punishment that Dye issued at the 1998 Grace for the City rally. On 1 June, 2000, an IRA 
splinter group exploded a bomb under Hammersmith Bridge in London; no one was 
killed or injured, but it caused severe traffic problems. Dye immediately claimed that this 
was a fulfilment of his prediction of “a major incident related to a bridge, and consequent 
traffic disaster”. The fact that no one was killed showed that God had softened his 
judgement, just as Dye had said he might. What I found interesting about this claim was 
the mixed response it drew from the Kensington Temple audience. Some interviewees 
accepted it without question: Maureen Archer, for example, said that God would not 
mislead the senior pastor, and took it as further confirmation of his anointed status. But 
there were also reports that some members of the ministry team were unconvinced. One 
pastor felt that Dye was “trying it on”, and told friends that the episode helped him make 
up his mind to leave KT and found his own congregation. It appears that, coming so soon 
after various setbacks, this particular prophetic claim drew too heavily on Dye’s depleted 
charismatic capital.
It is only fair to add that, by late 2000, Dye’s morale had improved: he threw the 
church into a new cell group initiative, G-12, imported from Colombia. That story lies 
beyond the scope of this study. But, despite this new excitement, there was still an 
impression that Kensington Temple’s size and ambitions had contracted slightly since the 
late 1990s, when it believed it formed the spearhead of a religious revival that would 
transform London. The relation of the calendar to these changes is indirect rather than 
causal, but it should certainly be taken into account. Before 2000, the magnetic pull of the 
anniversary sharpened KT’s sense of direction and (as it turned out) led its pastors into 
some unrealistic goal-setting. The timing of the Tabernacle fiasco was coincidental; but it 
did give a flavour of millennial disappointment to the beginning of the 21st century. For 
years, the church had been hinting that 2000 would be the moment when God’s promises
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would be fulfilled with a new intensity. There had been no preparation for the possibility 
that it would bring a public humiliation. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that some 
people reacted to the loss of the Tabernacle with the sort of bewilderment associated with 
millenarian believers when prophecy fails. One keen young Bible student told me that the 
setback had been sent by God as a trial, and would help KT distinguish between fair- 
weather friends and Christians who were really committed to revival. But, even as he 
spoke, it was obvious that he was struggling with this explanation, and within a few 
months he had moved on to another church.
Individual attitudes to the year 2000
We have discussed at some length the reluctance of rank and file members of Kensington 
Temple to talk about the Second Coming of Christ; they were even less willing to engage 
in discussion about the year 2000. I had originally intended to build this study around 
their ideas about the anniversary, comparing them to those of other congregations, but it 
soon became obvious that there would be relatively little raw material to analyse. The 
most common response to a question about 2000 was a statement along the lines of “It’s 
only a date”. Many people knew that the 2,000th anniversary of Jesus’s birth had probably 
already passed. As Tom Rayner put it:
The millennium is very important to the world, for whom it is 2,000 years from Christ. 
Therefore we should use it. We should get the focus back on Jesus. However, the 
millennium is, i f  anything, a red herring. It’s unlikely that Jesus was bom  on 25 
December in the year 1, so i f  we were looking at a proper bi-millennium w e’ve passed 
it anyway.
Sophie Kempff, the German woman who had dismissed apocalyptic theories about the 
European Union, was equally adamant that 2000 was just a date:
Nothing will change in the year 2000. It’s not special, it’s normal. Some people expect 
change, but that’s not the case for me.
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But note the reference to “some people”. There was a recognition that other people 
were excited about the date, namely the media and those apocalyptic fanatics who were 
expecting Jesus to come back in 2000. The latter were spoken about in terms very similar 
to “prophecy nuts” — the difference being that, while everyone knew church members 
who were obsessed by the End Times, no one could point me in the direction of anyone 
who thought Christ would return on the stroke of midnight, December 31, 1999. The 
closest I came to this belief was a second-hand report from an elderly West Indian man 
called Lionel, who told me in June 1999 that he had a friend who was wandering around 
church meetings announcing that Jesus was coming back that September. This friend had 
apparently picked up the idea from a preacher who had visited KT (he did not know 
who), and had shifted his estimate at least once; he was unemployed, but not worried 
about this because it gave him time to evangelise. “I take it all with more than a pinch of 
salt,” said Lionel with a smile. “I don’t know whether Christ is coming back in 1999, 
2000, after the millennium. Naming a year is one thing, but when he narrows it down to a 
month I’m not convinced.”
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that just because church members 
rejected the notion of 2000 as a deadline for the Second Coming, the date therefore 
possessed no eschatological resonances at all. Amelia, a 21-year-old business student 
from Nigeria whom I met at a Tabernacle party in March 1999, said the year 2000 was 
important because it was 2,000 years since Jesus was bom, and also because it was a sign 
of the End: “It’s getting closer to the time Jesus Christ will come. It’s like your 50th 
birthday approaching. You keep saying to yourself, it’s getting closer and closer.” Silvia, 
the Brazilian Bible college student, said that her ideas about the millennium had changed:
For me, a few years ago, 2000 was a really scary thing, but now I am living it. I do 
believe that London City Church is in God’s heart for this generation at this time. We 
are not here by chance. For me, the year 2000 will be more a time o f  harvest and the 
Church will arise in mission.
There is a strong hint here of a shift from le futur to / ’avenir: the long-term future proves 
a natural backdrop for scary or utopian images, whereas the short-term future — and
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2000 was by this stage less than six months away — is something that one already partly 
inhabits. And it is worth remembering that Silvia had already said something similar 
about the Second Coming. As a child growing up in a Pentecostal household, she had 
been afraid of the coming apocalypse, but her anxiety receded as her confidence in God 
grew. Moving to London in her early 20s, she came under the influence of Dye’s 
Restorationist theology, in which the horrors of the Tribulation were juxtaposed with a 
vast End Times harvest associated with the year 2000.
Silvia’s comments confirmed a general impression that ways of thinking about the 
Second Coming and the year 2000 were related to each other. Church members who were 
“into the End Times” were more likely to feel that the calendar millennium meant 
something, even if they were not sure what that something meant. When asked what 2000 
meant for her, Sarah Kim — who looked forward to being Raptured within a few years 
— replied:
It makes me a little bit frightened because many people are not saved, such as my own 
family. And I will be a little bit frightened to meet God face to face. But I don’t think 
2000 is going to be the End. Personally, I hope that it will make people wake up a 
little bit. But the media makes a big thing out o f  it, to make money. To me it’s another 
year, though deep down I’m a bit frightened.
Metin Tilki told me in June 1999:
From a world perspective, it’s a big marketing hype, a lot o f people will make a lot o f  
money out o f  it. From a Christian perspective, it’s insignificant to me, completely. But 
I think that God is so sovereign that he will do something before the year 2 0 0 0 .1 just 
sense that God is never mocked. Something will happen, I don’t know what.
For both Sarah and Metin, therefore, the millennial transition evoked confused feelings: 
although they recognised that it was in many respects a manufactured event, without any 
direct religious significance, it still had the power to evoke subliminal fears and hopes. 
Their remarks suggested that, behind the protestations that 2000 was “just a date”, there 
might be a greater degree of eschatological anticipation than I had at first suspected.
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The KT census of October 1999 offered an opportunity to find out more. On the last 
page of the form, alongside the questions about the Second Coming and conspiracies, I 
added the statement: “The year 2000 is an important date, marking the beginning of the 
End.” To my surprise, 26 per cent of all respondents — 25 per cent of men and 27 per 
cent of women — agreed with it. This figure included 27 per cent of Africans and 22 per 
cent of Caucasians, which was again unexpected, given the lower proportion of Africans 
willing to predict the return of Christ. Overall, however, there was some evidence to 
suggest that anticipation of the Second Coming intensified apocalyptic interpretations of 
the calendar change. Forty-nine per cent of 10-year millenarians thought 2000 was the 
beginning of the End, as opposed to 35 per cent of 50-year-millenarians and 24 per cent 
of non-speculators. This gradient is in the direction one would expect, though it is 
puzzling that just over half of all the respondents who believed that Jesus would return by 
2010 at the latest did not think that the turn of the millennium was significant. There was 
also evidence that ideas about 2000 and conspiracy were linked: 41 per cent of believers 
in the euro conspiracy and 47 per cent of believers in Satanic barcodes assented to the 
statement. Participation in the KT ministry made little difference, however.
The relatively high level of positive responses was hard to square with the 
reluctance of most interviewees to talk about 2000 as the beginning of the End, and with 
the fact that, by October 1999, Colin Dye was no longer presenting 2000 as an important 
date in the life of the church. I was keen to find out whether willingness to assent to the 
statement would survive into the year 2000. There was no possibility of a full-scale 
longitudinal survey, but in July 2000 I was able to put the same statement to 68 first year 
Bible college students, now back in the Notting Hill church. A total of 19 (27 per cent) 
agreed with it, which matched the percentage for both the whole church (26 per cent) and 
the Bible college students and alumni (27 per cent) in the October survey. So, whatever 
ideas were conveyed by the responses, they did not appear to be affected by passing 
through the calendrical deadline.
I returned to Kensington Temple at the beginning of 2003 to find the cell group 
system well established, the Bible college replaced by a part-time school of ministry, and 
the church once again on the verge of revival. “We are on the threshold of a great 
outpouring of the Holy Spirit. God is already moving in apostolic power within our cities
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and across the nations of the earth,” wrote Dye in the February issue of Revival Times. I 
interviewed some church members, and was not surprised to discover, given the 
traditionally high turnover, that few of them had belonged to the congregation in 1999-
2000. We have already encountered Jason Robinson’s theory that the significance of the 
calendar millennium was revealed on September 11 the following year. For all the other 
interviewees, however, the date seems to meant very little, before or after the anniversary. 
“I don’t know what to say about it — 2000, 2001,2002, they’re all just dates,” said Bill, a 
middle-aged businessman. “Maybe 1999 was a big thing for some people, but not for 
me.” Daniel, a young man from Nairobi now working as a London bus driver, told me:
Dates don’t really matter, because Jesus told us that it was not for us to worry about 
the times and seasons. Some people were worried about the Millennium Bug, but that 
was a scientific problem —  nothing to do with religion. It was a transition into a new  
millennium, and in a way that was exciting, but it didn’t mean anything for Christians.
Sanjay, a Londoner from an Indian background, said he had not been a believer when 
2000 dawned:
I can’t tell you what it was like from a Christian perspective, because I wasn’t saved in 
those days. It was just an excuse for a drink with my mates. I got drunk, went home, 
and thought: is that it? What a let-down.
The he produced an observation which neatly encapsulated the reservations of ordinary 
Pentecostalists about the prophecy subculture:
As for Christians, there might have been some people thinking about the Second  
Coming in 2000, but to be honest with you I don’t think real, committed, bom-again 
Christians worry about that mystical stuff. We don’t worry about dates —  because 
w e’re ready for him whenever he comes.
Emmanuel Johnson laughed when I raised the subject of 2000:
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There was all that talk in America about the end o f the world at the millennium, but 
it’s 2003 now —  and, hey, w e’re still here.
Conclusion
With the benefit of hindsight, almost everything written about the turn of the millennium 
during the 1990s seems to have exaggerated its importance. Academic commentators 
were as guilty of this as religious leaders. A collection of articles entitled The Year 2000: 
Essays on the End (Strozier and Flynn, 1997) contained a memorably over-the-top piece 
entitled “Hysteresis of the Millennium” by Jean Baudrillard which suggested that history 
had been sent into reverse as it approached “the terror of the year 2000”. Next to it was an 
essay by Sandra Schanzer on “The Impending Computer Crisis of the Year 2000” which 
argued that it might already be too late (in 1997) to avert technological disaster. A similar 
volume entitled Calling Time: Religion and Change at the Turn o f the Millennium (Percy,
2000), consisting of essays submitted in 1999, also over-estimated the significance of the 
moment. One contributor, the Anglican theologian Michael Sadgrove, described the 
millennium as “a ‘singularity’ in the flow of time, an interruption of ‘ordinary’ time by a 
historical moment that is already ‘pulling’ us into orbit in fascinating and perhaps sinister 
ways” (2000: 78). There was also an essay by me arguing that the dawn of 2000 would be 
the first nearly universal experience in human history, one which, by distorting our 
understanding of time, would increase our feeling of powerlessness in the face of 
mortality (Thompson, 2000: 123-4). I pointed out that the calendar change was what 
philosophers call a pseudo-event, without causal preconditions or consequences (Gell, 
1996: 161). The shift from 1999 to 2000 would occur instantaneously, unlike a real event 
occupying time and space; therefore it was both elusive and inescapable.
Looking back, I still think that the status of the transition as a pseudo-event is 
important, and that it helps explain why its reverberations were so limited. By insisting 
that 2000 was “just a date”, members of Kensington Temple recognised the intangibility 
of the millennial moment. The Decade of Evangelism, the Millennium Dome, the hand 
on the clock pointing to twelve, the row of three zeros on newspaper mastheads: none of
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these was the thing itself, but merely a sign of token of the phenomenon that — carelessly 
glossing over the distinction between calendar unit and anniversary — we called “the 
millennium”. The arrival of the year 2000 could signify nothing or anything. It could be 
endowed with apocalyptic, theological, philosophical, sociological, technological, 
political and artistic significance, but the one thing it would never receive was an 
authoritative definition. Some Christian writers bravely tried to nail down its meaning: 
Sadgrove (2000) wrote of it as a kairos moment for Christianity that demanded serious 
theological work, enabling the Church to reach out to a complex, postmodern world. Yet 
there was little sign of such work being done. With the exception of Pope John Paul II, 
who never really communicated his millennial enthusiasm to his own Church, no 
mainstream Christian leader seemed very interested in 2000, and for a good reason: most 
of them instinctively realised that there was no Christian narrative of the millennium that 
churchgoers, let alone secular society, would find convincing. And, in any case, as 
practitioners of routinised religion, they were risk-averse; the calendar millennium held 
most appeal for those who aspired to charismatic authority, and were prepared to take the 
gambles that this entailed.
For decades, if not centuries, 2000 was synonymous with the future. To talk 
authoritatively about it was therefore to claim some knowledge of the future, or at least 
the ability to anticipate it intelligently. In the late 20th century, some visionaries portrayed 
2000 as a threshold for the operation of supernatural power, while secular commentators 
— academics, scientists, market analysts and politicians — made forecasts or emphasised 
the attainability of various goals. In practice, sacred and secular interpretations of 2000 
were difficult to separate from each other. Pentecostalists tried to quicken the action of 
the Holy Spirit by devising action plans such as AD 2000; scientists issued predictions 
about the millennium that drew heavily on the resources of their imaginations and on the 
quasi-priestly status of their profession. In the 1990s, 2000 was sometimes described as 
“the year by which”, a phrase that captures the charismatic essence of the rhetoric 
associated with the millennium. Predictions and promises lie at the heart of charismatic 
claims, which are translated into authority when an audience accepts them; but that 
authority can quickly crumble when the claims are invalidated. In this respect, those who 
attempted to harness the power of 2000 faced the same threat of disconfirmation as
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Weber’s prophets or war leaders: things could so easily go wrong. The experience of 
millennial scholars after 2000 offered an ironic demonstration of this danger: the final 
conference of the Centre for Millennial Studies at Boston University in November 2002 
called for sustained ideological work to explain why academic predictions of apocalyptic 
fever and technological collapse had not come true. Colin Dye, too, had to execute some 
deft manoeuvres to extricate himself from 2,000 by 2000; he left it rather late in the day, 
and his authority suffered real damage when this was followed by the loss of the 
Tabernacle, but one thing that never deserted him was his sense that charisma works best 
when routinisation and radicalisation are properly balanced. Risk management remains an 
essential part of his strategy for Kensington Temple.
Dye’s listeners may not have consciously realised that they were in the position of 
granting or withholding authority, but there was nothing automatic about their reception 
of his ideas. One of the questions facing them was: “Do we believe what Colin is telling 
us about God’s plan for the year 2000?” The answer for many people was that they did 
not; otherwise Kensington Temple would have moved beyond 25 per cent of its target. 
This was partly because Dye, at Wynne Lewis’s prompting, had set the hurdle too high, 
but partly for deeper reasons to do with the loss of overarching meaning in modem 
society. Peter Berger’s “heretical imperative” attacked narratives of 2000 with a 
vengeance: no plausibility structure was strong enough to sustain a single interpretation 
of the calendar millennium. Roman Catholics did not invest heavily in John Paul II’s 
mystical understanding of 2000 as the beginning of a Christian springtime because to 
have done so they would have had to block out countless competing interpretations, many 
of which dismissed 2000 as an event, and surrender the freedom to make up their own 
minds about it. Pentecostal Christians were, on the whole, equally confused. The leaders 
of their community, having initially embraced over-ambitious schemes to evangelise all 
the nations by 2000, spent much of the 1990s backing away from them. And so, as my 
fieldwork at Kensington Temple suggests, most rank and file believers sought refuge in 
toned-down rhetoric coloured by the ambiguities of modem urban living: 2000 was 
exciting, but not as exciting as the media pretended; the anniversary of Jesus’s birth but 
not the exact anniversary; a milestone in history but just a date; a sign of the End but not 
the End itself.
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8. Conclusions
Introduction
This final chapter is divided into two sections. The first examines the wider lessons to be 
drawn from the study of millenarianism at Kensington Temple. It emphasises the dangers 
of generalising about the beliefs of conservative evangelical Christians, which are more 
varied than the popular image of the constituency suggests; moreover, there are 
unexplored parallels between their working out in practice and trends in secular society. 
The second section argues that, although the Problem of the End has manifested itself 
throughout the history of millenarianism, it is becoming more acute. The marginalisation 
of apocalyptic doctrine at Kensington Temple reflects the way millenarian and other 
religious beliefs are being undermined by the fragmentation of plausibility structures in 
modernity; it is an aspect of secularisation.
Kensington Temple: perspectives and parallels
When I began my fieldwork, I did not expect to discover that Kensington Temple was a 
hotbed of millenarianism. Even so, I was surprised by the circumscribed and tentative 
nature of its members’ apocalyptic beliefs. As Bryan Wilson’s (1961) account of the 
early Elim Pentecostals shows, KT has a substantial apocalyptic heritage; moreover, 
much of the literature on the wider conservative evangelical tradition implies that belief 
in the End Times is central to its appeal (see, for example, Ammerman, 1987; Wills, 
1990; Strozier, 1994). In particular, Charles Strozier’s interviewees, who included 
Pentecostalists, spoke passionately about the coming apocalypse and its relevance to their 
daily lives. Given the closeness of the year 2000,1 expected to encounter at least a similar
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level of intensity. Instead, almost from the first interview, it was clear that my study of 
millenarianism at Kensington Temple would be centred around what people did not 
believe — or, bearing in mind the difficulty of measuring belief, what they did not say 
and do. For a time, it was mildly depressing to focus on a negative; gradually, however, I 
came to see, like Sherlock Holmes, that the fact that the dog did not bark in the night time 
was a curious incident. Why would members of a religious movement founded amid 
expectation of an imminent Second Coming show so little interest in this prospect at a 
time of supposedly heightened apocalyptic sensibilities?
The basic answer is that they found that millenarian ideas, in their raw form, could 
not easily be reconciled with the dictates of common sense. And so, using their subjective 
rationality, they worked on these ideas until cognitive dissonance was minimised. In the 
process, apocalyptic theology did not disappear: I met no one for whom the concept of 
the End Times meant nothing, and many of those people who put it to the back of their 
minds would, i f  asked, produce a mild rhetorical expression of apocalyptic belief. There 
were also a few individuals who embraced millenarian or conspiracy ideas that had the 
effect of increasing the tension between themselves and their surroundings. But, on the 
whole, ideological work on millenarianism was intended to reconcile it with the reality of 
everyday life, thereby lowering subcultural deviance. In this, Kensington Temple was a 
microcosm of forces observable in the Pentecostal and evangelical world. Church 
members’ lack of interest in eschatology was entirely consistent with the downgrading of 
premillennialism within the Elim denomination; their lack of support for the unworkable
2,000 by 2000 project mirrored Pentecostalism’s pragmatic abandonment of schemes to 
evangelise the whole world by the millennium; the stigmatisation of worshippers such as 
Linda Symondson, who thought she had uncovered a papal conspiracy to send light rays 
through the ionosphere, reproduced on a small scale the marginalisation of “conspiracy 
nuts” in born-again Christianity.
The general direction of the modifications of apocalyptic belief at Kensington 
Temple was towards routinisation and the societal consensus. That said, the results did 
not have a uniform quality. People adopted all sorts of strategies for coming to terms with 
the problematic notion of the end of the world, and this lack of uniformity is in itself 
significant. One of the aims of this study has been to identify some of the gaps that open
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up when millenarian ideas are adjusted to fit circumstances. These gaps exist at the level 
of official ideology: between, for example, Elim’s eschatology before and after 1994, 
when belief in a premillennial Second Coming was downgraded from policy to a mere 
option. They exist between official and unofficial formulations of prophecy belief (the 
latter often moving away from the societal consensus) and between apocalyptic doctrines 
before and after they have been subjected to private customisation by the ordinary 
worshipper. But that customisation, of course, is applied to doctrines of every sort by 
religious believers everywhere. And that brings us to one of the most important questions 
raised by this study. What does the practical modification of apocalyptic doctrines tell us 
about the social construction of religious ideas in general?
One of the things it tells us is that the way people work on high-tension beliefs is 
not very different from the way they work on less controversial religious propositions. 
They make rational choices that take into account costs and benefits; a crucial factor is 
the degree of social support available for a particular idea. Such calculations can create 
substantial variations of belief even within groups that have a reputation for ideological 
uniformity, such as cults. It was her fieldwork with a new religious movement, the 
Unification Church, that led Eileen Barker (1984: 84-89) to coin the terms horizontal and v 
vertical variations of belief, referring to differences of emphasis produced respectively by 
a believer’s background and place in the group hierarchy. Other ethnographic studies, 
such as those by John Lofland on the Unification Church (1977 [1966]), David Van 
Zandt on the Children of God (1991) and Phillip Lucas on the Holy Order of MANS 
(1995), have also revealed the flexibility of ideology, lack of internal consensus and 
importance of negotiation within high-tension groups. Yet, as Barker (1989: 10) and 
Wilson (1990: 68) have pointed out, the beliefs of cult and sect members are the subject 
of sweeping generalisations in the media. These generalisations often exaggerate the 
content of high-tension doctrines and seek to identify spurious similarities between quite 
different movements; above all, they assume that everyone within a particular group 
subscribes with same degree of intensity to the exotic doctrines with which the group has 
become publicly identified. This non-existent ideological uniformity is often ascribed to 
brainwashing or mind control; but there is no reliable evidence to suggest that such a 
thing is possible (Barker, 1989: 17-19; Bainbridge, 1997: 235). If brainwashing did exist,
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however, many controversial movements would cheerfully use it, because they know 
better than anyone that a consistent level of subcultural deviance is hard to sustain against 
the gravitational pull of the societal consensus. The authority of cult leaders is 
notoriously fragile, and the groups themselves often fissiparous and short-lived. The 
simple reason for this is that they make charismatic claims that impose a punishing load 
of ideological work if cognitive dissonance is to be avoided; for many of their members, 
the cost is too high. A detailed ideological snapshot of a cult or sect would probably 
reveal a significant proportion of its members wrestling with ideas that offended against 
their common sense rationality. There would be people pushing in opposite directions, 
towards and away from subcultural deviance; the outcome might not be predictable, but 
history suggests that careful routinisation increases a group’s chances of survival.
Conservative evangelical Christians are not usually classified as cult members, 
even by their opponents; they think of themselves as strongly anti-cult and they are often 
the source of dubious generalisations about new religious movements. Yet they 
themselves have been the victims of sweeping media assertions about their 
“fundamentalist” beliefs, which some psychologists have argued — on the slimmest of 
evidence — are pathological in origin (see Savage, 2002). In the last 20 years, 
sociological studies of evangelical Christianity have challenged some of the more 
misleading stereotypes, distinguishing between the theological traditions within the 
constituency and charting some of the variations of belief that go with them (see Hunter, 
1983, 1987; Ammerman, 1987; Poloma, 1989; Percy, 1996; Miller, 1997; Smith, 1998, 
2000; Coleman, 2000; D. Martin, 2001). But the message that born-again Christians do 
not all believe the same thing, or indeed what their leaders wish them to believe, has not 
been successfully communicated to the secular world. There needs to be a sharper focus 
on the rationality of evangelical Christians and its consequence: the fragility of religious 
authority in a milieu in which, as Mary Jo Neitz (1987) observed of Charismatic 
Catholics, hypotheses are constantly being tested. At Kensington Temple, religious 
claims were subjected to continual evaluation by rank and file worshippers and frequently 
failed the test. The collective memory of the church was littered with failed, defunct or 
only partially successful charismatic claims: the Group-Gather-Grow initiative; 
pamphlets warning of Y2K meltdown, still on sale in the bookshop long after the
221
millennial moment; Dye’s interpretation of the Hammersmith Bridge bomb; and, of 
course, 2,000 by 2000. The failure of these claims should not be seen as evidence of 
intellectual dishonesty on the part of the people making them; rather, it underlines Neitz’s 
point that believers use their common sense to work out strategies, analyse consequences 
and assess “the goodness of fit between an item and an explanation” (1987: 79).
Analysis of conservative evangelical Christianity usually concentrates on the 
features that distinguish it from the rest of the world; there is rarely a focus on 
similarities. But the longer I spent at Kensington Temple, the more I was struck by the 
parallels between KT and the secular world, and also between my findings and those of 
scholars working outside the field of religion. The following paragraphs suggest areas in 
which further research into these parallels could yield useful insights. The suggestions 
may seem only tangentially connected to the subject of millenarianism, but they arise out 
of my observations of the management of apocalyptic belief at KT:
(i) There are similarities between Pentecostal churches such as Kensington Temple, 
and the charismatic systems of the political and business world. The calculation of risk is 
central to the operation of charismatic authority, and its growing importance in the global 
economy has lent a strongly charismatic flavour to . the authority of many chief 
executives. In the unitary structures of Pentecostalism, the success of spiritual claims 
depends partly on sound management techniques and anticipation of market trends; 
religious and commercial risk are closely intertwined. Will Napier, after leaving 
Kensington Temple, was briefly involved in direct marketing: he was struck by the way 
speakers would speak of a great wave of sales just around the comer, so similar to Colin 
Dye’s forecasts of imminent revival, and said he was uncomfortably aware of having left 
one network of dissonance-inviting claims only to become involved in another. The 
similarities between Charismatic religion and business activity have been noted by a 
number of scholars (see B. Martin, 1998; Coleman, 2000; Corten and Marshall-Fratani, 
2001, D. Martin, 2001), but there is room for more ethnographic research, such as a 
comparative study of the calculation of risk in a Pentecostal and a commercial setting.
(ii) The work of organisational theorists throws a useful light on the exercise of 
power in churches such as Kensington Temple. Taking their lead from Michel Foucault, 
many scholars see power as unstable, exercised and resisted within moving networks,
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incorporating discourses that themselves seek to exercise power (Clegg, 1998: 30-31). 
Applying this perspective to evangelical Christianity, Martyn Percy (1996, 1998), 
uncovered messy, volatile and sometimes abusive relationships in the Charismatic 
churches influenced by John Wimber. Many similar relationships exist at Kensington 
Temple, where patterns of granting and withholding charismatic authority cut across the 
top-down structure associated with the classic Pentecostal pastor and his audience. For 
Foucault, a characteristic of modem power relations was their open-ended quality 
(Cousins and Hussain, 1984: 249). This quality is certainly to be found at Kensington 
Temple, where, although pastors occasionally wield authority in a coercive way, the 
structure of power is forever shifting in response to the threat of disconfirmation and the 
network of tiny authority-claims emanating from worshippers’ personal prophecies and 
“words of knowledge”.1 To paraphrase Barker, we might say that authority is exercised 
horizontally as well as vertically.
(iii) The sociology of deviance is dominated by the study of crime and the 
stigmatisation of minority groups by society.2 Less attention has been given to the way 
minority groups themselves construct measures of deviance that they apply to their 
membership. A number of interviewees at Kensington Temple branded their fellow 
worshippers as “flaky” or superspiritual, and there was a general acceptance of the 
identification of strange people with strange ideas; the language used was reminiscent of 
that employed by political activists to describe their own fringes. A comparative study of 
boundary maintenance in a religious movement and a political party, examining the 
concept of deviance as it was applied within the groups, could make a substantial 
contribution to our knowledge of the management of ideology. It would be interesting to 
discover whether either organisation faced the paradox experienced by Kensington
1 Percy (1996: 126), writing about Wimberite Charismatic churches, says that “power and authority 
relationships are readily acknowledged, and understood to be necessary. Yet each believer also has a 
‘personal’ authority or power, just like Jesus, which can be exercised at will, only in relation to the Father. 
Thus, if Jesus possessed authority and power independent of human attribution, so can believers.
Inevitably, this can lead to unrestrained individualism and particularity; believers can sometimes imagine 
that they are the centre of God’s attention, at the expense of any wider commitments that divine power 
might have.” The same problem manifests itself at Kensington Temple, though the authority of the pastor in 
classic Pentecostalism, and the deference shown to him by many worshippers from the Third World, acts as 
a restraint on disruptive behaviour.
2 For an overview, see the volume of essays entitled Social Deviance: Readings in Theory and Research, 
edited by Henry N. Pontell (2001).
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Temple: that the most committed group members are also the most susceptible to 
heterodox ideas that can create unhelpful tension with society.
(iv) There is a trend in the field of rhetorical analysis away from treating statements
«
of belief as evidence of deep-seated attitudes. Michael Billig, drawing on the work of 
Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell (1987), argues that, instead of treating an inner 
mental state as the “reality” that needs to be studied, social psychologists should take as 
their starting point the use of attitudinal language (1991: 15). Such language often takes 
the form of an argument that is intended to achieve particular ends. Kenneth Burke, the 
father of modem rhetorical studies, analysed rhetoric in terms of strategy (1973 [1941]: 
297-300), a military metaphor that implies the deployment of rhetorical resources in a 
deliberate sequence (Bygrave, 1993: 109). Stephen O’Leary (1994) has stripped away 
some of the mystique of millenarian discourse by revealing the logic that underpins its 
arguments, an approach that could successfully be applied to many religious movements. 
Evangelical Christianity places a stronger emphasis than most traditions on rhetorical 
expressions of belief and, partly as a result of this, suffers from the over-simplified 
representations of those beliefs in public life. Although there have been studies of the use 
of language in evangelical and Charismatic groups (see Harding, 1994; Johannesen, 
1994; Roelofs, 1994; Percy, 1996; Csordas, 1997), relatively little attention has been 
given to the operation of rhetoric within these groups. This is regrettable, because such 
analysis would help us to understand the difference between what people say they believe 
and what their actions imply they believe. To cite an example from Kensington Temple, 
Debbie Mowbray and her friends told each other that “Jesus is coming soon”; but this 
assertion had little effect on their daily routine, because it owed more to rhetorical
\
convention than to conviction. This is not to say that church members did not hold firm 
beliefs (though they tended not to be millenarian ones); rather, we need to recognise that 
their expressions of belief were often moulded to fit argumentative strategies and, as 
such, were influenced by all sorts of factors — including, in many cases, the calculation 
of risk.
(v) Finally, cognitive science is providing support for the consensus in social 
psychology, rhetorical studies and the sociology of knowledge that belief — and 
therefore religion — is too complex a phenomenon to be reduced to straightforward
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causes. The anthropologist Pascal Boyer (2001 [2001]) concludes that religious activities 
involve too many areas of the brain for there to be any single cause, function or definition 
of religion. As he puts it: “There is no religious instinct, no specific inclination in the 
mind, no particular disposition for these concepts, no special religion centre in the brain, 
and religious people are not different from non-religious ones in essential cognitive 
functions” (378). Even when we narrow down our frame of reference to millenarianism 
alone, Boyer’s analysis is still relevant. Apocalyptic believers may exhibit distinctive 
psychological traits (though that is very hard to prove empirically), but there is no 
evidence to suggest that, in some fundamental way, they process information differently 
from everyone else.
Secularisation and the Problem of the End
We have considered some of the lessons that the management of millenarian belief in one 
setting can teach us about similar or wider social processes. But what does it tell us about 
millenarianism itself? Having accepted that apocalyptic ideas are considered alongside 
other dissonance-inducing charismatic claims at Kensington Temple, we are still left 
wondering why they are judged so harshly — why, in a movement with a millenarian 
pedigree, so many church members rejected, overlooked or drastically modified doctrines 
relating to the imminent end of the world.
The basic reason for this, I have argued, is that that millenarian claims offend 
against the common sense rationality of believers. But this assertion raises as many 
questions as it answers. The Pentecostal world accepts many claims that, in the eyes of 
secular observers, cannot withstand close examination. The healing rallies held by Morris 
Cerullo in London in the early 1990s attracted so many allegations of fakery that 
Kensington Temple, which had sponsored them, was effectively disowned by the leaders 
of British evangelicalism (Schaefer, 1999). Yet they were hugely popular with the KT 
membership, and helped to cement Colin Dye’s position as Britain’s paramount 
Pentecostal pastor. Why should worshippers exempt healing claims from detailed rational 
scrutiny while vigorously editing out what they regard as implausible millenarian claims
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from their private cosmologies? One relevant factor is Pentecostalism’s ambivalent 
relationship with End Times theology, which it has borrowed from fundamentalism and 
does not “own” in the way it does the theology of Charismatic healing (Prosser, 1999; 
Poloma, 2001). We should also remember that both the evangelical and the secular 
milieux in Britain are less influenced by apocalyptic tradition than their equivalents in the 
United States. But for a fuller explanation of the marginalisation of apocalyptic belief in 
the church we need to go back to J. Gordon Melton’s observation (2000 [1985]: 147), 
quoted in the Introduction, that supposedly apocalyptic groups in general do not organise 
their daily lives around millennial prophecy — at least, not to the degree that critics and 
scholars assume they do.
The importance of this observation was brought home to me half way through my 
fieldwork. In March 1999,1 visited one of the Amazon outposts of the Israelites of the 
New Universal Covenant, a Peruvian syncretist sect whose founder, Ezequiel Ataucusi 
Gamonal, prophesied the imminent emergence of a millennial kingdom presided over by 
himself in the role of Jewish Messiah and Inca Emperor (Thompson, 1999a, 2001b). 
Most of the ordinary members, however, seemed uninterested in and ignorant of the 
detail of Ezekiel’s apocalyptic timetable. Instead, they told me how they had turned their 
backs on alcohol, drugs and crime, and discovered true joy in an ascetic lifestyle based on 
the Ten Commandments. The evasive quality of their replies to questions about the 
apocalypse — and especially those about 2000, whose eschatological significance had 
once been considerable but was now played down — reminded me of the interviewees at 
Kensington Temple: despite huge differences in theology, demography and geographical 
setting, members of both groups appeared to be marginalising millenarian ideas in 
roughly the same way. The anthropologist Miguel Leatham (1997) encountered a similar 
situation at Nueva Jerusalen, an ostensibly millenarian colony of Catholic sectarians in 
Mexico. The peasants who joined the community were not attracted by the scenario 
outlined by its renegade priest founder, in which Pope Paul VI would soon emerge from 
imprisonment in the Vatican to usher in the end of the world. Their beliefs were 
orientated “not around doctrines, but around an economy of procurement of this worldly- 
benefits, such as improved health, amelioration of social relations and crop protection” * 
(299).
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If Melton is right, and Leatham’s findings point to a more general orientation on the 
part of members of apocalyptic religions, we are faced with a difficult question. Does this 
pragmatic approach reflect a peculiarly modem sensibility, or is it foreshadowed in 
earlier movements? Making direct comparisons between past and present religious 
activity is a hazardous business: supporters and opponents of the secularisation thesis are 
still fighting over records of church attendance from previous centuries in an attempt to 
prove or disprove that Western religiosity has gone into sharp decline.3 The question 
about millenarianism takes us into similar territory: it asks, in effect, whether changes in 
the nature and expression of apocalyptic belief offer support for a version of the 
secularisation thesis.
During the 19th and 20th centuries, leading social theorists believed that religion 
would eventually disappear. Supporters of the secularisation thesis no longer make this 
claim. Their main proposition is more modest: that “modernisation creates problems for 
religion” (Bmce, 2002: 2). According to Bryan Wilson’s statement of the thesis, the 
social significance of religion has declined as its functions have been taken over by non­
religious agencies; there has been a gradual replacement of a specifically religious 
consciousness by “an empirical, rational, instrumental orientation” (1982: 149). There is 
a paradox here, namely that the religious doctrines whose impact has been weakened by 
rationalisation were themselves the product of, and contributed to, the growth of the 
rational mindset that led to secularisation. Peter Berger (1969), developing Max Weber’s 
theories, argued that the process began with the ancient Hebrews, whose one God was 
beyond the reach of magical manipulation and made primarily ethical demands of his 
followers. This incipient secularisation was partly reversed by the devotional practices of 
Catholicism, but gathered pace again when Protestantism restored the concept of ethnical 
rationalisation. Interestingly, millenarianism as a system first emerged among the ancient 
Jews, and was given many of its modem distinguishing features by Protestants. It, too,
3 Stark and Finke, in a chapter of their book Acts o f Faith entitled “Secularisation RIP”, attack what they 
call “the myth of past piety”. They maintain that religious participation in Western Europe was very low, 
centuries before the onset of modernisation: therefore, “claims abut a major decline in religious 
participation in Europe are based on a very exaggerated perceptions of past religiousness (2000: 68). Bruce 
(2002: 58) replies that medieval and early modem people attended church in far greater numbers than their 
modem descendants, and even those who did not go to services exhibited a profoundly supematuralist 
worldview. In my opinion, Bmce makes the stronger case.
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bears some of the hallmarks of emerging rationality. The Jewish apocalyptic genre 
appealed to reason in a way that previous texts had not, presenting its readers with 
mathematical puzzles that did not require the intermediary services of priests. Much the 
same could be said of Protestant apocalyptic theorising; dispensationalism, in particular, 
exhibited the thoroughly secular impulse to assemble a structure that could be “tested” by 
proof texts in the manner of a scientific model. And, in a broader sense, it has been 
argued by some scholars that the millenarian vision of a perfected world gave birth to the 
utopianism that lies behind the modem concept of progress (see Campion, 1994; Bull, 
1995).
But, as I have tried to show, rationality also dismantled the credibility of 
millenarian teachings. The traces of hasty recalculation in the Book of Daniel (Hartman 
and Di Leila, 1990: 419) imply that, from the beginning, the authors of the apocalyptic 
argument had to negotiate their way around the Problem of the End — the tendency of 
the discourse to subvert itself by prophesying things that did not happen. The crucial 
point is that this tendency was, and is, unavoidable. Far from being an accidental flaw in 
the construction of the apocalyptic argument, it constitutes one of its defining qualities. 
The typical apocalyptic statement does not confine itself to prophesying the End: it says, 
“The End is coming and this is the p roo f. The demonstration is provided because the 
listener requires it, but there is no guarantee that he or she will be persuaded, and stay 
persuaded. For that, a plausibility structure — a social base of people who accept the 
argument — must be built and sustained. It must be strong enough to withstand 
discontinuation, and reasonably extensive: one of the features of millenarianism is that it 
offers collective salvation, and if the number of the elect remains tiny then the millenarian 
claim on which their status is based will be undermined.
As Berger points out (1980 [1979]), religious plausibility structures as a whole, let 
alone those that espouse a high-risk charismatic theology, are difficult to sustain in 
modem society. The fragmentation of meaning systems has created an expansion of 
choice in religion — the “heretical imperative”. This expanded choice is not fatal to
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religion; it may even be the source of religious vitality.4 But it does pose special problems 
for the maintenance of orthodoxy, both in mainstream Christianity and in Pentecostalism; 
and it has proved almost fatal for large-scale millenarianism in the industrialised West. 
The story of apocalyptic theology in Europe and, to a lesser extent, America, has been 
one of steadily shrinking plausibility structures: first for predictive millenarianism and 
then for the explanatory variety. As Mclver’s (1999) survey shows, the actual volume of 
millenarian literature has not diminished; what has changed is the influence it commands 
in Western society. Millennial disappointment has had a cumulative effect. The failure of 
the last large-scale outbreak of predictive prophecy belief in the West, that of the 
Millerites, has been seared into the historical memory; evangelical Christians are adamant 
that they will not make the same mistake again. The phenomenon of the “apocalyptic 
cult” is testimony not so much to the potency of millenarian ideas as to the hothouse 
conditions they require if they are to flourish in an unroutinised form — and, even then, 
the focus of cult members is likely to lie elsewhere.
Part of the modem challenge to apocalyptic belief is produced by technology: 
although the multiplication of sources of information makes it easier for the individual to 
construct a customised apocalyptic worldview, the same deluge of data tends to sweep 
away the consensus necessary for the credibility of prophecies of collective salvation. 
Part of the challenge is produced by the way we now think about ourselves. To return to 
an earlier question, there is a peculiarly modem mindset that is shared even by members 
of apocalyptic religions, though it derives ultimately from the exercise of a rationality 
that can be traced back at least as far as the Book of Daniel. The main characteristic of 
this new mindset is its individualism. As doctrinal plausibility structures collapse, and 
people become detached from traditional ties of place and kinship, the search for meaning 
is increasingly bound up with what Anthony Giddens (1991) has called “the reflexive x 
project of the self’. Personal experience becomes the test of authenticity, even (or 
perhaps especially) in high- or medium-tension religious movements. Members of 
Kensington Temple, the Israelites of the New Universal Covenant and Nueva Jerusalen
4 Berger himself no longer believes that modernity will lead to religious decline: in an interview in 1997, he 
said that the argument that secularisation and modernity go hand in hand had been proved “basically 
wrong” by the flourishing of religious faith in many parts of the world (1997: 974).
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are as thoroughly engaged in this project as conventional religious believers: they are 
more concerned with their own spiritual journey than with abstract doctrine.
This is not secularisation as Max Weber envisaged it: he believed that creeping 
rationalisation would eradicate precisely those “magical” elements in religion that thrive 
in modem Pentecostalism; as David Martin observes (1996: 42), many scholars have 
clearly misconstmed the consequences of technical rationality. But, if the essence of 
secularisation is seen as the relocation of religious experience from public life to the 
private sphere, then it is possible to see how rationality, secularisation and charismatic 
religion can comfortably coexist, at least in the short term. James Davison Hunter has 
written about the “narcissism and hedonism” of modem evangelicalism, which finds 
expression not as self-infatuation or vanity but as “a fixation on the potentiality of the 
human being ‘under the lordship of Jesus Christ’ ” (1983: 97). Although this orientation 
towards the self can be seen as a rational response to conditions of modernity, it need not 
involve the application of scientific rationality to religious claims. On the contrary, the 
small-scale miracles of “signs and wonders”, however fragile in the face of empirical 
investigation, provide the quick spiritual benefits that consumers demand in a choice- 
driven marketplace (Wilson, 1996: 27)..
At the same time, however, the gravitational pull of the societal consensus is 
making itself felt in ways that, in the long term, threaten to erode the doctrinal 
foundations of religious belief. In Hunter’s opinion, even conservative evangelical 
Christians are now quietly edging away from teachings that the secular world considers 
preposterous or socially offensive, such as those relating to the eternal punishment of 
non-believers (1987: 40). Something similar is happening at Kensington Temple. As we 
noted at the beginning of this chapter, church members were far more receptive to certain 
high-tension claims, such as those relating to healing miracles or personal prophecy, than 
they were to others, such as those of millenarianism. This preference can be explained by 
secularisation — or, to be more specific, by a particular pattern of secularisation that has 
altered the balance of the costs and benefits of religion as it is perceived by believers. The 
worshippers I interviewed, most of whom were under 40, were profoundly aware of 
societal norms: they responded to them, even if they did not entirely subscribe to them. 
They were not afraid of subcultural deviance — but it helped if it was the right kind of
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deviance, one that did not conflict too dramatically with modem society’s shared values. 
Thus, many of them were (subject to some rational scrutiny) happy to embrace 
Charismatic healing and personal “words of knowledge”, apparently high-tension 
concepts that, in practice, resonated with the secular emphasis on healing, the body and 
personal fulfilment. They were less enthusiastic about doctrines that incurred the extra 
expense of offending against the canons of liberal society. A number of interviewees 
distanced themselves from traditional Pentecostal attitudes towards women; there was 
little support for the historic anti-Catholicism of the Elim movement; and there was 
unease about the prospect of damnation for virtuous non-Christians.
As for millenarian theology, we have seen that, although many members of 
Kensington Temple drew on it as an occasional resource, a majority viewed it as dubious 
or unimportant. Arguably, at some fundamental level, they found it hard to reconcile with 
their own cognitive style, which was closer to that of their secular contemporaries than to 
that of old-fashioned sectarian Elimites — not least in its demand for immediate spiritual 
benefits. The theologian Douglas Davies has suggested that Charismatic Christianity 
abolishes deferred gratification: “An interest in personal salvation remains, but its 
realisation has been brought forward from the hereafter to the here and now” (1984: 144). < 
Millenarianism brings salvation forward to this side of the grave; but the reward, however 
imminent, is nevertheless delayed to some degree, and that runs counter to modem 
priorities. We must not forget, however, that for the average KT member there was a 
more obvious consideration: the fact that, for the most part, other worshippers were not 
millenarians and regarded “prophecy nuts” with suspicion. Apocalyptic teaching received 
little in the way of social reinforcement within the community; the lack of a plausibility 
structure was a cause as well as an effect of the lack of millenarian belief.
My conclusion, therefore, is that secularisation weakens millenarianism in an even 
more direct way than it weakens other forms of religious consensus. The bewildering 
expansion of the spiritual supermarket, coupled with the ancient susceptibility of 
apocalyptic prophecy to disconfirmation and the ever more rapid circulation of the 
information that disconfirms prophecies, makes it hard to envisage a large-scale outbreak 
of classic millenarian excitement in the West; we should certainly not be surprised that 
the year 2000 failed to produce one. On the other hand, just as sociologists no longer
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rashly prophesy the end of religious activity, so we should not predict the disappearance 
of apocalyptic ideas; that would be to invite certain discontinuation. Millenarian 
movements in the developing world may yet have a profound effect on their societies — 
and, in the case of the syncretist Falun Gong sect in China, are already doing so. In the 
West, meanwhile, one possible future for the Christian millenarian tradition is suggested 
by the version of the secularisation thesis put forward by the sociologist James Beckford. 
In Beckford’s view, religion in the West has come adrift from its former points of 
anchorage: instead of operating as a sacred canopy, it serves as a resource to which 
individuals and groups have recourse from time to time, one example being the surge of 
quasi-religious emotion after the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. At a time when 
institutional religion is in decline, the deregulation of religious symbols, meanings and 
values has made it easier for secular society to exploit them (2001: 232). If the imagery of 
mainstream Christianity can be plundered in this way, so, too, can the Judaeo-Christian 
narrative of the end of the world, with its unforgettable images of Rapture, Antichrist, 
Armageddon and Last Judgment. Indeed, the “improvisational millennialism” described 
by Michael Barkun (2003) — the fantastic bricolage of apocalyptic conspiracy theories 
to be found on the Internet — suggests that these symbols are more malleable than ever 
before. But how much significance should we attach to this development? Ideological 
malleability does not lend itself to the construction of strong plausibility structures. In the 
final analysis, the elaboration of apocalyptic themes in cyberspace and popular culture is 
not evidence of a renewal of faith in millennial transformation; rather, it suggests that 
doctrines in which people once devoutly believed are becoming routinised into metaphor 
and entertainment.
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Appendix: Methodology
This study has involved qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection. The 
choice of Kensington Temple for my fieldwork came about by accident: one of my fellow 
students at the London School of Economics was a member of the church, and he invited 
one of its pastors, Larry Grant, to speak to a sociology of religion seminar. Grant agreed 
to approach Colin Dye about the possibility of my conducting interviews at KT, though it 
was several months before permission was granted in the summer of 1998. Dye remained 
an inaccessible figure — I had only one long conversation with him, and that was off the 
record — but his senior assistants, Will Napier and Andrew Kenworthy, cheerfully 
answered my questions and suggested further lines of inquiry. (It was a stroke of luck, 
from my point of view, that Napier then left the church and proceeded to give me an 
uncensored account of life behind the scenes at Kensington Temple.)
My choice of interviewees was dictated partly by considerations of access: Napier 
and Kenworthy both served as head of the Bible college during my fieldwork, and 
essentially threw open its doors to me. I approached other interviewees outside services, 
and paid regular visits to the bookshop, where many customers were happy to talk to me. 
With the exception of Ravi Holy, whose testimony is on the Internet and therefore in the 
public domain, the names of all the ordinary worshippers and staff members in this study 
are pseudonyms; pastors appear under their real names, except for Ron and Sarah 
Tomlinson. Longer interviews were taped and shorter ones recorded in shorthand (I am a 
trained newspaper reporter). I also kept detailed field notes of the services I attended, and 
made extensive use of the tape recordings of sermons provided by the church. As I have 
explained in the thesis, I was careful to include in my interview sample members of the 
different demographic groups represented in the church, but I was not in a position to 
structure it in a way that reflected the precise composition of this large and porous 
community.
Fortunately, Kensington Temple conducts a “census” of its membership every two 
years, and allowed me to insert questions into the 1999 survey. The 2,973 respondents 
included the vast majority of worshippers at KT and Tabernacle Sunday services during
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the month of October; many of these (it is impossible to say how many) also belonged to 
satellite churches. Staff at the Tabernacle were responsible for entering the responses 
onto a database, which they emailed to me in the spring of 2000. Multivariate analysis of 
the data was carried out using the Microsoft Excel program. The text of the questions 
added to page four of the questionnaire was as follows:
A. Place the following in order o f  importance in your personal faith (numbering them
1 to 5, with 1 as the most important and 5 as the least important): Evangelism;
Spiritual Warfare; End Times; Bible Study; Gifts o f  the Holy Spirit; Prayer.
B. When do you think it likely that Jesus Christ will return? Within the next 10 years;
within the next 50 years; not our place to speculate.
C. Have you read books or watched tapes by the following authors? Kenneth Hagin;
Barry Smith; Hal Lindsey; R T Kendall; Grant Jeffrey.1
. D. Do you agree with the following statements?
1. The move towards a single European Currency is a sign o f  the Antichrist
(Agree/disagree/ neither agree nor disagree).
2. The world was created in six 24-hour days, just like the Bible says
(Agree/disagree/ neither agree nor disagree).
3. Supermarket barcodes may contain hidden Satanic information
(Agree/disagree/ neither agree nor disagree).
4. The year 2000 is an important date, marking the beginning o f  the end
(Agree/disagree/ neither agree nor disagree).
1 Smith, Lindsey and Jeffrey are leading prophecy authors, Hagin is a proponent of “health and wealth” 
theology, and Kendall is a leading British evangelical theologian; the last two are not regarded as End 
Times authors. The proportion of respondents who had read each author was as follows: Hagin 41 per cent; 
Smith 23 per cent; Kendall 22 per cent; Jeffrey 15 per cent; and Lindsey 9 per cent. This might imply that 
Hagin’s message of prosperity appeals to book-buyers more than the apocalyptic message of the prophecy 
authors, though other factors such as the number of titles stocked should be taken into account.
234
Glossary
Antichrist: In the fundamentalist Christian tradition, the world leader who will usher in 
the Tribulation and reveal himself as the Satanic “Beast of Revelation”.
Apocalypse: The end of the world, and also the name given to a literary genre containing 
cryptic prophecies of the End.
Apocalypticism: In this study, a synonym for millenarianism.
Charismatic Christianity: A worldwide Christian movement based around the 
restoration of the Pentecostal gifts. It is more middle-class than classic Pentecostalism 
and has a strong presence in the mainstream denominations.
Dispensationalism: A fundamentalist Christian theory which divides history into 
Biblical “dispensations”, the last of which will culminate in the return of Christ.
End Times: In evangelical Christian tradition, the period from the beginning of the 
fulfilment of the Bible’s eschatological prophecies until the dawn of the Millennium. 
Millenarianism: Also known as millennialism, a belief in the imminent end of the 
current world and the dawning of a perfect society on earth.
Millennium: In Christian theology, the thousand-year reign of Jesus and his saints. With 
a lower case “m”, it can signify any post-apocalyptic new world. Also a calendar unit of 
1,000 years.
Pentecostalism: A worldwide Christian movement, with fundamentalist and sectarian 
overtones, based around the restoration of the gifts of Pentecost.
Postmillennialism: The belief that Jesus will return after the Millennium. 
Premillennialism: The belief, held by a majority of conservative evangelicals, that Jesus 
will return to earth before the Millennium.
Rapture: The rising of all true Christians into the air to join the returning Christ. 
Restorationism: The belief, shared by many Pentecostals, that Jesus will restore the 
Church to apostolic purity before his return to earth.
Tribulation: The seven-year tyranny of Antichrist. Evangelicals are divided as to 
whether Christians will be raptured before or after this period; hence the “pre-Trib” and 
“post-Trib” schools of thought.
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